Interview with Miles S. Pendleton

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

MILES S. PENDLETON, JR.

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

Initial interview date: June 22, 1998

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Q: Today is the 22nd of June, 1998. This is an interview with Miles S. Pendleton, Jr. But you're called Kim.

PENDLETON: Right

Q: This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Okay, Kim, let's start. Can you tell me when and where you were born.

PENDLETON: Yes, I was born on March 22nd, 1939, in Montclair, New Jersey, where my father and grandfather had lived. My grandfather built a house there in the early 20th century but worked in New York City.

Q: Can you tell me something about your parents.

PENDLETON: Sure, I think that in many respects they were typical of a certain element of suburbia at that point. My father was a graduate of Andover and Yale after graduation, who had gone on to Cambridge University in England. Then, because it was the depths of the Depression, in '33 he ended up working as an engineer for his father, rather than for

somebody else, in New York City, where the Pan Am building was later built. After World War II, he went to Massachusetts to run a woolen mill in Lowell. The mill was owned by a Canadian firm and we all moved to Andover. The president of the Canadian firm was my father's best friend from his days at Cambridge. So I grew up thinking that Toronto was the capital of the world, and when Toronto called, you saluted - which most Americans don't tend to do.

My mother was adopted by a Virginia farm family when she was about nine years old after a very difficult childhood during which she had never been to school at home along the rural Virginia-West Virginia border. It was a coal mining environment and a difficult family life. She was fortunately adopted by a farm couple, the woman of which - my adoptive grandmother - had been a schoolteacher in New York City. She taught my mother to read and write. My mother eventually went to Sweetbriar College near home in Virginia, where her father was on the board of overseers. Fortunately, they had some wealthy New York relatives who said when she graduated, "You've done so well we're going to give you a car." And she said, "No, I want a truck. I want you to fund me to go to graduate school and learn how to be a social worker." And so she was briefly a social worker, but she made the mistake of meeting my father on a golf course in Quogue, Long Island. My father's family had a summer house in Westhampton Beach, Long Island. They got married, and my mother eventually became a successful real estate agent, but only after we were a kind of "Ozzie and Harriet" family for many years in Montclair and Andover.

Q: You say you were born in '39. Where did you live after New Jersey? You say you moved up to Massachusetts eventually..

PENDLETON: Yes, we moved to Andover, Massachusetts, practically onto the campus of Phillips Academy, where a number of the people who were on the faculty were close friends of my parents, some of them going back to the time when my father was a student there - and also from his class at Yale.

Q: Well, how long did you grow up there?

PENDLETON: We moved there when I was six years old, and the last time I was there was last weekend. However, all our family members have died or moved away from Andover.

Q: So you went there in '45?

PENDLETON: '46, I think. Maybe I had just turned seven. It was right around my birthday.

Q: I took the Summer Session at Andover. I thought that the war was never going to end in the summer of '45. I took a course in physics there in order to get ready to go into the military and get a better job. And then somebody took a rather large experiment in physics(i.e., the atomic bomb(and dropped it, and that ended my having to go into the military. But it's a beautiful campus.

PENDLETON: It is.

Q: Still is?

PENDLETON: I went to the memorial service for my father's closest friend last Sunday, so I saw the campus. It remains one of the most handsome campuses in the nation, with everything from a major art gallery to an archeology museum, along with 1,100 students.

Q: Did you go to Andover?

PENDLETON: I did.

Q: Before you went to Andover, where did you go to school?

PENDLETON: I went to the public schools in Andover. In those days the town was quite small, about 11,000, and the high school wasn't particularly vigorous, although later

it produced Jay Leno. In the (40s and (50s, you tended to know pretty well early on if you were going to head eventually towards the Academy, or - if you were a girl - Abbot Academy. The two academies are now joined. That tended to be a sort of a divider in the community that perhaps wasn't entirely healthy.

Q: While you were in grade school and before you went to the Academy, what were your interests?

PENDLETON: Well, I developed a real interest in sailing early on, and that was in part because my first summer in the town of Andover I got polio, and I spent many months in Children's Hospital in Boston(it was in my neck and back(and then a year of doing exercises to recover, et cetera, with my mother being a trooper about making me do them and guiding me. And I did recover, but while I was away, the baseball team that lasted all the way through ninth grade was formed, and I wasn't in any danger of being on it. The public schools had a sailing program run by some volunteers, and I started doing that. I had a keen interest in hiking, camping, biking, skiing, and tennis - along with a strong interest in reading. I liked to travel, but I never ended up going out of the country other than to Canada until after I graduated from college. So it was in a way a provincial existence on a hill where, because of the Academy, many people tended to have a healthy world-view.

Q: Let's talk a bit about the reading. Can you think of any books that you particularly enjoyed. They don't have to have been seminal books in the world or anything, but any authors or anybody like that?

PENDLETON: Well, I went to libraries frequently, either a Phillips Academy or downtown.

Q: There's a nice little library downtown, because I used to use that, too.

PENDLETON: My tastes were catholic. They were excellent libraries and provided a real feast on open shelves. I read whatever I picked off the shelves that interested me and got

a lot of support from librarians, and I fell into reading a great many historical novels, such as those by Kenneth Roberts-

Q: Oh, yes.

PENDLETON: -which I think helped to interest me in history as a series of events which were not very far removed, if you can call history a series of events.

Q: Particularly Kenneth Roberts, who focused on the New England side of the Revolutionary War or the period just prior to it.

PENDLETON: Right.

Q: I was wondering, just on an aside, I was interviewing a former security advisor, Anthony Lake, and he was talking about one of the authors that really intrigued him was a man named Lamson, who wrote books about Swallows and Amazons, and I was thinking, if you were into sailing, did you read those?

PENDLETON: Not until I married my wife. She had not only read them all but seemed to have committed them to memory, and our children were brought up on them. But I didn't read them. I read a great deal that was non-fiction about sailing and gained a particular interest in the Americas Cup, for instance, and the J class boats that raced for the Cup in the (30s. Books on piloting seamanship and small-boat handling and that sort of thing I would read by the hour and then study, in that you had to master things I didn't know I'd ever get a chance to use. But it was fun to think about.

I also became addicted to the National Geographic Magazine and for years read an article or two every night before going to sleep. An aunt gave me a subscription for Christmas when I was 10. Soon thereafter, a neighbor gave me his collection of almost every copy of the magazine going back to 1911. My parents were aghast. The house under my room

probably should have been reinforced. But I am certain that reading them constantly opened me up to the wonders of the wider world.

Q: Well, at Andover, can you talk a bit about the system there and the education because while we're doing these interviews, although they're foreign-affairs-focused, I try to pick up some social history and all that. I think it will be interesting.

PENDLETON: You mean at-

Q: At a school, at Andover, during your time there. You were there from when to when?

PENDLETON: I entered Phillips Academy in (53 as a day student and graduated in the class of '57 having boarded my senior year. I was there ninth grade through 12th grade, and probably there is a question as to whether I should have been there. Fortunately, Spike Adriance, the dean of admissions, was my father(s closest friend. I also bless Doc Howe, who later became U.S. Commissioner of Education, for my acceptance. He was my junior high school principal. Doc said to the admissions committee - they wrote on a card, which was much later shared with me, "Doc says he can do it." And that was nice to know, because I think there was a great deal of skepticism amongst my Phillips Academy teachers at the outset. It was really very hard academically, and I had never been in with people who were so manifestly bright - along with teachers who had standards which they weren't going to flex. I suspect if I couldn't have run home between classes at the outset, I probably wouldn't have made it through that institution. At the end of four years I had grown, as one hopes one does in a high school, year by year. My senior year I had three courses which were really lifetime-informing, in a sense. One was a religion class with William Sloane Coffin, Jr., who went on to be chaplain at Yale when I was there and, among a host of other things, a freedom bus rider. He had gone to help teach at an Outward Bound school in Wales and had been in the Army at a young age. He challenged us tremendously. Also during Thanksgiving break senior year, he married the daughter of the pianist Artur Rubinstein, and she would come to class and the two of them would

play the piano and sing and then challenge each other in front of us. It was one of those rollicking things you are exposed to only rarely. And an English class that was superb and an American history class with a fellow named Fritz Allis, who was certainly one of the best teachers anybody could hope to have. These all went together and my grades went way, way up and I was able to think of going to Yale.

In those days it was very easy, as a point of sociological note, to get into Ivy League colleges from a school like Andover. They were big on legacies. My father and uncle had gone to Yale. I recall when I was lining up to get my (college counseling(from a rotund classics teacher named Porky Benton, who was a great football coach, he said to me, "Well, where do you want to go?" And I said, "Yale, Sir." And he said, "Are you in the top half of the class?" I said, "No, Sir." He said, "Well, you need a fallback. Go away and think about it and come back tomorrow." The next day I stood in the line, and he said, "Well, have you decided?" I said, "Yes, Princeton, Sir." And he said, "Fine," and wrote down Princeton as my fallback. They both admitted me. And I didn't apply to any others. So that was, shall we say, an earlier generation.

Q: Absolutely. I went to Williams, and I came out of a prep school. You could do that, and rightly so. I think the education, there was a real divide. At Yale(you were at Yale I guess '57 to '61(were you pointing towards anything when you went there or just going to Yale?

PENDLETON: I was largely going to Yale, and I studied history, which was one of Yale's great strengths. However, I was not particularly pointed in any given direction. I was increasingly interested in what was going on overseas. Ghana had become independent, for instance, when I was a senior at Andover, and that has a place later in this recounting, in the sense that I went to teach there.

But at Yale two things happened. One, my father lost his job just before I entered freshman year, so I had to work and get a partial scholarship, as did my brother, who came two years behind me. I became determined to do my bit by working excessively

hard and, indeed, graduated magna and Phi Beta Kappa. I was fascinated by the courses, and I probably tended to study too much and contribute too little in other areas. Hard work generally stood me, in a sense, in good stead, but it's also perhaps the way I approach things - by throwing myself at them without the breadth or sense of humor that might be advisable when you have a chance to do something like go to Yale. In the summer, I earned a lot of money running the sailing program at a yacht club on Long Island, and that helped get me outside and preserve my overall sense of balance.

Q: At Yale, did you concentrate(you say it was history(was it any particular history or was it a pretty broad sweep?

PENDLETON: Well, it fell increasingly into almost a sociological history. One of the best courses I took was on immigration into the U.S., and one of the best things it did was throw me in with folks at Yale whose families were much more recent arrivals in this country than my father(s at least. Yale in that period at the end of the '50s was not a very diverse institution. It is remarkably diverse now. First of all, it had no women, of course. We had only a handful of blacks in a class of 1010, which is shocking. There was a known quota on Jews at that point, and a lot of people could go through Yale without the chance to meet, know, and understand people from a very different background. That(s one of the things that I regret about my Yale experience. But that has perhaps been remedied in spades.

Q: Did foreign affairs loom at all in your radar?

PENDLETON: Well, it was funny, I read a lot. I had never been to Europe or anyplace overseas, as I mentioned before, other than to camp in Canada. And yet I had a real interest in the world, but I'd never really been able to exercise it. I had had each summer to make a lot of money to help pay the tuition, and the way I could make money best, as I mentioned previously, was teaching, running sailing programs at reasonably hoity-toity camps and yacht clubs. So my world was fairly circumscribed. One thing I was determined

to do when I finished Yale was not to simply go back and be a prep-school teacher, and I was lucky enough to be given a grant that allowed me to go to Europe for a year to do anything I wanted. And that was a great boon, but I had also decided before that happened that I would go teach school in Ghana under something called Yale Men Abroad in conjunction with the African-American Institute in New York. About 12 of my classmates, including, for instance, our present ambassador to Zaire, Dan Simpson, and our former ambassador to Sierra Leone and to the Geneva trade negotiations, Mike Samuels, went to West Africa. Dan and Mike to Nigeria, me to Ghana, and others elsewhere. So that after Yale I spent three years overseas, which helped to make up for a lack of such adventures in the preceding years.

Q: I guess it would be the beginning of your senior year at Yale, the election of 1960 came along. Did this catch you at all, I mean some of the spirit of this particularly? Both Presidential candidates were younger. I mean, it seemed to be a new generation coming on board.

PENDLETON: It did not, to my regret. I caught up with me when I was in Europe, and I got very excited about Kennedy, but I voted for Nixon. I voted for Nixon in a kind of knee-jerk way, coming from quite a staunch Republican family. It was the first opportunity to vote, and I have regretted what I did since, although I don't think that Mr. Kennedy at that point seemed to me to have the experience that I thought our leaders should have in order to run the nation.

Q: Well, you got this stipend to go abroad after you graduated in 1961, to Europe. Where did you go?

PENDLETON: The first thing I did was to fly over to the UK, but actually I went to Scotland and hitchhiked all over Scotland. Then I went over and hitchhiked through Sweden, Finland, up along the north end of the Sea of Bothnia over to Norway and down, having many adventures along the way, visiting a castle where my father had stayed in the

summer of '28 with the same woman as host. She was then 101 and was able to tell me about her grandfather, George Bancroft, the great historian, talking with his grandfather about the American Revolution. She was the only person I ever met who covered the entire sweep of U.S. history back to the founding of the nation.

When I was in Finland, the Berlin Wall went up, and I decided to go down and see it, and went to East Berlin and became rather horrified by this token of Communism at its worst. I ended up during the year studying French in Paris for a period of time; teaching at an Outward Bound school in Aberdovey, Wales, the first Outward Bound school ever founded, which Bill Coffin had steered me in the direction of; and ended up in the spring in Spain and Italy, Greece, up through Yugoslavia, back(it was one of those remarkably footloose years that was, in a way, life-forming, but in another way, pretty devoid of focus. I don't regret any of it.

Q: I know. This, of course, was at a time when Americans, lots of them, and youth of all countries were on their Wanderjahre, I would say much more than today. You were out and were able to hitchhike and move around and be well accepted. Was there any drug scene at that time, or was that a different?

PENDLETON: There was a minor drug scene and perhaps a major naivete on my part. I had never smoked even cigarettes. I liked to drink beer and wine, but drugs just were totally not part of my agenda. And so the old question of "did you inhale?" didn't even come up. And it wasn't until I was a freshman proctor later while in graduate school in Harvard that I became really aware of what was happening vis-#-vis drugs.

Q: Well, it was a time of a certain amount of innocence, but of course, nasty things were happening, particularly in the Soviet Union and its satellites. Did that exposure to communism sort of leave a residue within you.

PENDLETON: Yes, it did, and it made me more anti-communist and conservative than a fair number of my colleagues. That was partly my upbringing and my exposure, brief

as if was. And I tended, when I later got to Ghana to teach, to be quite impatient with the inroads that the Soviets were making in terms of propaganda in Africa, the impact they had on students. One of my colleagues wrote me recently and said, "You were incredibly idealistic in those days and couldn't bear to see your country put in second place," which often seemed to be the threat in West Africa, when my real job was not ideological at all(it was to teach kids. Anyway, I'm jumping ahead.

Q: Well, after this '61-'62 Wanderjahr, what?

PENDLETON: Well, I went home to Andover for the summer and then traveled to Hershey, Pennsylvania, for a training program for teaching in West Africa, and I went to Ghana late that August.

Q: How was this training program? What was your impression of how this one worked?

PENDLETON: The training program for the African-American Institute was not of any particular utility. It was run by a very small provincial college in Hershey, Pennsylvania, which had somehow gotten a contract to run a training program. It was not able to attract instructors, it seemed to me at the time and still does, who could give one a real insight into the societies into which we were going or the kind of cultural experiences we would be facing. The session was relatively brief, and it was innocuous and allowed us to meet each other, those who were going to West Africa - and potentially to found friendships that would allow you to visit each other later. But I wouldn't call that one of the highlights of my academic career.

Q: How did you end up with Ghana?

PENDLETON: Well, Ghana, as I mentioned before, had become independent when I was a senior at Andover, and it had captured my imagination much more than Nigeria and Sierra Leone, which were the other two English-speaking West African countries that were part of the program. And there was no doubt in my mind(I mean, I had been reading about

Ghana, not with a great passion(that if I went to West Africa, I would like to go to Ghana. And I'm glad I did.

Q: Well, you were in Ghana from when to when?

PENDLETON: I was in Ghana from '62 to '64.

Q: Were you in a particular place?

PENDLETON: The first year I was teaching at a school called Ghana Secondary School Koforidua, which was in a town 50 miles north of Accra, and I shared a house in the bush, at the outset, with a Peace Corps volunteer under rather unpleasant conditions. I eventually managed to become very ill and was hospitalized for over a month. The second year I was moved to Adisadel College, Cape Coast, on the coast, where the environment was considered more salubrious. In both places, I taught English and history and a little French, which was slightly a laugh, but I could keep well ahead of the students. I would say that in Koforidua, one of the interesting things was that I met a Czech couple and we have remained friends to this day. I visited them a number of times in what is now the Czech Republic, and they've visited us in Paris and Washington. I arranged a fellowship for him to come to Johns Hopkins for training in surgery and he's now dean of the Charles Medical School in Pilsen.

We also had the inevitable jungle experiences, such as being attacked by ants, which ate all the chickens and goats caged and tethered behind our house. I managed to escape, as did my housemate. But the thing that struck me I think the most in Ghana was the excellence of the educational system and the superb teachers, Ghanaian and from all over the world. I also worked for excellent headmasters. Ghanaians are great fun as people, and while that country's had its ups and downs, I have more faith in it than in a lot of countries.

Q: When you went there, what were you expecting from Ghana, particularly I'm thinking of Nkrumah and the system there, and how did that match with reality?

PENDLETON: I didn(t quite expect to be so involved psychologically as I tended to become on occasion with the impact that Nkrumah could have on people who were considered his enemies. But as you started teaching kids and you saw them in the morning weeping because there was a picture of their father upside-down in the newspaper - which meant that Nkrumah's people probably would kill him, or at least imprison him by the end of the day - you became quite impatient(or I did(with Kwame Nkrumah. Whatever he wanted to do for Africa as a whole, he certainly betrayed a great many of his own people in the process. And I found that very hard to take and not comment on, at least indirectly. I tried to keep politics out of my classrooms, however.

Q: When you're teaching history, what type of history were you teaching?

PENDLETON: I taught two sorts of history. One was European history, and that was required in order to pass the O-level and A-level exams, which were all corrected in England in those days, leaving the poor students to grapple with questions such as "Which side of the tree does moss grow on?" And of course in their country it grows on all sides, but they had to know that whoever was sitting in Leeds and correcting it would say the south side. Or, for example, all my students told me on one exam that the reason that some of the German princes supported Martin Luther was that in those days it "cost a lot of money to fly to Rome," whereas the textbook said that the Pope had "caused a lot of money to flow to Rome." So the students and teachers were dealing with both an alien history and an alien language in many cases. While many of these kids survived and triumphed and went on to great heights, that was part of the battle.

We also taught West African history, which I found fascinating and for which there was a tremendous thirst among the students. But of course, a lot of the history was not solidly based at that point. People were just beginning to try to untangle what had happened

before the arrival of the Europeans, and one had to deal with some of the truths about slavery, which were very hard for kids to digest and are hard for adults to digest, wherever you live, on this side or over there.

It was a challenge. The number of students was a great challenge. We were teaching maybe six, seven, eight classes a day with 40 to 50 kids in a class, even at some of the best schools. If you gave everyone a writing assignment only once a week you were up to midnight(often over a candle in the first school I was at because we didn't have electricity in the house(trying to correct these things, with the bugs landing all over the papers. It was no fun.

Q: Did you find both of these servings of history, of Europe and of West Africa, highly political, and was the government's hand rather strong there at that point?

PENDLETON: There were attempts, but what everybody wanted to do was to get his or her A-levels and O-levels, and in a way, you could say that the dead hand of the former colonialists was as much in evidence as that of the government. And you couldn't, in a sense, blame the government for wanting to have an independent country(it was no longer the Gold Coast(with standards that they set. The kids were frantic if you varied much from the syllabus, frantic about not being able to get the kind of license that they would need to go on to university, which they wanted to do. So the government was always present, and it was not nice. There were strong Marxist elements. Nevertheless, there were people like Conor Cruise O'Brien, who was the vice chancellor of the University of Ghana, appointed by Nkrumah but who spoke out vigorously, as is his wont, against any intrusion into the intellectual process. And of course, Nkrumah(s people were after O(Brien in a big way, and that was cautionary to some of us minor munchkins running around, that you had to be aware that your words had consequence, and you had to be willing to say good-bye.

One thing that did happen to me in Ghana was that I did get a combination of malaria, typhus, and dengue and went into a coma and spent, really, six weeks in the hospital,

which is why I was moved from the interior to the coast by the Ministry of Education. I think it really screwed up my immune system, which had some impact on me and my career downstream.

Q: You mentioned the students. Were they from any particular class or tribe?

PENDLETON: Adisadel College was a classic Anglican-based school founded in the 1840s with quite a history of being a first-class institution. It was not considered the best school in Ghana, but it was right up there, and its motto was Vel primus, vel cum primes("Either the best, or with the best" (which I thought was a reasonable approach. A lot of the kids there tended to come from more affluent families, and from the south, either Ga from around Accra, Fanti from around Cape Coast, or Ashanti from the great central Ghanian tribe that Lord Baden-Powell, the founder of the Boy Scouts, managed to subjugate in the 1890s.

And at the first school I was at, the kids were more rural and often came from more traditional villages and often from quite far away(anything to get an education. As students, they were all elitist by nature, and when the faculty thought it would be a super idea to plant trees on the new compound, it was almost impossible to get the kids to help plant. They wanted to break away from being agriculturalists, and they couldn't imagine why people with master's degrees and Ph.D.s and B.S.s and all were out there in the hot noonday sun lugging tree seedlings around and planting them. I went back there years later and stood under the trees we planted and admonished them and said, "I hope that your generation is more willing to do this than were your predecessors, because you benefit from the shade that is now provided for you."

Q: Did you at all feel that your effort was in competition with the Soviet Union's effort there, or did that not intrude on what you were doing in Ghana?

PENDLETON: Well, the Soviets actually had an AID program in Ghana that was very small, but they had a few teachers and others I met one of them in Cape Coast and

later had lunch with him in Moscow in 1964. That was interesting in itself; finding him in Moscow proved to be a challenge. When I did, he was very hospitable. But in a way, for some funny, odd reasons, we were equally aware of the Chinese, who were quite active in Ghana. There was a book written by a student who attended another school in Cape Coast that I could see out the window of my classroom. He had gone on to Beijing and then wrote about his experience in China, which was not a very happy one. But there was a tremendous amount of Soviet and Chinese propaganda that floated around, and I perhaps took it too seriously. It just seemed to me that these were systems that were not going to last, and which had no monopoly on virtue. Nevertheless, they managed to project themselves as being the way ahead, which people would take seriously in a former colony(and rightly so. Ghanaians had every right to try to plot a new course. And I personally liked this less than I should have and wanted to discuss privately how much bull this was with people. I'm not sure I would do it the same way now, but I think historically some of my concerns proved to be correct, and some of my fears were perhaps misplaced.

Q: You're up till 12 at night correcting papers. What about the social life? I'm told the people of Ghana are really delightful people.

PENDLETON: They are, and social life was a little complex, because in the cities, you could go out dancing and dance the high life and be in an environment which was very casual and where Americans and Canadians would feel very much at home with Ghanaians. In the countryside you would probably not be invited much of anyplace, so that your social interaction would revolve around the institution to which you were affiliated, and that had a kind of hierarchical aspect to it -the way it would in any institution when the dean invites his subordinates for dinner or whatever we've all been through many times. There was, I think, an understandable tendency on the part of young Americans in the Peace Corps(it started there before I got to Ghana, although I had signed on to go to Ghana before the Peace Corps was founded. So there were quite a few young Americans running around teaching(very able people. Ghana was one of the first programs, and it

scooped up for the Peace Corps a group of young people who really had to decide very suddenly to drop everything and go do this. And by and large, these were people who had a certain amount of guts and a certain amount of willingness to move quickly, and I found them very impressive. There was a tendency on weekends to want to go to Accra and get together with others from your own country and share experiences and find out how to teach a subject better or what to do when the students gang up on you. There was the normal human desire to interact. My rapport with Ghanaians, who often were my bosses and older than me, was fairly formal. My rapport with students was relatively informal, for better or for worse, compared to the way the British handled it, and sometimes that worked very well, and sometimes it was dangerous.

Q: How would it be dangerous?

PENDLETON: Good question. The students would almost instantly expect that somehow you could give them a scholarship to the States, and you would be under quite a bit of pressure to produce things which you couldn't produce. Now there were things that you could produce. For the first school, they had no library to speak of, so I wrote to Phillips Academy in Andover, and they had a book drive led by Jeff McNelly, one of my former sailing students. He later won two Pulitzer prizes for his cartoons. They shipped out about 8,000 books, which was a tremendous help. One student at the school whom I'd known at Andover, Jeff McNelly, who's won two Pulitzer Prizes for his cartoons, said, "I just went around to the desks of my classmates and poured the entire contents of the desks in the box and sent them to you." We were able to do that sort of thing, but on the other hand, I met an Anglican minister at my second posting who desperately (I thought) wanted to study in the United States, and I arranged a full scholarship for him at the General Theological Seminary in New York. And just before he was about to go, he decided, no, he didn't think he could survive in New York, and so he didn't go. I had been working so hard on this it was one of those knocks in life that you just have to learn to live with. It was

probably in a way good for me he didn't go, but I'm not sure it was good for him or good for Ghana or good for God. But there you are.

Q: Well, what about here you have a new nation which had ambivalent feelings toward the mother country, Great Britain. You have a President who was educated partly in the United States, Nkrumah, and yet you were running a sort of an old-line school with the line going back to the United Kingdom for marking and for moving up, and here you were a brash American teaching there. Was there an American-British conflict in the schools?

PENDLETON: No, this would only have come up in the second school I was at, Adisadel College, Cape Coast. I shared a house with two young Brits who were on sort of UK Peace Corps program, one out of Oxford and the other out of Cambridge, one teaching biology and the other teaching chemistry and physics. I've known them ever since. And we got along just fine. There were some superb Canadians on the CUSO program, Canadian University Service Overseas, one of whom, David Godfrey, had had one of his short stories published in The Best American Short Stories of 1962. He also founded a student jazz band. I think the Ghanaian teachers recognized that those who were teaching who were younger were quite an extraordinary group, and if anything, there was perhaps a bit of generational problem amongst the foreigners from those, particularly Brits, who were older and found this infusion of 22-year-olds a little bit hard to take after they had spent, in many cases, a good hunk of a professional lifetime teaching at these schools. That struck me as being similar to what could happen in many institutions, and I didn't in any way find US-Canadian or US-British or other hostility. The few younger teachers we met from other countries, if they were dedicated teachers, were respected as being serious at their craft if, like us, inexperienced. Enthusiasm can go a long way.

Q: Oh, yes.

PENDLETON: Teachers who've been teaching in the heat a long time don't stay up till midnight correcting papers, I can assure you. They're entirely too wise.

Q: Did you travel around Ghana and West Africa at all?

PENDLETON: Yes, on one vacation I went to Nigeria by plane since the border was closed with Togo. I took the train from Lagos all the way up to Kano in the Muslim North and then went to the old hill station at Jos, where the Brits went when they couldn't get home during World War II. I also visited Kaduna and Ibaden. During the Christmas holidays in 1963, some twenty of us — Americans, Canadians and Brits — went overland to Timbuktu in Mali by motorcycle, goods lorry and small river barge from the Niger River. We didn't eat well. Some got really sick. Returning from Timbuktu via Niger and Upper Volta was not easy, and when we arrived at the border with Ghana where my British housemate's motorcycle was stored (it wouldn't go in the sand of the roads in Upper Volta), we found the border closed because of an assassination attempt on Nkrumah. We had to cross by a hidden path ("the small, small Way") and ride nonstop to the sea — no food, no sleep. It was cold, and we arrived a day after school had opened. Our headmaster was furious.

Q: Did you have any contact with or any interest in the American diplomatic representation in Ghana at that point?

PENDLETON: No, oddly enough, given what happened to me in the future. I went in the Embassy once or twice. I think I was more interested in the Embassy building, which was a handsome structure up on stilts. Now when Nkrumah unleashed his demonstrators, the poor folk working in the Embassy, were trapped upstairs, because there was only one flight of stairs down, and they had an unhappy time on occasion. I went once to a beach house on a weekend with some people from the Embassy, and I hardly found out who they were. I was much more interested in teaching, and yet, at the same time became more intrigued than I had been about the nation of representing my own country abroad.

When it was coming time to leave Ghana, I knew I wanted to continue working overseas, but I knew I did not wish to work for another government, and the notion of working for our

own became more attractive to me. But for some reason I didn't go and put in my oar with the folks in the Embassy and try to find out how they saw life in the Foreign Service. I was applying for law school at that point, and I can remember on the Harvard Law application being asked, "Do you plan to practice law?" and I wrote "No," which was perhaps a stupid thing to do, but they accepted me anyway. Basically, I had as little contact with the diplomatic corps as I think one could probably imagine having in such a small country where you're living for a couple of years.

Q: Well, then, you left there in '64, and you'd applied for law. What does this mean, or why law?

PENDLETON: It meant that, like so many Americans, I knew that law could allow a great deal of flexibility in what you did in the future in the United States or overseas. But I also knew that I was increasingly interested in Africa and in development. And I was a bit torn between places like the Woodrow Wilson School in Princeton and SAIS and Littauer at Harvard and stuff, but I decided that if I had law school under my belt, it would be really a useful thing no matter what I might do with my life. I thought I could study development later and approach it differently. At the same time, I happened to get a Ford Foundation fellowship in International Development(I mean, I applied for it, but I got it(and was going to use it at law school and did, which didn(t make them too happy because they were afraid that I'd end up on Wall Street or something — which I knew I wouldn't. I went to law school at Harvard for one term.

Q: One term.

PENDLETON: Right.

Q: Could you give me your impression of it and then say why it was one term.

PENDLETON: Well, The Paper Chase is right.

Q: There was a book and then a television series, movie too, called The Paper Chase, that you refer to.

PENDLETON: Right. The Paper Chase was right. Well in the end I decided it was easier to marry a lawyer than be one, and I did marry one of my Harvard classmate, Elisabeth Morgan. She is my best friend, and we have been married ever since. I think a couple of things struck me at Harvard. One is that when I had filled out the application and written in, "No, I don't want to be a lawyer," that was quite correct, and I had felt whatever I'd done in Africa was really quite useful and fulfilling. I found law school to be intellectually fascinating, a bit overwhelming, but not on target in terms of what I had just been doing. And I also was in terrible shape physically when I arrived back in the country. I now weigh 220; at that point I weighed 110. All the illness and the heat had knocked me really off my pinions, and when I was at law school, I couldn't even make my bed without shaking, which had nothing to do with whether the teachers were screaming at me. I went home over Christmas and just decided, this is silly, it's not what I want to do, I'm much more interested in overseas work and developing countries. And I went to see the folks at Littauer who said, "By all means, come and join us." Littauer is now the Kennedy School of Government.

Q: Littauer was then what? A school of government.

PENDLETON: It was the Littauer School of Public Administration. The State Department and other agencies sent people there for mid-career training, and it wasn't much of a separate entity. It basically had some courses, and people took courses throughout the Harvard system. And they were nice enough to allow me to transfer in. I took the mock law exams for some psychological reason at the Law School on January 15 and started at Littauer on the 17th. I didn(t want to just walk away from what I'd been exposed to without kind of putting a punctuation mark on my mind. That was perhaps a bit silly. But I did fine.

Q: Was it the Kennedy School when you were there?

PENDLETON: Well, as I recall, it was just called Littauer. It later changed its name to the Kennedy School.

Q: You were there from when to when?

PENDLETON: Well, I was actually at Littauer for quite a long while because when I was there, I applied to join the Foreign Service and there was that whole, lengthy process. Also, because I had not worked for the government I had to do a two-year masters in public administration program, as against, say, folks going from being mid-career civil servants and Foreign Service Officers who would do nine months. So I was there until the summer of 1967, when I joined the Foreign Service — that was '64 to '67. I was happy to dawdle because I was fortunate enough to become a proctor for Harvard freshmen and have free room and board in Harvard Yard. I had a nice suite of rooms, and then we took a lot of our meals(the proctors did with the students(in the Harvard Freshman Union. The proctors were a fantastically able group of people. I'd never met such an able group. A fellow you wouldn't have paid too much attention to, but whom I liked very much, for instance, was among the proctors, David Souter, who's now a Supreme Court Justice. Among the students I remember an amiable, polite southern-seeming young man named Al Gore from Washington. You couldn't have a conversation with student or proctor alike that wasn't just very interesting, and perhaps more interesting for me than chatting with the mid-level bureaucrats who came for training at Littauer and with whom I didn't feel any particular identity of experience because I'd never worked for the government.

Q: Well, what did the proctors do?

PENDLETON: The proctors were supposed to be "moral tutors," but they did two things. They lived in the dorm and were supposed to be supportive of the students in time of need and to guide them in time when there wasn't need. That was where I had my first exposure, really, to the impact of the introduction of pot, in particular, to an environment. The proctors were also supposed to act as student academic advisors and work with the

students on choosing the best courses for their particular interests, keeping in mind the requirements that Harvard had that undergraduates get exposure to a breadth of courses. We were supposed to interact usefully with the students and I think most people did. Proctors all found it a very rewarding experience. In fact, when AI Gore's class had its 25th reunion, that class invited all the proctors to come back, as part of the reunion weekend, which I thought was interesting and generous.

Q: Did you have any particular problems with students that you can think of that come to mind?

PENDLETON: In general, I was singularly impressed by the students, and the only time that I had any particular problem was that Harvard inevitably, like most fine institutions, has some awful bright kids who shouldn't be there because they were not psychologically capable of coping with it. I had in my entry one kid who arrived with a very strong phobia against microbes, and he never was able, for instance, to pick up a telephone without wiping it off with alcohol in advance. One night a knock came on my door, and he was there with his wrists slashed, and he fell upon me. Fortunately, he hadn't been very aggressive about it, but he was trying to send a message that he needed help. Well, he was wise enough to come to somebody who would pay attention. And that's why proctors were in the dormitories.

In general, it was the Vietnam era, and what you saw was the beginning of the lottery. You saw people beginning really to worry about whether they were going to end up in Vietnam. And that was one undercurrent. Drugs were another undercurrent. And also, Harvard for the first time was beginning to have a cohort of black students, enough to band together and sit at the same tables, as you find now in almost every college and university — with something of an exclusionary sentiment. Having lived among people who were black the previous two years, sometimes found hard to digest this attitude when it was made clear that I would not be welcome to sit at such a table. There were those sorts of changes, and yet all in all, I'm very glad that I was able to have that experience.

The Academics were not as good as I had been used to at Yale. I found that the lecture courses were bigger. A seminar(I took Kissinger's "seminar" on strategy(he had Al Haig as his sidekick correcting papers, if I recall correctly — had almost 200 people in it. In my naivete, I thought it would be like Yale, where a seminar, by definition, could have no more than 12. And, you know, I learned something about how too big an institution can be too big, but at the same time you had exposure to wonderful people in the classroom, both professors, guests, and students.

Q: Was it during this time that you were getting ready to get married, and all that?

PENDLETON: Well, I think, psychologically, but my wife and I really didn't run into each other in any permanent way till very close to the end of her Harvard Law School career and my career at the Littauer School. And we decided to get married, I would say, rather spontaneously. I'm a fellow who will, you know, go to Consumer Reports and decide which can of tuna fish may be the better deal, and yet I don't think we approached marriage quite the same way. But we were correct in our judgements of each other. We're still together after 31 years.

Q: What got you pointed toward the Foreign Service?

PENDLETON: Well, it's hard to say, but I did come back from Ghana, as I mentioned, with a strong feeling that if I had to put up with a lot of crap from another government, or from a government as an employer, I would rather it be mine than somebody else's. And I had never really thought about other ways that might take me back overseas(banking, corporations, whatever. I wasn't unmindful of them, but I think I had — perhaps from watching my father lose his job on occasion — a sense that I would rather join a bureaucracy where I incorrectly thought you could work till you were 65 if you kept your nose clean. What I didn't know was that if you got promoted too fast you'd be unemployed long before 65, which is probably the reason I'm sitting here. But I was comfortable with the notion of a large hierarchical organization. I knew that I cared about the United States

and that I could represent it with a full measure of enthusiasm and, in a way, had already been doing so. So the Foreign Service seemed quite attractive to me, although I had not really known people in the Foreign Service. I had met various people who, I have to say, were often the remnants of the '20s and '30s who seemed a bit fuddy-duddy to me. Certainly it wasn't an organization that seemed to be particularly diverse, but it was an organization I thought I could understand and to which I could make a contribution. At any rate, I applied. I took the written exam and the oral exam, and as you get into the process you begin to pay more attention to what might be involved.

I decided to try it out, and it turned out that my fianc#e's father had been a British diplomat. She had thought of applying for the Foreign Service but hadn't. Her grandfather had been an appointed US Ambassador in Mexico in the '20s, and she'd grown up in a family where certainly being a diplomat(in perhaps more of a traditional way than we would think of a Foreign Service officer(was something that was integral to her experience and existence. So the Foreign Service initially worked as a notion for both of us.

Q: We're talking about '67 or so, and the Vietnam thing is cranking up. Did this impact on you as far as student protests, and "Don't work for the government(the government's the enemy," and all that sort of thing.

PENDLETON: You know, I tended to not consider the government the enemy. I might have a couple of years later, but I don't think so. It just wasn't part of the warp and woof of my being to any extent. I had too much faith in the government, although I had learned some shocking things along the way, such as FBI intrusions into the lives of private citizens. In terms of did I join the Foreign Service so as not to go to Vietnam(which isn't part of your question, necessarily(what had happened was that when I came back from Ghana, I was called for military service and I had my physical. The doctor said, "Son, your weight is way below our guidelines for a person who's six-feet-one. You've got to go to Florida and lie on the beach and drink malted milks." And there wasn't a question at that point of drafting me. My brother was drafted one day before his 26th birthday and spent

four years in JAG. He'd gone to Yale Law School and was a law clerk after that, with a wife and child. As for me, when I told the Secretary of our draft board in Andover that I planned to join the US Foreign Service, she told me sternly, "Don't join that foreign army. It will cost you your citizenship."

Q: JAG being(

PENDLETON: Judge Advocate General Corps, lawyers in the military. And I was increasingly preoccupied with Vietnam but very anxious to think that we were doing the right thing. Increasingly I could see that the students — particularly after the threat of no more escape through graduate school and being subject to a lottery, were increasingly agitated about what we were getting into in Vietnam(what we were into, had been for many years by then.

Q: Do you remember anything from the oral exam?

PENDLETON: I remember my wife's oral exam better, and we can return to that because it was a cultural lesson of sexism. But I think that the oral exam for me was easier in some ways than the written exam, where I felt that to answer correctly a lot of the questions on the written exam you had to say to yourself, "Oh, Jeez, whoever wrote that question studied under X at the University of Chicago in the '50s or Y at Berkeley in the '60s," and that didn't come easy to me. I had had too much education by then. The oral exam was more manageable. I'd read quite eclectically and felt more at ease. I was counseled after the exam that I would have to learn to be more succinct in my answers if I wished to survive as a Foreign Service Officer, but that they would like me to be a Foreign Service Officer, and it wasn't a particular trauma, basically.

Q: Did your wife take the exam later on?

PENDLETON: She took the exam when we were in Burundi in 1972. When we were in Burundi, she decided that she would like to try to join USIS and that we'd try to become

what is now called a "tandem couple." She took the written exam. She actually studied for it, got out all her old math books and everything, and she just absolutely aced it. She's a brilliant woman, and very numerate and also an English major and a lawyer, and when we got back from Burundi and before I started working in the Op Center, she was called for her oral exam. And she came out of it and she was annoyed. They had wanted an indication of her "creativity". She had written some articles and stuff like that, and they were all in our sea freight. But she came out of the oral exam, and said that "they're not going to have me. They just don't want a wife, I can tell." They claimed that she "did not have adequate sensitivity, among many other things, to different sorts of people in the world," including people of color, and she said, "You know, we just went through the massacres of Burundi," where we hid our gardener in our house for several weeks before he went out and escaped and killed his mother. She had been living through things that I know none of those people had lived through. Later I ran into a State Department official, high-ranking, in the basement of the State Department who was seconded to USIA at that point. We had met him in Africa. He said to me, "Tell your wife to find a job in a law firm. They are not going to have a working couple. They are not going to have a woman who is married to a Foreign Service Officer." So this was hard to take, and the examination board also said that my wife was not analytical enough to be a cultural officer. Now she had done extraordinarily well at Harvard Law School, and there wasn't a member of that panel who had had some of the experiences that she had had. She's been an investment banker since in Paris and London. She works for the World Bank now. And to have this crap poured in her way(in our way, because it really did not make her feel kindly about the organizations with which I was affiliated and as a member of which she was going to join me on overseas assignments as she had already twice (and that, I think, is something which is one of the great joys of the evolution of the system, that it has evolved positively. But it wasn't very long ago that this sort of thing was in play.

Q: When did you come into the Foreign Service?

PENDLETON: August 1967.

Q: Can you describe your entry class, you(re A-100 class, characterize it?

PENDLETON: Yes and no. I have to tell you, while we're talking about my wife, she took the DC bar exam on a Wednesday, and I was teaching at the Andover Summer Session, concluding on a Thursday. We flew to Portland, Oregon, and were married on her family's ranch in Washington State on the weekend, and we flew back Monday to the East Coast. We spent one night over to the Eastern Shore and then joined the Foreign Service the next day. And the class had started by a day, but they kindly let me come a day late. I was much more preoccupied with this life change I'd just gone through than with my classmates. I was with one exception very positively struck with the people who were my classmates, but I was still untangling and getting to know my wife and everything else. And I didn't throw myself into the process with the kind of vigor I might traditionally have brought to it. Fred Chapin, who was rather old-school, ran it, and I think he perhaps had expectations for me that were a little different than he did for some of the folks there. For some reason he thought, maybe based on my educational background, that I should be more adroit than I was, whereas actually I was hyperventilating in terms of trying to reorganize my life at that point. The way we bonded in the class, to a degree, was around being appalled by one poor fellow who was a perpetual embarrassment to us all. We couldn't understand how he ever appeared there. If somebody gave a nice lecture on the issuance of visas, he would put up his hand and say, "Well now that you've discussed passports, could you discuss visas?" And this never went down very well with the visitors or with the class. And the fellow, six months later, was actually arrested in Portugal for selling visas, so that was a sad aspect.

On the more positive side, some marvelous people were in the class, some who stayed, like Al Adams, who was Ambassador in Haiti and Peru and, early in his career, in the Horn of Africa, and now runs the United Nations Association in New York; and someone, sadly, who didn't stay long, Theodore Roosevelt, IV, who is with Lehmann Brothers and

one of the leading conservationists in the country. One of the things that was of course on everybody's mind was where were we and our families going to go when we got called to the podium at the end of the class and were told that we were going to go to live for the next two or three years in X or Y or Z. And that's an old tale, but we really didn't know. And one thing that became very apparent when that graduation ceremony was going on was that everybody who had not served in Vietnam and was not married was assigned to Vietnam, without exception. Roosevelt, who had been a SEAL in Vietnam, was assigned to Ouagadougou. I had never been to Vietnam, but I'd been married just days before joining, having no idea that this would affect what happened. I was assigned to Israel, and I wasn't best pleased with that because the personnel folks had said, "We can never tell you where you're going to go, but we know you want to go to French-speaking Africa, and what we think we can promise you is either a French-speaking post or Africa. And probably, since there are so many of them, French-speaking Africa." — So when it was announced that I was going to Tel Aviv — I had nothing against Tel Aviv but I did have something against being toyed with. That was a fairly fundamental lesson to learn in the Foreign Service, when the idea of "service", along with the "foreign" was a bit less negotiable than it is today. Those are part of the changes.

The group as a whole was, again, by today's standards, not particularly diverse and it was more a symptom of the times, in a sense, but they were very able people who had very steady and often exemplary careers. And to the extent that they became any sort of nascent club, I was a bit preoccupied and to the side.

Q: My group, I don't know, we didn't seem to bond particularly, and I'd just gotten married. I was still learning to live in a small apartment with a wife.

PENDLETON: We had an apartment a couple of blocks over from FSI in Rosslyn. My wife chose it because she knew I could go over to the FSI building and study at night and have a short walk. It cost 89 bucks a month, and it was so small it wouldn(t even hold but a portion of her wedding presents. And she was rather used to larger establishments.

Q: Well, are you in Israel from, what, '68 to(

PENDLETON: Right.

Q: '68 about?

PENDLETON: Well, we actually arrived early in 1968. In preparation for Israel, of course, I was given the French part of the "French," which was that I was sent to FSI to study French and then assigned to Israel. So that's fairly normal in the Foreign Service, to be assigned to French instruction and then to a country where French isn't one of the most frequently used languages. Fortunately, English is. While waiting for a budgetary travel hold to be lifted, I was assigned to the Turkish Desk for ten days. My principal assignment was to hang pictures of former U.S. ambassadors to Turkey on the wall. We arrived in Israel in February of '68, so we missed the Six-Day War, and we departed before the Yom Kippur War in '73. We were there during a time(from the Israeli's point of view(of psychological and physical expansion, which was very exciting for Israelis, and in a sense, it was a very exciting and positive time to be in Israel if you were not totally preoccupied with the Arab side of the equation.

Q: You were there, then, from '68 to what?

PENDLETON: '70. The summer of '70.

Q: What was your impression of Israel when you first arrived?

PENDLETON: In a sense, you can't go to Israel without being almost immediately struck by the people, the kind of dynamism, the energy, the "Israeliness" of the people who live up to their reputation as go get 'em, stand up for themselves people. You have that. I was extremely struck by how small the country was. I think it's the size of New Jersey. From the deck outside our bedroom, we could see the hills that had been captured a few months previously from the Jordanians on the West Bank. We were living in Herzaliya Pitua, which

is in the narrowest sleeve of Israel proper. You quickly realized that you were living in a land of pent-up energy and that it really was pent up, that you had only 12 miles, say, from the sea to the former border right where we lived. I took an immediate liking to the Israelis I got to know, and I think that there's something about a first post that always lives with one. Certainly my married life really started in Israel. My professional life started in Israel. Our daughter, who is now 28 and an attorney, was born in Israel. So our family life started in Israel. And I was earning \$8,200 a year, but we never lived better, in a funny way, and it was one of those times in our life that seemed to fit very well with the mood of the Israelis after the Six-Day War.

Q: Well, I'm told that there was a real sense of euphoria after the Six-Day War because they felt that, you know, they could do anything. I mean, for the first time, they really felt Israel was there to stay.

PENDLETON: Well, I sensed that, but six months had past from the war when we arrived, and yet there was this undercurrent and overcurrent which was very much one of being upbeat, being optimistic, and sometimes it's hard for Israelis to be optimistic because of (a) their Jewishness, if they're Jewish Israelis, and (b) the fact that the country has a kind of institutionalized fragility by its very geographic nature. But that was quite true.

Q: Can you describe a bit who was the Ambassador, the embassy, and what you were doing.

PENDLETON: The Ambassador, whom I never really met for a long time, was Walworth Barbour, who was an institution. He'd been there, I think, nine or ten years at that point. He remained a total of 13, 14 years. He refused other assignments. Barbour was offered Moscow at one point. I think he was afraid he couldn't pass the physical, because he was manifestly overweight. I did get to know him well in the end because I became his staff assistant, but initially I was assigned, of course, as a consular officer. And I was assigned to look after Americans in distress, welfare and whereabouts. I had a lot to learn about

that. Certainly, learning about the embassy wasn't too easy from that particular perch. Almost immediately, I had a run in with Bill Dale, who was the Deputy Chief of Mission. The first weekend we were there, I was assigned to be the duty officer for the embassy, and I had never even walked around the embassy or been shown around it. And there was an event with Jordan which required a flash cable from Washington and our embassy to Amman. Suddenly, I was part of the process to get it out, but I had never in the A-100 course been shown how to write a cable or what was involved in sending one. We were never told that, and the nice person in the communications office said, "Don't worry, we'll take care of it." Well, the upshot was that the cable did not reach its destination, and that wasn't discovered until the following Monday, when I fond myself sitting in the Deputy Chief of Mission's office being more or less berated. I just told him, that frankly, I was astonished that I had been assigned at the outset of my tenure to be the embassy's duty officer (which somebody mindlessly went through and made up the duty roster (and put in a position of some trust when I couldn(t possibly know whether I was fulfilling it or not.

So we had a bit of a go around about that, and I went back to look after citizens in distress. I was feeling a bit like myself at that point. The first one on the first day taught me another lesson, which you would appreciate. A hotel called and said, "We have a woman here who's very ill. She's an American." I said to the head local, "host country nationals" were called in those days, "Well, let's go over to her hotel. It's just down the street, I gather." He said, "I wouldn't do that if I were you." Anyway, we went, and I went up to the room and knock on the door. The woman yells, "Come in." I go in. She gets up off of the bed and says, "I'm sick," and then proceeds to throw up all over me. So I could see that Jack, the head local, thought, "Well, this young man is going to learn fast, or not at all." And so we slunk back to where I could change my clothes. My first citizen in distress was inebriated, and life in consular office kind of went up and down hill from there.

How did we learn about the embassy as a young couple? The DCM invited my wife and me to dinner at their house. We didn't have a car at that point, so we had to walk quite a long way and were pretty tuckered out when we got there. And when we got to dinner we

found his secretary there, who had just announced to him that she was not going to stay in Tel Aviv, where she'd just arrived, but was going back to the States. He said to my wife, "Well, you will come and be my secretary starting on Monday." And my wife said, "Now, wait, I was a secretary at Look Magazine, and I went to Harvard Law School to get away from being a secretary because I couldn't see where it was leading me. I want to think about this." Well, we discussed it, and I said, "Look, where I am, I'll never learn about an embassy. Why don't you say you'll take the job for six weeks. By then they've got to have somebody else from Washington, and you can brief me on how an embassy works." She did that, and it was helpful for both of us.

We had a lot of mental cases in the Welfare and Whereabouts section. Too many Americans were dispatched to the Holy Land by themselves and fell apart upon landing. One day I met Mr. Afroyim, of the Afroyim decision by the Supreme Court, that you can have dual nationality. Then I moved to the visa section, which I just hated, because no Israeli going to the States wants to say that he is going "down" from Jerusalem, "yeridah", as against going up to Jerusalem, "aliyah". And so they would do anything to convince a Foreign Service Officer that they were just going to Aunt Minnie's wedding and would be back within a week. And then, of course, you'd get the adjustment of status straightaway, and you'd know they were lying to you. I couldn't bear it, and I never could have been a career visa officer.

Q: I was a supervisory consular officer and I think one of the hardest things was for young officers in the visa process to be lied to. I mean someone would look them right in the eye and lie to them, and it's not the sort of thing that we normally run across, you know, in our education. Under the system you might run across some things but not people outright lying to you. I would think there would be a lot of problems, because of the close connections back in the United States, with refusing visas. Did you get screams and yells from Congress?

PENDLETON: All the time, and a funny thing happened. I never, as I say, really met the Ambassador. He only came to the office from 10:00 to 12:30 or so each day, which was a bit unusual. I've always described him as being like a guided missile(expensive to keep in place, but very much on target when launched. I thought he was a terrific ambassador as I got to know him better. However, one day I turned down a person to go to the States, because our chief local in the visa section, host country national, told me that the young lady had admitted that she was going to get married, which sadly you couldn't do in those days. And so I said, "Well, I believe you. If she said that, then I can't give her the visa, as much as I hate to..." It turned out she was the daughter of the president of one of the biggest Israeli-American corporations and that the father was very close to the Ambassador and the embassy leadership and everybody else, and so the word that came down was that I was to reverse myself and give the visa. And I said, "No, I won't," being petulant and not totally caught up in the system at that point, and I said, "If the Consul General or the Ambassador(if the Ambassador as an exequator that gives him the legal right to give a visa — wants to give the visa, they may do so, but I simply can't, and I won't." And I was told that that would finish me with the Ambassador, but since I hadn't really met him it didn(t matter. But he got me up to his office, and I told him I wouldn't, and I went away and thought I'd better start packing may bags. And about a week later, the Admin Counselor came and said, "The Ambassador wants you as his staff aide." And there was a lesson in that someplace. So I moved up to his office. Incidentally, a letter came from a Congressman about the famous visa saying all the young lady wanted to do was to get married. I was vindicated. And she did get married.

Q: Before we talk about the ambassador's Office, you mentioned a large number of mental problems. I have been told that Israel gets a lot of people who want to be close to Jesus or Mohammed or Yahweh or whatever it is, and they go there, so that you end up with a lot of really unstable people.

PENDLETON: Right, absolutely correct, at least in those days, and I assume that still happens. And many were American Christians, young usually, who thought that the answer to a very difficult life here in the United States usually involving mental problems would be to go to Jerusalem, to go to the Holy Land. There would be occasions when you would find that the pilot of the plane they were flying on would radio ahead and alert Yakov Hospital for the mentally unstable and the embassy and anybody else that somebody was arriving who was going to need special attention. We were involved in a sad number of those cases. My wife and I also went to visit prisoners in prisons on a couple of occasions together and once went to a psychiatric prison, where a great deal of torture had taken place in the past. My wife and I found ourselves seated at a table in an amphitheater with lights on us while we were trying to find out about the fate of an American prisoner, or mental patient(I can't remember at this point. But it was one of those memorable experiences.

Another memorable experience of a more positive nature was the chance we had to give people a year's worth of Social Security and Railway Retirement Benefit Checks all at once. That was when Washington finally decided what it was going to do about delivery to Druze in the Golan Heights, those whose benefits were cut off when their mountain villages in what had been Syria were captured during the Six Day War. Druze had worked in Detroit and Chicago before retiring to the Golan and were quite reliant on their Social Security benefits. These were often American citizens who, when you met them in their traditional villages, didn't give much impression that they'd ever lived in the United States. But they certainly had for a long time and had earned these benefits. So finally the high muckamucks in Washington decided that these checks, which had been held up for over a year, could be delivered if one wrote "via" Israel on the envelopes, and didn't make the switch to Israel totally. And so I was dispatched with my wife and her visiting cousin in our Volkswagen, to these Druze villages. Well, you can imagine when a person arrived with thousands and thousands of dollars worth of checks to give away there was much

slaughtering of the goat and eating of the eyeball and other things which unnerved our stomachs but left very pleasant memories.

Q: Could you tell about being staff aide to Walworth Barbour, who was the "Mr. Israel" for the United States for so long. You saw him towards the end of his reign?

PENDLETON: Well, I saw him about three-quarters of the way through, but he'd settled into a pattern. One was to let the Embassy be run, by and large, by his Deputy Chief of Mission, and for most of the time I was working with Barbour, J. Owen Zurhellen, who had been an authority on Japan, a very dynamic, sometimes roughly dynamic individual, was the Deputy Chief of Mission. Owen could do almost anything with his eyes shut, and he was allowed very large measure of play, both in terms of substance and in terms of administration. He knew when to defer to the Ambassador and when to seek the Ambassador's judgment, and he had the Ambassador's confidence, totally, as far as I could see. And yet I found myself in a bit of an awkward situation because I was not working for Owen but for the Ambassador, and the Ambassador wasn't there very much. There were a few occasions when the messages were crossed and when Owen got cross. Barbour didn(t get cross with me much because I think I served him well in term of what his traditional expectations were. Having been there already nine years or so, he knew every Israeli, and while he did not speak Hebrew, which was in a way a bit sad because he missed a lot of fun, he would over the years go to all-night sessions with key Israelis and play cards and be with them at moments of high crisis. And he brought a kind of stability to the embassy in both form and substance which was very, very useful. He was extremely well respected by the leaders of the American Jewish Community, which was a great supporter of Barbour staying on, because they believed that he understood Israel very well, understood the angst of Israelis, understood what the American role might usefully be in Israel, and they didn't want to get into trying to have somebody new who might be less predictable. The Administration respected him. His Arabist colleagues, I think, had(and you

would know from interviews, I guess, better than I would(some degree of skepticism about him.

Q: Oh, absolutely. I mean this is part of the dynamic. We're talking about the ambassadors and others who served in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, or Saudi Arabia.

PENDLETON: On the other hand, I described him previously as being like a guided missile. If there was a message that had to get through, he could pick up the phone and call Golda Meir and just lay it to her absolutely straight, and it would be listened to. He didn't overdo it. If anything, he probably underdid it. But that allowed him to be such a voice of authority that today, I think, it's really equivalent to the President picking up the phone, because we did not have at that point the kind of involvement of the President and Secretary of State that you have at this point. At that point, it was the Jarring Mission, and Jarring was a Swedish diplomat reporting to the United Nations, and we were not involved in shuttle diplomacy and things which we have come to take for granted. We did not have Presidents or Secretaries of State fluttering around(very usefully, I would say(but we were feeling our way during that period. It was a time where we continued to support Israel very heavily financially, and the arrival of the first F-16s came during that period. It was also the period when some of the first terrorism events, the first hijackings, came in the region. I remember leaving the embassy one night and the Marine guard said, "There's a phone call you'd better take." It was Stuttgart saying, "We're following on radar a hijacked plane coming your way." We had not had that experience before and didn't really know how to handle it adequately. It was also the period of Black September.

Q: I was going to say, the Black September was towards the end of your time there. It occurred in Jordan, September 1970.

PENDLETON: I had left for home leave and reassignment to Burundi, a few months earlier. In the runup to Black September, I became aware of what everybody who reads newspapers now knows, that there were more communications between the Israelis and

King Hussein than one supposed, than I as a newspaper reader had imagined, and that there was a singularly important role for the United States at a variety of levels that we needed to play. And it was a period during which I had a chance, even based on some of my contacts from my consular work, to find out what was going on down on the Suez Canal, where both sides had heavy fortifications. One informant was a U.S. citizen who renounced his citizenship in front of me and then went to serve in the Israeli Army down there.

There were ways that I could begin to learn to be a reporting officer, but most of what I was paid for was Friday night. In those days an "immediate cable" was used rather indiscriminately, with no indications as to whether action at night would be needed, and every Friday night as people were dumping their cables before the weekend into the code room back in Washington(and I've been guilty of the same thing(we'd start about eight o'clock getting a flood of incoming cables, and I often would have to move into the embassy and stay there overnight reading them and deciding whether the Deputy Chief of Mission had to be alerted or anybody else had to be alerted. That also was a useful sort of training, in a sense. If you make a mistake, you can make a bad mistake, and it's fairly evident quite quickly. In general, I didn't make mistakes, but just a week before leaving, after a near-flawless run of about a year, I made a booboo which I will recover from someday.

Q: What was that?

PENDLETON: I frankly don't remember what it was about, but I do remember a very angry Owen Zurhellen at six in the morning saying I should have brought it to him at midnight. I waited till first light, I think. He reached in his wallet and pulled out the number of the Operations Center at State and called them. I memorized that number on the spot and know it to this day.

Q: Was Ambassador Barbour concerned about unfolding events in the region?

PENDLETON: He was of course concerned, but he had served in the region during World War II and had seen it all over the years — even the sinking of a ship bringing supplies of food and liquor to the diplomatic section in Cairo. The corps had gone up to Alexandria to see the ship arrive and it had been sunk right before their eyes. So Barbour came to have a remarkable way of suppressing concern. He was notably overweight and also sick and for many months was at home.

Only the deputy chief of mission, myself and his chauffeur saw him during this period. I would say that his concern became even more modulated than it normally was.

Let me just tell you a story which I heard but was not there for. During the Six-Day War, there was great fear about the embassy being destroyed.

Q: This was 1967.

PENDLETON: In '67. And at one point everybody went down to the sub-basement parking lot to use it as a bomb shelter, and people, I'm told, were understandably a bit tense. Barbour was down there, and he said to his secretary in a very loud voice, "Take dictation, please." So everybody hushed to listen to what the Ambassador was going to say. And he said, "Special for Sisco," who was the Assistant Secretary for North African and Near Eastern Affairs, "from Barbour: fail to understand why shipment of my new couch for the residence has not been expedited." Et cetera. Well, everybody calmed down, allegedly, after that because they knew he was counting on having his embassy and his residence and his team. This was the way he approached so many issues. When he picked up the phone, there was often nobody else in the room. And I've heard him a fair number of times, and I've heard him become angry, but an awful lot of communication from that Ambassador drifted unrecorded, I think. As mentioned previously, the deputy chief of mission, Owen Zurhellen, had a pleasant sort of temper, which added spice to each day. When Owen got angry it was more of an event.

But in terms of the substance, I realize in retrospect that I didn't untangle it as well as I would like to have, and I was especially aware of this some years later when I became head of the Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs in the Department, and I was so glad that I understood Israeli Angst and sorry that I didn't understand a bit more of the history, although I'd read widely, and even what had gone on when I was in the Ambassador's office.

Q: All right. Is there anything else we should cover, do you think, on this then? Why don't we stop at this point, and we'll pick it up in 1970. You went to, what, Burundi? And you were there from 1970 to(

PENDLETON: '72.

Q: '72, and so we'll pick it up at that point.

PENDLETON: Okay.

Q: Today is the 29th of June, 1998. Kim, we're off to Burundi. Did you ask for this, or how did this come about?

PENDLETON: Well, it was slightly a surprise in terms of timing. It came about, I think, for the because I had read in the Yale Alumni Magazine that Dan Simpson, my Yale classmate with whom I'd taught in West Africa — who now in 1998 is finishing a stint as ambassador to the Congo, formerly Zaire — was serving in Bujumbura. I said to my wife, "Oh, poor Dan, he must be lonely down there. I will send him a note." I wrote him a note, never got a response, but received quite soon thereafter a cable assigning him to move on to South Africa and me to replace him. We remain great friends but I've always accused him of organizing that particular response to my attempt to be pleasant. At that time I was too na#ve to think about how to go about working your next assignment, but I had wanted

an assignment in French-speaking Africa. Burundi had been a Belgian mandate and was French speaking. So we were ordered to go there immediately, and my Ambassador in Tel Aviv was very helpful to organize it so that not only could we delay long enough so that our daughter would be born in Israel but that we could go to my brother-in-law's wedding in Portland, Oregon. And then we flew directly, at the end of August, 1970, from Portland to Bujumbura, Burundi — not really stopping on route until we got to Uganda, and I can tell you, that can screw up a little child's clock and an adult's clock.

Q: When you arrived in August, 1970, can you describe what the situation was in Burundi, you know, political-economic, as you saw it then?

PENDLETON: Well, one of the great fortunes for me was that Dan Simpson was still there, and he had a very refined view of the tensions under the surface between the 85 per cent of the population that was Hutu and the 12 per cent that was Tutsi. The Tutsi actually ran everything. The Hutus were frequently described as "the short people" and the Tutsis as "the tall people." If you were a newcomer and had not had a guide to tell you to keep your eye out for potential conflict between the tribes I think you would have been very much inclined to let it drift off your radar screen. The country, for all intents and purposes, seemed quite tranquil, and one had a sense that the various ethnic factions were trying to get along and work together to a certain point. And that proved before we left to be a total miscalculation.

Q: One's mind sort of boggles at trying to separate the various conflicts that have happened there, but at that time, in 1970, had there been the Hutu-Tutsi explosions yet? Had there been any of those?

PENDLETON: There had been in particular explosions in Rwanda, the country to the north which was the other Belgian mandate of Ruanda-Urundi, and many, many Tutsis had been slaughtered by Hutus, and Hutus had taken over control of Rwanda in the '60s. This absolutely traumatized the Tutsis of Burundi, who were in power. They controlled not only

the government, even though there were a couple of Hutu ministers, they controlled the government and the army. And they were determined that they were not going to allow to happen to them what had happened to their cousins, the Tutsis of Rwanda. That isn't to say that they were very generous to the Tutsi refugees from Rwanda who were living in Burundi, but there was this background and backdrop in everybody's mind about what had happened not too long before. That proved to be quite significant as events unfolded.

Q: What were American interests as sort of described to you when you went out there at that point?

PENDLETON: American interests in Burundi were really fairly minimal, to say the least. That was reflected in the fact the Country Director for Central Africa couldn't make time to see me before I went to post. One of the principal concerns was that we had missionaries there in the interior, because they were Johnny-come-latelies, way behind the Catholics in terms of impact on the country and the elite. They tended to be fundamentalist Protestant missionaries who were working amongst the Hutus. And when fear of the Hutus increased among the Tutsi elite, there was a normal tendency to become convinced that somehow the missionaries, who after all were teaching these people to read and write and think and know of the larger world, were involved or causing or sparking some of the potential for violence.

As for the economy, Burundi raised some coffee and tea. It has a vote in the United Nations. And indeed, the Burundi ambassador to the United Nations represented Burundi on the Security Council while I was there. So Burundi took on a slightly larger role than would normally be the case through the happenstance of history. I used to remind Washington that the entire national budget of Burundi in any given year at that time would only run Harvard University for three months. So we were dealing with a relatively minor country to which our largest export was used clothing, which is the case in large hunks of Africa. When we were asked to find somebody to represent Burundi at a convention in Pittsburgh on tall buildings, I think supported by the elevator industry, we were able

to report that there weren't any buildings over two stories, but we'd heard rumors of one being built that would be three stories and might have an elevator. I was assigned as political-economic officer; I was also the consular officer, the backup USIS officer, the science officer in a very small embassy with an ambassador and a deputy chief of mission and myself and a tiny CIA station and a USIS operation. We did have an interest in what was going on in Eastern Zaire as well, which I should mention. We also kept an eye on the Russians and Chinese in Burundi. Indeed, a PRC diplomat had defected prior to my arrival and remained in the embassy for months before being smuggled out.

Q: First, let's talk a little about the embassy. Who was the ambassador, and how did he or she operate?

PENDLETON: The Ambassador during my tenure was Thomas Patrick Melady, who was a political appointee of all things. He'd originally been a supporter of Nelson Rockefeller's, and was very much enmeshed with and devoted to the Catholic Church. He later became our ambassador to the Vatican. And he had moved from being a Rockefeller supporter to a supporter of President Nixon, and he had taken with him a fair amount of influence within the Catholic Church vis-#-vis the American political party process. I wouldn't say it was an extraordinary amount or he wouldn't have been given little Burundi as a political payoff. But his style was a bit unusual. He'd been an academic. He'd written a lot of books which, when I was in graduate school, I had skimmed and found, to my regret, to be superficial. I sensed even before I arrived that this could be a potential problem of analysis in terms of what the embassy was going to put forward as its political analysis.. Melady was an extremely nice man with a pleasant and interesting wife, but he was a bit confused about the difference between a tiny embassy and a large bureaucracy. He, for instance, tended to have a great many formal staff meetings, with agendas and note takings, so you would be burdened with a good deal of in-house work and false deadlines which, on top of the terrible amount of tasking from all of the bureaucracies in Washington, tended to make life

a lot more frantic than I would have expected it to be. It was hard to get out and deal with the people, whether they be expatriate or Burundi.

Q: I wonder if you could comment on this tasking. Where was this coming from and how did this tie you up particularly?

PENDLETON: Well, I think a fair bit of it was self-generated in large part by the Ambassador, who was very anxious to make a good mark in Washington. As a result, there was a lot of demands to meet artificial deadlines. We had only one American secretary who could type anything classified, a superb person, Dawn Loberg. But the Ambassador wrote a great many letters, all the time, back to friends and acquaintances in Washington, so it was hard to get help from her. And then the tasking within the embassy tended to be related to formalizing activities which should probably in that particular environment have been left simply to get done in the normal course of events. I mentioned, for instance, if you had a staff meeting, why did you have to have promptly on the ambassador's desk a full readout of what had transpired at the staff meeting a few hours before when, really, nobody was going to be interested in reading it — not even the Desk officer in Washington, who would get it by pouch three or four weeks later. We sent a lot of information by airgram and relatively little by cable at that point. The tasking was not of the sort that I thought was important, unfortunately, in terms of getting outside the embassy and analyzing the internal dynamics of the country as much as would have been wise. I found that I had to fight to carve out time to report what I thought we should in terms of US national interests. What came from all over Washington in the way of tasking frequently was simply not relevant as well. I remember being asked by the Commerce Department how many Samsonite suitcases had been sold in the shops the previous year. I discovered one that had been. One of the things which is positive about the Small Embassy Program, is that you now don't get the amount of tasking from every agency in Washington that you used to if you are at a really small post.

Q: Well, how do you find dealing as sort of a political-economic officer(with the Burundi Government, which you say was basically Tutsi at the time. Were they easy to deal with? How did things work with them?

PENDLETON: They were not particularly easy to deal with. They were suspicious of the United States and suspicious of almost everybody. You could have a useful discussion, but whether it would mean anything in the long run was hard to say. There were some areas in which I put an undue amount of energy perhaps, because Washington at that point was very concerned about them. One was securing votes for the Law of the Sea Treaty. Burundi is landlocked. But I found a fellow at the foreign ministry who professed to be interested(I think he wanted a scholarship to the States(and I devoted a lot of time to allowing him to understand the issues and encouraging him to telephone his mission in New York and his embassy in Washington to tell them to vote the right way. Sadly, he was killed in the "events," so-called, of 1972, and so that effort went for naught. A great deal of my interaction was aimed at convincing Burundi to join with us, particularly at the United Nations, on issues which were of significance to us. These ran the entire gamut of American strategic political-economic issues. It was in large measure an educational process on our part with Burundi officials. I'm sure we made no particular impact time and time again, but we tried.

Q: Did the Belgians still play a major role there?

PENDLETON: Belgians played a very major role. Ambassador Melady and Mike Hoyt, the deputy chief of mission, paid a good bit of attention to the Belgians. Mike had quite a reputation in Bujumbura because he'd been through Stanleyville and had been captured and the Belgians knew a lot about him. Mike was charg# at many intervals, and they paid attention to Mike in particular, and Mike encouraged Ambassador Melady to keep in close contact with the Belgians. I tried to pay attention to the Belgian military which was heavily involved in training the Burundi Army, and that proved to be useful, again, during the massacres of '72. The Belgians were much better plugged in across the board than

we could possibly be because they had a large number of citizens permanently living in Burundi.

Q: Well, what about dealing with the American missionaries prior to the '72 crisis? Were they approachable, or were they a problem?

PENDLETON: No, they were very definitely approachable, but I think that they saw themselves as having a calling which was not necessarily in any particular way akin to the calling of those of us who were working in the embassy. We had a Desk officer named David Rawson at that point, who is now our ambassador in Mali and was previously Ambassador in Rwanda. He grew up in Burundi, where his parents were missionaries, and David helped to introduce my wife and myself to a number of missionaries, including his parents, and to encourage word on the net that we were okay people. We also met several Brits who were working at missions and got to know them. Ambassador Melady also spent a good bit of time in contact with the missionaries. This all became extremely important during the crisis of '72 because the missionaries were in real danger, and I helped a number of them leave the country quietly, in the trunks of cars and by other means.

Q: We'll come to that, but prior to this, Mike Hoyt had been through operation Dragon Rouge and the whole thing, and missionaries in Zaire were very much at risk at that point, and some of them had been killed, particularly Belgian. But was the embassy working to develop a plan to get everybody the hell out? I mean, were we realistic about the Hutu-Tutsi equation in Burundi?

PENDLETON: No, I don't think any of us were as realistic as in hindsight we should have been about the imminent possibility of a massive tribal conflict. I believe that I had, thanks to the prodding of Dan Simpson, better instinct that things might fall apart than most. And because Mike Hoyt had been through hell, we paid careful attention to such things as planning how to escape ourselves and making sure that we were hooked into the missionaries on their own radio and telephone nets. And the American missionaries had

a cascading radio capability amongst themselves, even when they weren't always from the same church. They would contact each other, see how everyone was doing and be protective of each other. We did not have a totally refined plan to the degree that we would no doubt have today, in terms of the best way to help protect American citizens in distress, but I can tell you, they were never far from my mind. We didn't convert it into a set-piece plan such as David Rawson later could draw on to lead people out of Kigali, Rwanda, in the mid-1990s. By then we'd learned many lessons which I, as a relatively inexperienced officer, had not yet digested when I served in Burundi.

Q: Again, my question is prior to the explosion. What was happening in Zaire at that point, because we'd had also the Shaba revolts and everything else in Zaire, and were there any repercussions during the time you were there?

PENDLETON: Zaire was an immense country, and I used to say it was the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. The roads were increasingly decaying, so that when you were along the eastern frontier of Zaire, you were very far removed from Kinshasa, the capital. The governors had a very large say in things. But there were rebels, for example, under Kabila on the peninsula on Lake Tanganyika called Fizi Baraka. A group of us went down to Fizi Baraka to see what was going on at one point in Boston Whalers, down lake Tanganyika through very rough water.

Q: Boston Whalers being a type of motorboat.

PENDLETON: Of motorboat, yes. And it was really quite fascinating. It seemed to me it was like visiting Vietnam. The government of Mobutu Sese Seko controlled everything by day, more or less, and at night there was no control. Those who went down I went down included John Stockwell, our CIA station chief, who later turned against the Agency over Angola and other things; our consul general in Bukavu came down bearing gifts, Ray Seitz, who later became the first Foreign Service ambassador to the Court of St. James's in London. We stayed overnight with some Italian missionaries, who were later killed in

the church. We went around with some of Mobutu's generals during the day in jeeps with machine guns on them. But at night, rebels burned down the huts around the church in which we were staying, and you could see who was in charge. And Laurent Kabila, the rebel, later became the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Mobutu was very afraid of him and had asked Nixon in a surprise request during a White House visit for ships that could be placed in Lake Tanganyika to guard against rebels coming over from Tanzania. Those rusting hulks of ships which we had flown out to Lake Tanganyika were there during this visit, really an outpost of American imperial interests, I would say.

Q: One has to read Forester's The African Queen in World War I. Anything from Tanzania?

PENDLETON: Everything that reached Burundi, by and large, came either by Sabena from Brussels, such as the moules, or mussels, which were eaten by the Belgians and wiser Europeans twice a week. But all the overland stuff was shipped from Dar-es-Salaam up the railway to near Ujiji, where Stanley met Livingston, and was then put on barges and brought up Lake Tanganyika to Bujumbura. This is why our household effects took nine months to arrive from the Israeli port of Eilat, which, when you have a baby, isn't easy. But there were refugees, some from Burundi, along the border. When Tanzania wanted to make life difficult for Burundi, for whatever reason, they just had to stop or slow down shipments, which were bad enough anyway, of the things that the people in Bujumbura and the interior needed.

Q: What about relations between Burundi and Rwanda?

PENDLETON: Yes, very cool, although there was some effort to make relations seem better than they were. Rwanda was led by Hutus and Burundi by Tutsis, and the underlying suspicion ran very deep indeed so that it was hard to think of relations between those two countries warming to any great degree despite efforts to encourage them to look at each other as part of a larger whole in the region.

Q: Was there much consultation or visiting with our embassy up in Rwanda?

PENDLETON: A certain amount, but not a great deal. I think that we went there for professional reasons, to better understand the dynamics involved, and because they were our neighbors. I went to Kigali once and more frequently to our consulate in Bukavu, Zaire, where U.S. military planes would land from Kinshasa with APO packages, including holiday turkeys. But there also came a time when people would have to vacation with their families, which tended to be not to go to Kigali, Rwanda but to go to the Serengeti in Tanzania or the coast in Kenya or Murchison Falls in Uganda and get a change of pace and a slightly wider view of the world. I think that we could well have afforded to have spent more time linking Rwanda and Burundi in our own minds, so that we would understand it better, and the Desk officer, David Rawson, was responsible for both countries, as you might well imagine.

Q: How was family life at this point, again prior to the troubles?

PENDLETON: Well, for my daughter, for instance, who arrived there at age two months, it was kind of a Garden of Eden. We had a reasonably large house; we had a large garden. She almost got eaten by a big lizard once, but other than that it was pretty good if you stayed healthy. There was actually a pediatrician, of all things, in Burundi and a couple of doctors. There were only six miles of paved road in the country when we arrived.

It was hard to get to know, on a friendly basis, the suspicious citizens of Burundi, from whatever side they came from, no matter how hard you worked at it. If we gave a representational dinner, I always set a couple of tables but had others ready to go depending on who turned out to be in prison that day. One would make adjustments right up to a point after the first guest arrived and told you who wouldn't be showing up because of events in their political and personal lives.

Bujumbura is at a relatively high elevation, and the weather isn't all that bad. I didn't think so as somebody who had really sweated it out in Ghana previously, and you could go out on Lake Tanganyika and sail. You didn't want to get into the reeds and get bilharzia, but you could drive up into the mountains to a tea plantation and have a picnic. However, you did tend to trip over the same people over and over and over again, whether they be UNDP (United Nations Development Program) aid workers or the few foreign businessmen. Many of them were very interesting. One was James Ross who ran two BP (British Petroleum) petrol dumps, or gas stations, and sold kerosene. The next time I saw him in London fifteen years later, I said, "What are you doing now?" and he said, "Well, I'm in charge of all of BP's downstream operations." And he later became president of BP North America in Cleveland, sitting in John D. Rockefeller's old office and looking after North and South America and the Alaskan slope and all of Africa, out of Cleveland. So you never quite knew whom you would meet, and that's one of the interesting things about Africa. People who have served in these conditions tend to stick together for life, practically.

Q: Can you tell me sort of the narrative of what happened, how you observed what led up to the '72 occurrence.

PENDLETON: Well, I saw very little in the months ahead that would suggest that we were facing an explosion.

Q: Question before we get there. You mentioned that when you'd throw a dinner party, people were being thrown in jail. Who was throwing whom in jail, and why?

PENDLETON: Well, usually it was President Michel Micombero, who was about 31 or 32 years old who had been president for five years. He would throw potential enemies in jail, but they didn't have to be Hutus, and it could be for whatever reason. One would never figure out totally what was going on, but people at a certain level in the government or the military with whom we had some dealings(I taught English to military officers(led

a life that had its ongoing uncertainties. And I didn(t think too much about people being jailed because they seemed to be released quite promptly. And that was one of the things that led to a slightly numbing sense of tranquility, that in terms of the underlying Hutu-Tutsi problem. And, indeed, David Rawson, who's no dummy, and as I say, speaks Kirundi and Kinyarwanda, was out visiting us in the spring of 1972, and he and I went around the country and went through some roadblocks and didn't recognize them as being precursors to the "events" (and in French they're called "#v#nements") of '72. And the word "events" disguises the fact that 200,000 people were killed, most all of them horribly and systematically with sledgehammers in a genocide during that period.

This was in April of 1972. My wife and I gave a dinner party in late April in David's honor, and we tried to balance it very carefully between Hutus and Tutsis. He knew more Hutus than he knew Tutsis. As far as we could figure out later, within three weeks, all our guests were dead, both husbands and wives. People we thought were Tutsis turned out to have one Hutu grandparent, and # la Hitler became at the outset of the fighting from the wrong side and were killed. I was reminded how, in a sense, na#ve I was about what was going on and how hard it was to really fathom what was going on. I had a number of rather unattractive people practically on my "payroll". I would give them a little bit of money, and they would give me gossip. But it didn't seem to suggest an explosion.

At the embassy, we did not know that a rebellion or coup by Hutus was being prepared for the end of April, 1972. And one thing that happened that I probably should have paid more attention to was that a distinguished Hutu who had studied in the United States and whom I knew quite well, relatively speaking, and with whom I could converse in English, called me on the phone, and asked me if I knew any way to help get outboards for some friends of his that would survive the choppy water of Lake Tanganyika. He knew that we had Boston Whalers and whatever. I was sufficiently tranquilized that this didn't mean anything to me, but upon reflection, it may be that I was being asked for help in terms of this Hutu uprising, which started in late April in the south and reached Bujumbura, but we didn(t have word of it, on the 29th of April. Micombero, the president, had dismissed his

government at midday, and in the evening one began hearing noise that sounded like rifles and machine-gun fire around the town. I went around on my mobilette, which was a motorized bicycle, and didn(t see anything of great note. We got word, however, that something was going on which might be an uprising.

Q: How about your missionary net?

PENDLETON: Well, that's partly where we got some of the word, and then the Ambassador got word from the Zaire ambassador that a coup or whatever had started. I went to the embassy and sent a cable to Washington, after talking with some of the key missionaries on the phone alerting them to get their heads down and then asking if they had any reports of anybody caught up in it, and the answer was no. Our first focus — and this is something which I can remember stressing to the Ambassador— was on the American citizens and trying to make sure that they were all safe and well. So the first little cable we sent(we didn't know what the hell was going on(was to that end. We sent another cable at midnight, and then in the morning at first light I went around on my mobilette again which was probably a bit stupid. I saw a place where we(d heard something had happened, and it was clear that there were burned out cars and gutted cars and blood on the ground et cetera. There had been some kind of skirmish. And we began to put more and more pieces together to the effect that there had been a Hutu uprising of sorts and that the Tutsi army had pretty well controlled it.

Actually, it took them quite a while to control it, and it was very hard for us to get information from the hinterland. And it was very hard to tell where the combat ended and reprisals, systematically, began. But the Hutus were beaten almost immediately, it seems to me. I haven't studied this perhaps as intensively as I should to get the dates right, but it was clear within a week to ten days that systematic reprisals were starting. And these reprisals really became genocidal and went on for a couple of months. Every Hutu over eleven who could read or write was rounded up if he had not fled, and an attempt was made to kill them. Many, many thousands were buried out at the airport,

and you could see the mass graves as you flew in. In order to save ammunition, they were sledgehammered, usually, and pushed into mass graves and then covered with a bulldozer and suffocated to death if they hadn't died from the earlier blows. A curfew was started at six in the evening, so we couldn't see what was going on at night, when in the capital city the trucks were going around loading the literate Hutus up. And we all had to be in our houses, or somebody's house, by six o'clock. I was trying to collect as much information as we could all day every day and get a report to Washington at 4:30 in the evening so I could have time to get home. As the days went on there were more and more overnight curfew parties to keep up the spirits of the foreigners in Bujumbura.

The daily events were really quite traumatic. For instance, we had a Hutu gardener who hid in our house. We stashed him even at one point in our bedroom. And then he went crazy and went out and killed his mother and escaped from our garden compound. We had Hutus and Tutsis working for us. One is here in the United States now, is an American citizen, who helped raise our children for many years, a Rwandan Tutsi. Her son is my godson and in the U.S. army out in Oklahoma. So life has its complexities, but trying to keep even those who worked for us from ratting on each other or whatever was not entirely easy.

And as time went on, the Catholic Church began to get very good demographic studies. They had census takers in Burundi who had been there before. And you began to get consolidated reports from parishes as to how many Hutus had died and how many had run into Tanzania or Rwanda. A lot didn't go. The Hutus frequently have a kind of subservient mentality, and we heard stories, which I believe, of a truck coming and soldiers filling the truck with Hutus and telling those who couldn't fit, "Come back tomorrow at 10 o'clock and we'll get you in." They would come back and get in the truck even though they must have known they were going to die. And they were only six miles from the border with Rwanda(I mean, really, quite astonishing to see this. And in the months that followed, between 150,000 and 200,000 people were killed, and we had a pretty good fix on that

through the work of the census takers of the Catholic Church. Washington, quote-unquote, did not wish to hear about this. It was inconvenient. And that's another part of the story.

Q: Well this, of course, is during the Nixon period, and Kissinger, when Africa was sort of off their radar.

PENDLETON: Human rights were definitely not an American issue in the way it is today, institutionalized as a matter of concern no matter what else is in play, as we're seeing in China at the moment. And our reporting, which really was, I think it's fair to say, seen in Washington as inconvenient because we had no particular interests there as long as our citizens were okay. And there was a real question as to what could be done about it. The OAU (the Organization of African Unity) didn(t seem to know what to do. They were encouraged to send a mission to Burundi, and about three weeks into the reprisals, they sent a mission of three people, as I recall, other heads of state, who did not leave the airport and met with Micombero, to our shock, and expressed their "solidarity" with the President of Burundi. That was the last thing he needed at that point. It just encouraged him more and more. He was reported to be going up in the French military helicopter, which was provided by France as aid, flown by Colonel Biot of the French Air Force, to machine-gun Hutus from the air. And there was a joke that went around, "What do Hutus do when they hear the president's helicopter coming? They take an anti-Biot-ique."

The only communication from Washington that I remember just got me quite riled up was when we got a telephone call from the country director for Central Africa telling us that it was hard to believe that so many people were being killed and would we kindly tone it down. And when I got back to Washington in September after this stint to work in the Op Center and I went into the editor's office(the events started in late April(there was a June "morning report" to the Secretary of State hanging on the wall which had a little summary of how many people had been killed in Burundi and what was going on. The executive secretary of the Department of State had written on it: "Do not waste the secretary's time with such a thing again." And so this was the kind of non-human rights guidance which

prevailed. And it was very frustrating. The Ambassador was also named to go on to be ambassador in Uganda, and he had a terrible time, in my view, recognizing that Africans can kill Africans. And he left about three weeks after the initial outbreak, having been the day before his departure given a medal by President Micombero. The Ambassador Melady flew to Greece, where he was going to spend a couple of weeks on the beach, and frankly, to those of us who were left, it was kind of a relief, because he simply couldn't and wouldn't agree that there was anything horrible happening. However, he then heard on the radio that things were continuing, so he left the beach and flew to Washington and helped follow Burundi events from there. But I found it absolutely astonishing that the Department let the Ambassador go when this thing was in full flood.

Q: Well, sometimes when there's an ambassador for whom they have no great regard, it's best for them to stay away.

PENDLETON: Well, I don't know whether they had regard or not. He had enough political clout to get another embassy at that time and one some years later. He also became Assistant Secretary for Higher Education at the Department of Education, and president of Sacred Heart University in Connecticut.

Q: If I recall, he left Uganda under some questionable circumstances too, didn't he?

PENDLETON: You know, I don't even remember at this point. I have very mixed emotions about it because here was likable person who wanted to be liked and whom I genuinely did like but whom I didn't respect, and I hate to say this in what will be written down, but(

Q: Well, I think it's important because this give a flavor for the times. When something happens today, which it did not too long ago, we're all over ourselves trying to figure what to do. It's very difficult for the United States to do something, but at least we play an active role in trying to organize and to tone down something like this. And here is something of this magnitude happening, and essentially we were told to stay out of it.

PENDLETON: Well, part of what happened was that there was no TV. There were no reporters; no foreign reporters were allowed in for months. But there was somebody in Dar-es-Salaam who would get our cables about five or six in the evening and give them almost lock stock and barrel to BBC, and when I'd get home for the curfew, I'd listen to the BBC News 6:00 pm and you could hear whole paragraphs and phrases that you'd written an hour and a half earlier coming out of London back at you. But there simply wasn't a feeling in official Washington that anything could be done, and it was a sad moment, and we haven't learned totally that lesson. I'm proud of the reporting, by and large. Sometimes it was that we had no leverage, and today we have that same problem. With people having seen what happened to some of our troops in Somalia, we have as much of a burden about committing troops today as we did then, which I think is very sad. I disagree with that a lot, but it's core to where we are.

Q: What about the American missionaries?

PENDLETON: The missionaries wanted desperately to hold on, but there were a number who were threatened and endangered. I worked with a number of them, as I mentioned earlier, to help them to get out, usually overland, into Zaire, from which they could go to Rwanda and out to Uganda and Kenya and what have you. Some had to be essentially smuggled out. But for them it was an absolutely horrible experience because they saw that systematic destruction of the people in whom they had invested their lives, and it took a certain kind of bravery to live with that. I came away from the events of '72 with a great deal of respect for the missionaries and their nature. I'm probably not the one to ask about the missionaries. Some day you should snare David Rawson because he would see it from both the family and human side as well as the institutional side.

Q: You mentioned taking some people out in the trunk of your car.

PENDLETON: No, I didn't take them in the trunk of my car. We had a car. My wife drove a little VW [Volkswagen], which arrived eventually from Dar es Salaam. But I was helping

with the paperwork and related plans to get some of the missionaries across the border in missionary cars. But of course they knew Burundi much better than I did, and it was kind of a joint effort.

Q: I would have thought that if the Tutsis were going after those that had learned to read and write and the missionaries were the teachers of the people who were learning to read and write, that the missionaries would have been targeted by the Tutsis as well.

PENDLETON: Yes, well, you're getting at a very good question, which is that it is clear that the Tutsis did not wish to do anything which would involve the world community. They therefore were very, very careful to try to avoid having anybody hurt who was a, quote, European, unquote, which might get the industrialized countries upset. They cared about public opinion. Teddy Kennedy got up and made a brief speech in the Senate one day about what was going on, and the military really stood down for a day when they heard it on VOA and BBC. They were afraid that the Kennedys somehow were going to mobilize against them, but then they figured out that that wasn't going to happen. It was one of the few public comments that had an impact. It showed that if you could speak out, you might have had some impact. At the end of it all, I ran into the Bishop of Bujumbura, who was also head of the coll#ge, the Jesuit school. I'd heard a lot of rumors that he had really turned from being a Catholic into being a Tutsi during this period. And I said, "I want to talk with you about this." He said, "Come to lunch and bring your wife." Therefore, we went up to his house and had a horribly frank discussion about what had happened. He basically admitted to me, despite his eight years of training in Rome, that he believed the Tutsis had no choice but to defend themselves and that he was involved in this process. Otherwise the Tutsis would be exterminated. My wife and I left feeling that this man of the cloth had just betrayed the cloth almost totally, because he could have played a dampening role, I think, if he had chosen to do so. But he was totally frightened, totally frightened.

Q: What about the Belgians?

PENDLETON: The Belgians were in quite a difficult position because they had, I think, about 1500 Belgian citizens in Burundi, many of whom had lived in Zaire and had escaped, many from Stanleyville, and had migrated to Burundi. They were doing the kind of jobs that in a British colony you would not have seen Brits doing. They often had shops, and if they had a restaurant, they might just as well wait on you if they were having staffing problems that week; and they put a tremendous amount of pressure on their embassy to protect them. There were also a lot of Hutu students in Belgium who were very outspoken about what was going on in Burundi, and the Belgians were extremely anxious to see a peaceful reconciliation. Their military training presence in Burundi was certainly on the alert, but there was no particular way that you could adequately influence an armed part of the population that was frightened about its survival. We were in very close touch with the Belgians. I was in touch with some very fine Belgian military officers, who, by and large, were aghast that their government wasn't doing anything of note. This made a bit of bond between me and one of them in particular. But I think Belgium was just so worried that if they put their foot down, their citizens would suffer directly. So, they were unable to do so.

Q: Were there any rumblings from Rwanda, being a Hutu-based government?

PENDLETON: Nothing of consequence that I can recall, but I would have to review the bidding on that. There certainly wasn't anything that I thought was of any great import. The kind of raw brutality from the Hutus that we've seen in this decade didn't same to get mobilized as energy through the government in Rwanda to threaten in a way that would help to put a stop to the slaughter in Burundi.

Q: Well, now, did Kabila and his Congolese(now he was neither Hutu nor Tutsi, but he later became involved with the Tutsis, I think.

PENDLETON: Yes, with the Tutsis. At this point he was not on our radar screen in terms of having anything to do with it. However, Tutsis did charge that some of the Hutus involved in the initial coup or uprising had come across the lake from Kabila-Land,

basically, and they'd had support from Kabila and others. But I don't remember well enough, if I ever knew, what the charges and countercharges were with respect to Kabila. And it just astonished me years later, when he came back on the scene in a very big way.

Q: What was the spirit? I mean, you've got your Ambassador, who from what I gather really couldn't quite admit what was happening, but Michael Hoyt, having his experience in Stanleyville, certainly is aware of, you know, the area. Was there any sort of feeling about what the hell sort of government are we representing, or concern about our policy?

PENDLETON: Well, I felt that way, but I was younger and less wise than Mike, and Mike had been through a lot, and he knew what to expect and what not to expect out of the State Department in Washington with regard to matters in obscure Catholic Church census-takers reported that now more than 100,000 had been killed. Mike put an addition to that: "Tick Tick(A Numbers Game?(to leave it open. Whereas I was being dogmatic, he was experienced enough to trim somewhat.

However, when the Department press spokesman was asked about reports of many thousands killed in Burundi, the press spokesman said two days later, "Well, nobody knows; it's a numbers game." You were dealing in an arena where Mike wanted to make sure that we didn't lose our credibility, and he was quite correct, by being too precise and too dogmatic, and I was pretty sure of my sources, and I think it's like every newspaper and every organization where you have a bit of - I wouldn't say "internal conflict." I was the scribbler, and Mike as change would edit when he could, and sometimes he couldn't and we'd just send stuff on the wires. It was certainly different when I got into larger embassies or back in Washington when you had to have 27 clearances. Mike had spent a good bit of his time in Burundi talking through issues with the Ambassador in large measure to try to encourage the Ambassador to think through some of his enthusiasms more carefully. And I bless Mike for that because that was the only thing which allowed me to do any of what I thought I was there for in terms of contact work or economic and political reporting. But it was astonishing to see in such a tiny embassy an extraordinary amount of time spent in

consultation between the number one and the number two at post with different visions of life and the region in which we were serving.

Q: This is what I think these oral histories bring up. This is a different era. It's unthinkable of anything like that happening today, I mean to have, without having and uproar and the press moving in and everything else.

PENDLETON: Of course there was no TV coverage. The Washington Post arrived two months later, and I was sufficiently traumatized and, I think, by then suspicious of almost everybody that I pulled my punches in talking with the reporter. Then my wife told me she would strangle me if I pulled any punches, so I opened up. My wife had been through a very unpleasant personal experience because she's an attorney and she was teaching law to the law students at the Official University of Bujumbura. She was in the midst of giving them two days of exams on morality and the law, when half her students, the Tutsis, killed the other half. And you could hear the cries from the classrooms. It was one of those things where, you know, my wife and I to this day(we think of it often, I mean, these sorts of events. They really were life-informing in a sense and affected our career in terms of what I wanted to ask her to do with her law degree thereafter. But unless you know people who've been through this sort of experience in a very personal way, it's quite distasteful to most people, particularly the nature of the killings, et cetera. We found when we served later in Brussels, that if you invited a group of old Africa hands over, which meant people who had lived in Rwanda and Burundi, you had a bond that went very deep, whereas you normally could do no more than tip your hat to a neighbor you might see every day, from Brussels, who didn't understand.

Q: What happened? In the summer of '72 you left?

PENDLETON: Yes, I was reassigned in the summer of '72, and by then I was really emotionally quite wiped out. Almost everybody who was going to be killed had been killed, and it seemed, in a sense, a fair moment to leave and let somebody bring a new

measure of enthusiasm to working things out. While in East Africa, Ray Seitz and I had gotten to know Bob Blackwill, who later became ambassador to MBFR. He was serving in Nairobi. Bob was a consummate mover and shaker on the personnel and other fronts, and he played a major role in arranging that Ray Seitz and I would be assigned to the Secretariat, to the Op Center, when I got back — which was fine with me. And so we actually returned to the States that summer. I went on home leave. Ray went on deferred home leave, and then we were both assigned to the National Military Command Center of the Pentagon, which was at that point staffed by Operations Center people representing the State Department. It was the height of the Vietnam War, and the National Military Command Center did nothing, oddly enough, at that point, because everything related to Vietnam was going on elsewhere. I recall a day when they announced on the loudspeaker "All hand on release to watch Sink the Bismarck on Channel 5."

But it was great in one sense. Ray and I traded off. One of us worked from six till noon(we only had to work six hours(and the other one would work noon to six. This allowed us both to get our kids in school and buy a house and get settled, because we'd never lived in Washington, but it soon became clear that the NMCC was a non-job.

Q: You did this in...

PENDLETON: I went to the Pentagon in the early fall of '72, but only for a couple of months, and then one night I was outside the State Department waiting for a bus, and a man who looked quite distinguished said to me, "Where are you working?" And I said, "Over at the National Military Command Center." He said, "Is it useful?" And I said, "It's the least useful thing I've done in my whole adult life." And he said, "Well, I'm the Director General of the Foreign Service. I'll change that." A week later I was moved to the Op Center itself, and he closed down our operation at the NMCC. Ray Seitz, because he had not taken home leave, had already moved on to the Op Center, and our assignments there were done on a first in-first out basis. So I went over and he showed me what you do in the Op Center, which is a very important place. But it doesn't allow for the greatest play of

personality or professionalism in many ways. If you drop the ball, you can make a terrible hash of things, but there are enough professionals there to kind of pick you up and put you back on track. Ray showed me around and instructed me what to do for about ten minutes and said, "That's it." And I said, "What do you mean, 'That's it'?" He said, "Well, that's all we do." But it was more than that, of course, and it was a time of a lot of hijackings to Cuba and other world events.

Q: You were there(I like to get these(from late fall of '72 to-

PENDLETON: I was there, basically from the fall of '72 till the summer of '73, in the Op Center. It was run by Charlie Thomas, who later became ambassador to Hungary, and there were a lot of good people in the Op Center. Another thing I did learn while I was there was about terrorism and our inability to cope with it any more than humanitarian events, because the capture of our charg# in Khartoum, Curtis Moore, took place while I was on the watch.

It was really horrible if you were working in the Op Center, because the way they were communicating with Washington was by typing on some kind of machine, and the words would come up on the screen in a little room adjacent to the Op Center itself. That was the was the first word about each thing that was happening was coming in, and it was very compelling. The senior officials of the Department were coming over to read the messages as they flashed up on the board, and it became very clear to me that nobody(God bless them(knew what to do. I certainly didn't have any suggestions, but it was not the kind of thing that people had experienced or had had experience in systematically dealing with.

Then "Butts" Macomber, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management came in and said, "I will fly to Khartoum to rescue them." And there was such a relief on the part of the officials and everybody else who had been able to read this board that somebody was going to do something. One person said, "I'll find out the weather reports." Another said, "I'll get a plane." Another said, "I'll line up refueling on route," etc. And everybody took a slice of

something they knew how to do, but it seemed to me, as a fly on the wall, that everybody stopped thinking about the plight of the hostages and was only thinking about how to get Macomber there. And of course, by the time Macomber arrived, the hostages were dead, and he could do little more than return with the bodies. His plane was forced to stay in Cairo by a sandstorm, as I recall, and it became really, I think, very, very clear at that moment to an awful lot of people in the Department, that we needed to have experts in coping with terrorism and we needed to have a coordinated approach to how we would deal with the issues that flow therefrom.

Q: There was some question at the time(and I think it still rankles with some people. I think it was Nixon, who was President, made some comment when asked, "Well, we don't give in to terrorists" or something like that(something that was felt that it would probably have been just as well to say, "Yes, things are tricky and I'm not going to comment." But it sounded like something, you know, "I'm tough." Did you note that or not.

PENDLETON: No, but I did become, as the next few years went by, increasingly aware of Henry Kissinger's approach to "no dealing with terrorists." We had later the situation in which we had some captured Stanford students in Tanzania, and I believe that then Secretary Kissinger fired or threatened to fire Ambassador Terry Todman because he said something that made it sound as if it would be all right if Stanford University would pay a ransom. And Kissinger went through the ceiling. That was the approach, yes, you're right. Todman, I gather, later got some help on the Hill to rescue himself from the predicament.

Q: I've heard people say that this is all very nice, but it sounded like Nixon and Kissinger sort of showing we're tough guys when their lives weren't at stake, and rather than let the people deal with it in some way or another, it sounded like posturing. I don't know, I mean, there was a reason for the policy, but the comments made at the time didn't seem to be helpful.

PENDLETON: I can't give any particular perspective on that. I think people did, in a sense, appreciate knowing, as time went on, how the President and Secretary of State viewed the question of hostages. But in terms of my experience in the Operations Center, — which was very peripheral to what was going on but instructive to me— I learned that you always have to look ahead and anticipate and plan for the worst eventuality. As I said, I concluded that you may need, even in a large bureaucracy, an office which has a reservoir of expertise. That was a lesson I took away from the Operations Center big-time. And I always in my subsequent postings tried to make sure that I thought about the worst things that could happen and had some game plan for coping with them.

Q: What about being in the Operations Center? It's always been one of those places where up and coming officers often put in a stint there and they kind of learn the workings of the department, and then often go on to be special assistants or something like that. Did you have the feeling that you were a selected crew or not?

PENDLETON: Well, when I got to the Op Center, I was a bit na#ve about the ways of Washington. I'd been in the Foreign Service for five years and wasn(t quite sure what the best way ahead was. I sensed that the Secretariat staff next door, to which I moved next, was indeed a reservoir of people whom I respected. The Op Center, for me, was an experience that I think would be great for everybody to have, but only for about two months, and I found myself in there for close to a year. Again, under the first in-first out system, Ray Seitz moved on in a couple of months to the Secretariat Staff. As I talked with people there about what they did including advancing Secretarial trip, that seemed to me to allow more leeway and play. I wanted to move in there. It was at that point run by Nick Platt, who became ambassador to Zambia, the Philippines and Pakistan and is now head of the Asia Society. By the time I arrived, Dick Viets was the director. He had been in the Op Center and became ambassador to Tanzania.

Q: Well I think that after Jordan, he was nominated to go to Portugal and he ran afoul of Jesse Helms and never went there.

PENDLETON: Well, he ran afoul of a variety of things, including an admin officer who worked for him, but that's another(

Q: Which helped get Jesse Helms on his tail.

PENDLETON: That's correct. At any rate, there were, in the Secretariat Staff really a superb group of people at that point: Ray Seitz, Bob Blackwill (who came ambassador to MBFR), George Ward (who's now our ambassador in Namibia), Lionel Rosenblatt, who left the Service to work on refugees after going to rescue people in Vietnam, Richard Mueller (eventually consul general in Hong Kong), Lang Schermerhorn (and later ambassador in Africa), etc.

So I moved there in the summer of '73 and was there for a year, as I recall. And during that time, Kissinger was Secretary of State, and that, in one sense, marginalized the secretariat staff, but in another sense, it meant that when you were advancing and going on trips it was a terrific learning experience. You were right in the middle of the fray, particularly the Middle East shuttle, which we ran out of our office. Dick Viets selected Ray Seitz to be the next head of the secretariat staff, and Seitz was a remarkably mature O-5 at that time(

Q: That was about captain-level in the army.

PENDLETON: He was captain, yes. And he also was selected by Eagleburger and Jerry Bremer, who was one of Kissinger's special assistants, to join the team in Kissinger's immediate office.

But they forgot to raise that with Kissinger, their decision that Seitz would move to the Secretary of State's office, and Kissinger had independently decided he wanted to have David Gomper, who'd been with him at the NSC, come and do that job. So Seitz ended

up moving temporarily to Personnel to work with Carol Laise, who'd been ambassador to Nepal and was married to ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who was ambassador in Saigon.

Q: (and was at that point Director General of the Foreign Service.

PENDLETON: -and was director general. I found myself, for about five months, acting director ohe secretariat staff, which was a terrific opportunity. We were staffing all the shuttle flights, as I mentioned. I had been before that in something called Team S, for which the paper coming front-channel to Kissinger was to go, and Bob Blackwill, Richard Mueller and I were put in small room and smothered with paper while others didn't have enough to do when they were in town. And in one of those quirks, you know, I found that suddenly I was supervising Charlie Thomas, who had been my boss as head of the Op Center. He was supposed to go to the White House to work for Spiro Agnew. Agnew was getting into some difficulty, and a hold was put on Charlie's transfer to his office as international affairs advisor. So Charlie suddenly found himself assigned temporarily to the secretariat staff, reporting to me. And I have to say, that he was as gracious and energetic as anybody, and it taught me a real lesson about how, in a bureaucracy, you can find yourself in many different situations and you have to judge how you want to play it. He played it, I thought, very professionally.

Speaking of Agnew, I'm embarrassed to say that as far as I know, I'm the last person who will confess to having seen his resignation letter. It came into my in-box one day, and I routed it to the Legal Advisor's Office and Historian's Office, and it was never seen again. I didn't know it had disappeared until its disappearance was written up in The Washington Post. Then I called the investigators and told them, confessed that I had seen it and that I'd been really dumb, when it surfaced amongst all the papers I was dealing with, instead of hand-carrying it, I had routed it and put it in my out-box just the way it came into my in-box. And for somebody who has a strong historical interest - this was written to the Secretary of State - I think it was a shame that it was filched along the way.

For me, I think the most memorable experiences came from going on a couple of the Middle East trips. We were up at the United Nations when the Yom Kippur War broke out, and I was alerted in the early morning.

Q: This was October of '73.

PENDLETON: Of '73. And we went from a situation where Kissinger was meeting with lots of foreign leaders to a situation of considerable pandemonium and a retreat to Washington(organized pandemonium(but it was right at the beginning of Kissinger's tenure as Secretary of State, and there were some things to work out along the way. For instance, the Executive Secretary of the Department was a highly energetic individual named Tom Pickering, who also had in his title, I think, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. He kept taking intelligence information into the Secretary, and Eagleburger, who had come from the White House with Kissinger, could see, I think, that there was going to be (shall we politely say(confusion, if he and Pickering were both attempting to provide the Secretary with what they thought the Secretary needed. And Eagleburger, as a person very close to the Secretary of State, and Pickering, as a person sitting astride the bureaucracy, inevitably began to knock heads with each other. The tension soon thereafter landed Pickering in Amman, Jordan, as ambassador, with a golden handshake, and Eagleburger was left pretty much in charge as the right-hand man to the Secretary in Washington.

But these shuttle trips, for instance, were fascinating. I went to the first visit to Damascus just before Christmas in '73, and Assad had given Kissinger, apparently, an hour for conversation. After five hours he hadn't come back to the plane. Most of us were not let off the plane, and we stayed aboard. This was the first visit to Damascus of an American of any level since the Six-Day War. There were soldiers linked arm-in-arm around the plane, and there were armored personnel carriers and other things with their guns pointed at the plane. I spent a lot of the time talking to my wife on the phone because she had decided, while I was away, to take a new job at a law firm in town, and we wanted to sort that out.

A Secret Service man, sicker than a dog, was brought back to the plane after a couple of hours, and we were very worried when he arrived as to what the hell had gone on. But he said that, no, they were just talking.

It was fascinating to go back several weeks later and see the change. We were all invited off the plane. We were all put up either in hotels or at the guest palace of Assad. I remember working through much of the night and then going to bed at four in the morning, sharing a hotel room with a young journalist named Ted Koppel for about an hour and a half before we had to get up again. The quality of the journalists who traveled with Kissinger was extraordinary in those days.

Kissinger made one of those breakthroughs with Assad that only Kissinger could make. And while Kissinger was not an easy person to deal with, I came to respect him tremendously for what he could do that others couldn(t.

Q: Well, did you feel the heavy hand of Kissinger in your operations when you were on these trips, the demands?

PENDLETON: Oh, yes. In a way those at my level and some considerably above were just messengers. I remember once crossing the Atlantic with him, standing up as we got cables arriving aboard, being faxed, coming out of this one little machine, and you had to distribute them to people like Ellsworth Bunker, Win Lord, Joe Sisco, Peter Rodman, Larry Eagleburger, Hal Sanders, Roy Atherton, George Vest, et cetera, and I realized as we were arriving in London that I had stood up the entire way across the Atlantic, except for takeoff. Kissinger also had stood up almost the entire way across, and he was making everybody work. And if, say, Roy Atherton got a cable sent to him, Kissinger would filch it(Atherton was Assistant Secretary for the Middle East at that point(read it and dictate a reply that would blow an ambassador out of the air who never thought that he was going to reach the Secretary of State himself.

During that second trip to Damascus, Embassy Beirut sent overland a number of people, officers and secretaries, and a great deal of gear to be used for support(typewriters and xerox machines and things(and Kissinger came into the office where I was surrounded by this stuff, and he said to me in his characteristic voice, "Who are all these people?" And I said, "Well, they've come from Beirut to help you." And he looked around and said, "And to think I opened up China with only two people, neither of whom could type."

Q: Well, tell me, I'm interested in the reaction to the Yom Kippur War, the October '73 War. Obviously, you were the fly on the wall, and all that, but what was the reaction to developments on this, as you saw them?

PENDLETON: Well, I think that Kissinger immediately saw that this was both a very dangerous challenge and a real opportunity, and I think he made everybody who cared think much harder about how you deal with strategy and not get bogged down in tactics. I've always considered it singularly important that when he went to the Middle East for the first time, starting, what, it became known as "shuttle diplomacy," he went via Moscow. Doing so was a crucial statement about what the war could lead to. Furthermore, by trying to line up the Russians, thinking brilliantly about how you could manage this, Kissinger was determined to make of this mess something that would be good for the Middle East, good for the United States, good for the world. And I think he did so, in a way that probably nobody else could have done. You couldn't help but feel that this was going on, and it led, of course, to something called a Middle East Peace Conference in Geneva, which was a two-day circus in December of '73. I remember I got into trouble with Hal Saunders, who was the remarkably fine head of the NSC Middle East division.

One of the things that Kissinger wanted to do was to bring the parties together in Geneva. It was not to be a peace conference, but I was in charge of assembling the briefing books for this damned thing, and I called the staff aide in the Near East Bureau and said, "What shall we put on the front? Can we call it the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference?" And the staff aide said, "Sure." And I was reasonably untutored, so I sent 500 books to be silk-

screened. So we had our first planning meeting, and Hal Saunders, who was running it, said, "There's one thing that won't happen, and we we're not going to call this a Middle East peace conference." And I said, "Hal, I'm terribly sorry, but we've just silk-screened 500 books that call it that." And he said, "Oh. I know when the bureaucracy wins, "Okay, I guess we'll call it the Middle East Peace Conference."

I was sent on ahead from Jerusalem to Geneva to collaborate with David Korn (with whom I had worked in Tel Aviv), who had come out from the Near East Bureau to arrange the seating, among other things. Well, this was at a time when the U.S. had been spending months trying to arrange seating for a Vietnam peace table, and David and I went over to the palace where it was going to be held(and this included all the players and people who didn(t talk to each other(and we just kind of set it up, and it stuck, to my amazement. Also, because I was there early and the Egyptians were there early, the Egyptian Foreign Minister thought that I was closer Kissinger than I was and convoked me to straighten out some of the substantive things that Egypt wanted the United States to know and do before Kissinger arrived. Where was Kissinger? Kissinger had gone characteristically from Jerusalem to Spain, where he had met with the Vietnamese. His ability to balance all of these incredibly complex issues at once certainly became clear to me.

But you can imagine that as one got involved in these things they were terrific learning experiences for a youngish officer with the opportunity to really put one's foot in one's mouth if one tried hard enough. I think we survived. That conference did about all that could have been expected of it, and we were able to return on Christmas Eve, which was an adventure in itself because we got word that Kissinger's plane was going to be blown out of the air on take-off from Geneva. As I recall, I wasn't going to be allowed on the plane because it was oversubscribed. Everybody wanted to get home(all the journalists, too(by the 25th. But Ellsworth Bunker decided that he would fly another way, so I got his seat and held my breath, and we arrived on Christmas Eve at Andrews to be greeted by our families.

Q: Well, involved in this Middle East peace process, did you find that your experience in Tel Aviv, could you use this to understand a little of it, I mean, in order to add anything to what was going on?

PENDLETON: That's a good question. Yes and no. There are people like Roy Atherton, who were very open(and Sisco, if you got him at the right moment, was open to observations you might have(but my job at that point was really very much the paper pusher keeping stuff going, up all night preparing the messages from all over the world for the Secretary to read in the morning, helping get reports out, facilitating. I did find Roy Atherton particularly willing to listen if you had something useful to say. He may have been just characteristically gentlemanly. These were hard times for all of these people. They were working around the clock, and they were doing some of the best work for the US Government that I'm sure has ever been done.

And things would happen. For example, maps were absolutely vital in the process, and on one occasion when we were leaving Damascus to fly to Tel Aviv and go on to Jerusalem, the Marines forgot to load the map case aboard. They put it in the truck and left it in the truck. And when we called back from the plane, when we realized it wasn't on the plane, they said, "Oh, we knew it was very sensitive, so we destroyed it." And I have rarely seen Roy Atherton agitated, but he looked as if he was pretty unhappy on that occasion, as we tried to reconstruct discussions and decisions that were reflected on the working maps.

Q: How did you deal with Joseph Sisco, who's known, again, as one of the cleverest bureaucrats in the business. In this thing, did you find him in full fettle, or was he just a person?

PENDLETON: Oh, yes, I mean, you spent often eight hours just a few feet from people, and the people included, as I mentioned, Ellsworth Bunker and Win Lord, who was running the Policy Planning Staff at that point, and the high muckamucks from NEA. Sisco was a very voluble person, but I had gotten to know him a little bit in Israel when I was serving

there. He came through twice, I think it was, and, you know, I was his bag carrier when I was in Israel. He had offered me a job as his assistant, staff aide in NEA. When he got back to Washington he discovered that his deputy had offered it to somebody else and it had been accepted so it wasn't his to offer. But I found that dealing with Joe Sisco, you simply had to stand up straight and be very forward leaning and say what you thought and say it loud and clear. If you got a cream pie in the face, you just would go right on back and deal with it. I might have had to change my persona, but I think he respected people who were professional, working hard and were forthright..

We got Presidential word that F-16's, more of them, could go to Israel, once when we were in the motorcade going from Claridge's Hotel in London to Heathrow to fly on to the Middle East, and I was asked to convey immediately to Sisco the number that the President had approved, which I tried to do cryptically on the radio, but it turned out that every time I tried, I plunged into a tunnel, and he was on a flyover. But what I didn(t know was he got the message about eight or nine times, and when I got to the airport(and it wasn't clear he had gotten it at all(he said, "If I hear that bloody message from you once again, I will strangle you!"

At the same time, as Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, he was concerned that he was spending too much time on the Middle East and paying very little attention to the rest of the globe. He fretted about that.

Q: Did you get involved at all in the Vietnamese peace process?

PENDLETON: No, not at all. And I really had very little to do with Vietnam at any point until the collapse of Saigon, when I was in the Deputy Secretary's office, and that's a tale for another moment, but it's also interesting that at the moment of the fall of Saigon, Kissinger was in the Middle East on one of his shuttles(I think it was the famous 38-day shuttle, when people thought they were going for four days and never came home, or it may have been a later one, I can't remember, it was the one with Ellsworth Bunker's

80th birthday and stuff(and the folks back in Washington had to do an awful lot without Kissinger. I remember being very involved in trying to deactivate the nuclear plant at Dalat, and that sort of thing, but Vietnam was not an area that I knew anything particular about or on which I could add very much to your insights.

Q: Well, I was thinking, this might be a good place to stop now because we're moving, what, in '74 you moved to be a special assistant to whom?

PENDLETON: Bob Ingersoll(

Q: To Bob Ingersoll.

PENDLETON: (who had just become Kissinger's Deputy Secretary of State.

Q: And you were there from '74 to(

PENDLETON: (to '76. And then I went to the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels.

Q: Okay.

PENDLETON: I was there until Bob Ingersoll left, returned to private life. So I was there his entire tenure as deputy secretary, from the first couple of weeks of his tenure to the last day. I was a special assistant to the deputy secretary, and that came about in part because I was sitting in my office in the secretariat staff one morning about seven o'clock, and Parker Borg, who was working for the Director General, called me and asked if I knew anybody who might like to work for the deputy secretary, and I gave him some names and then I said, "What about me?" And he said, "Well, I was hoping you'd say that." Parker was a personable and energetic fellow who became ambassador to Mali when he was younger, and ambassador to Iceland just before he retired. So he arranged an interview with Bob Ingersoll for me, and Ingersoll and I rather hit it off, which was not hard to do because Ingersoll was, and is, a tremendously likable person. He had been on the Smith

College Board of Trustees with my mother-in-law and had gone to Andover and Yale, as had I, so he felt somewhat at ease with me.

Q: The deputy secretary is different things at different times, but how would you describe it during the Ingersoll period? What did the deputy secretary do?

PENDLETON: Well, that's a prescient question because it was the Kissinger era, and Kissinger really was the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and an awful lot else, and, as I suggested earlier, even Joe Sisco growled that he was not, as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, just going to be the office director for Middle East affairs, and he felt marginalized on occasion. I think that Kissinger chose Ingersoll, who had had a distinguished career as head of Borg-Warner Corporation and then as ambassador to Japan, where he served superbly by all accounts. Then he was Assistant Secretary for East Asia, and I think Kissinger probably turned to him with the full assurance that Bob Ingersoll would be an absolutely loyal and energetic member of Kissinger's team. At the same time, there was not any particular danger that the deputy secretary would try to sail across the Secretary's bow. This meant that the deputy secretary was involved in almost everything but in charge of less than might have been the case under some other regimes where portfolios were divided a little bit more evenly. He was busy as heck the whole time, but when a crisis erupted it almost automatically ended up in Kissinger's lap and not necessarily in that of the deputy secretary unless Kissinger was away and then Ingersoll had to be prepared to represent the Department at Cabinet and other high-level meetings. The deputy secretary held the hands of an awful lot of people, both within the building and around town —as well as within the diplomatic community— who did not feel that they were getting adequate access to the Secretary of State. He took on a lot of chores that would have driven a lesser person crazy. He had the unenviable task of firing a number of ambassadors on Kissinger's behalf by calling them up and telling them that they were gone. He rarely was the one who chose the new ambassadors and made them happy, although he played a key roll in the process. He devoted a great deal of energy, of course, to East Asia and always had

to be very careful that he wasn't, like Sisco, just a kind of ongoing office director for East Asia. As you can imagine, every Japanese group that came to town wanted to see him. And it was hard to say no, but he learned. He devoted a lot of time to nuclear issues. He devoted a lot of time to personnel issues. And he devoted a lot of time to making sure that, to the extent possible, Kissinger's time was saved. This meant, for instance, that a great many documents which were legally required to be signed by the Acting-Secretary of State or the Secretary of State would be saved until Kissinger would go on the road. Then wheelbarrows full of them would come into the deputy secretary's offices and we all would have to grapple with some of the most complex legal and technical and political issues that you can imagine.

Q: How did he accept this role? Was this one that he both did well and willingly?

PENDLETON: Bob Ingersoll was a man who could be totally relied on to do the necessary and to do it to the best of his capabilities and to do it around the clock. And he accepted the role with grace. I'm not saying there weren't occasional frustrations, but he was a man who knew himself. He knew what he had achieved already in this world. I think he was a little surprised to find himself as deputy secretary of State, and he served with the kind of old-school devotion to duty that one doesn't always see at the end of this century.

Q: I would think(you're sort of sitting at the man's elbow while he's doing these things(with a Secretary of State like Henry Kissinger there must have been a lot of things where Henry Kissinger had obviously a narrow focus of attention, as any Secretary does, but Kissinger was very suspicious. There must have been things that weren't getting done or that almost had to be done that the Secretary didn't know about in order to keep the operation going. Was Ingersoll able to play in that game, sort of say, "Well, wait till the Secretary's out and I'll sign it for you," or something like that?

PENDLETON: To a degree. He worked closely with Larry Eagleburger, who was Kissinger's executive assistant. And Eagleburger on occasion seemed more like the

deputy secretary and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs than the two who were doing those jobs, and it was frequently Eagleburger who sensed that Kissinger needed help in one area or another and would go to Ingersoll, parading into the office and snapping his finger and sending anybody else who was in there(including myself, or course(out and lay it out to Ingersoll what his view was. And Ingersoll would mull it over and decide how he wanted to approach it. There were also a lot of people in the building, who(as I mentioned before(didn't feel that they were getting attention, and he frequently gave it to them, whether it was Law of the Sea negotiations or a complicated nuclear matter or the fate of the Bureau of Cultural Affairs, which was moved over to USIA. He lent his ear. He often did for Kissinger, as I say, some of the nasty jobs, including informing the Taiwanese that a new ambassador was not welcome, given our approach to China, or telling an American ambassador that he would be leaving his post in the days ahead, or telling the South Africans to go to hell when their ambassador, Pik Botha, thought that he might have the ear of the deputy secretary since Ingersoll had been a businessman with operations in South Africa.

And so he served where Kissinger and he and his common sense and Larry Eagleburger and others saw a role, and I think he did a fine job, given the way that Kissinger was determined to play the role of Secretary of State. There were also times when, for instance, when Saigon fell in the spring of '75(that Kissinger was in the Middle East or elsewhere. The fall of Saigon was sufficiently complex that nobody on a shuttle mission on an airplane and in hotel rooms could keep up with it. It was very, very difficult to keep up with, but there was so much within the Washington bureaucracy that had to be dealt with that a great deal of it fell to Bob Ingersoll, in part because he had been Assistant Secretary for East Asia and was familiar with Vietnam. So I found myself, for instance, working very hard on trying to close down the nuclear reactor before it would fall into enemy hands, and just that tiny little sliver of the overall evacuation pie turned out to be extremely complex and time-consuming.

Q: How did it come out?

PENDLETON: We managed, as I recall, to get a team in who deactivated the reactor in time, but it was touch-and-go, and I don't know the fate of it after that. One suddenly found oneself learning lessons about issues that I, for one, had not worked on, but which really had to be handled swiftly and at the appropriate level in Washington.

I should say that one of the strange and perhaps(it's hard looking back to think it was appropriate, but it made it a lot easier for staffers(was that under Kissinger, all phone calls on that level at the Department were monitored by staffers, and if somebody called Bob Ingersoll, one of us among the special assistants would be asked to listen in on the phone call from our own desk. No word was given to the others who were calling that this was happening. What it allowed was a certain kind of efficiency, along with the invasion of privacy. It allowed Ingersoll to pick up the phone after a conversation and say, "Did you hear that?" Answer: "Yes." "Well, do the necessary." "Yes, Sir." And you wouldn't have to spend a great deal of time going back over issues. That gave one, from that perch, guite a bit of insight into issues and people that one might not have had otherwise, whether it was a call from Capitol Hill or a Cabinet member(I must say I came to respect, for instance, Attorney General Levi very much from listening to phone calls with him, and I also came to respect very much the Secretary of Commerce, James Baker, who later became Secretary of State. These were friends of Ingersoll's, and they talked a fair bit. And you could take the measure of the person through listening. That was educational for me. It did help the running of the office, but I am much more comfortable at this point with this present system where you're not being monitored when you call one of those people(as far as I know.

Q: Did you ever find that Ingersoll "being blind sided" or at least being surprised by the fact that Henry Kissinger often did things he didn't tell people what he was up to outside of his little circle or something? Something might come up(promises made, deals done or something(and all of a sudden, and the deputy secretary wasn't in the know?

PENDLETON: That happened —it was almost inevitable, given the number of issues that Kissinger was working on— and Ingersoll seemed quite philosophical about it. If it was important that he know, Larry Eagleburger would make sure that Ingersoll was cut in. Even those who had been selected by the Secretary of State to be in his closest coterie. whether it be Art Hartman, as Assistant Secretary for Europe, or Tom Enders, as at that point working economic issues and oil, Win Lord, as head of the Policy Planning Council, who'd been close to Kissinger previously (not one of them felt that they had Kissinger's total confidence or sufficient face time, as they say these days, with him on issues that were crucial to them. They could be blind sided on occasion. At one point, Ingersoll and Eagleburger cooked up a Saturday morning get-together of key Assistant Secretaries and others who worked the most closely with Kissinger, and you would have thought they would be the ones who would be the most content about their ties to the Secretary of State. However, there was abundant criticism in this meeting about how Kissinger ran things and his inaccessibility and his lack of guidance on issues which were key to them. And I recall looking around the room and realizing something one probably wouldn't see again in the future any time soon, except perhaps when George Shultz was Secretary. That was that with the exception of Win Lord, who had been a Foreign Service Officer, all these unhappy folks at the most August level were Foreign Service Officers, many of whom had been hand-picked by Kissinger and Eagleburger and propelled over the heads of others. But these were people of no mean ego and no mean intellect who were totally dedicated to doing the finest job they could and, therefore, somewhat frustrated if they found themselves marginalized on occasion. They were not shy about saying so at the meeting.

I think, as I said, Ingersoll himself was a bit more philosophical about this, having had a few more years than most of these people, and being as distinguished as they were and are and having been somewhat surprised that he'd been catapulted into the deputy secretary position. So for him it was not a major issue as far as he betrayed on a day-to-day basis.

Q: Did he find himself taking over any area more than not? I was thinking particularly of Africa or Latin America, or when he took over an area it was more just Asia because he knew Asia.

PENDLETON: He did a lot with Asia, of course, but what people knew in the building was that Bob Ingersoll would listen to them if there was a crisis. If there was a fishing dispute off the west coast of South America, if there was a terrorism crisis in Africa, and if it fell below the threshold that Kissinger was going to deal with on a day-to-day basis, people knew that they could go to Bob Ingersoll(and they would go to Bob Ingersoll(because bureaucracies hate a vacuum. And Ingersoll was smart enough to know that if he was making a decision which required some validation from above, some coordination with the White House, he would propel often his trusted and energetic executive assistant, Bob Duemling, who later became ambassador to Surinam, to run interference; or if Bob wasn(t there, Lionel Rosenblatt, who was the other special assistant or myself to try to coordinate. Rather than going to Kissinger directly, he would, more often than not, simply clear it through Larry Eagleburger either directly or through his special assistant, Wes Egon or Patrick Theros, both of whom became ambassadors later in life.

Q: What was your role?

PENDLETON: Well, initially, both Lionell and I were general paper-pushers and follow-up artists, and we got tons of paper which needed analyzing into the office and did the prioritizing and clarifying before it could go to the deputy secretary. And one had to get used to this. I was used, I thought, from the Op Center and other places, to dealing with large amounts of paper under a lot of pressure on a great many diverse subjects, but very soon after Ingersoll became deputy secretary of State, Turkey invaded Cyprus(

Q: July 14, 1974.

PENDLETON: (almost to the day(and all hell broke loose. In part, it was a very interesting case study, because just weeks before, the Greek-Turkey-Cyprus Desk had been removed from NEA, the Middle East bureau, and North Africa Bureau, and put in the European Bureau. This meant that the leadership of the European Bureau did not know the players or the issues and yet found themselves having to brief the Secretary of State. The amount of traffic(intelligence traffic, other traffic, cable traffic(on this subject was astonishing to me, and, I recall I think, my first day at the desk in Ingersoll's office, Art Hartman, as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs at that point, came roaring in and said, "What does the deputy secretary think about the latest flash cable?" And I said, "I doubt he has seen it because I haven't seen it, and there are about 50,000 sheets of paper that have been brought in here in the last half hour." And he said, "Well, if you can't keep on top of it, go find another job."

Q: Well, I've interviewed Wells Stabler who was there, but others during that switch over(here you had what amounted to a rather staid sophisticated European Bureau, and all of a sudden they get the Katzenjammer Kids of Greece and Turkey going at each other, and it's sort of, you know, I mean, they just weren't used to this type of fighting within their bureau, I mean, real, honest-to-God fighting.

PENDLETON: I don't think they were, and I must say, Wells Stabler clearly found it rather wearing.

Q: Oh, yes. And it didn't bring out his most amiable side.

PENDLETON: And you had to deal with him, but the invasion was quite a turning point, actually, because I think it was one of the few times that Kissinger somewhat lost it, in terms of having a concept of how to deal constructively with an issue and how to master the issue and how to dominate the issue. Kissinger was not against looking for expertise from down the food chain, but it was hard to play that role. You had to be invited, and the wrong cats were being invited for bureaucratic reasons. And I think historians will look

back at this, taking it from the perspective of how a bureaucracy copes with a challenge, and say this was an interesting moment and it was a moment of considerable significance in the evolution of Henry Kissinger and maybe the State Department, who knows?

Q: I would refer readers here to look at the oral histories of Bob Dillon and Tom Boyatt on this as well as Wells Stabler and others. You know, you're absolutely right. You mentioned the deputy secretary got stuck with firing ambassadors. Was this happening? I mean, was Henry Kissinger pointing his finger and saying, "Off with his head"?

PENDLETON: Well, it was hard to tell. Larry Eagleburger did so on occasion, or threatened to, or an opening had to be made for, for instance, the previous deputy secretary, Ken Rush, to go to be ambassador to France. And another previous deputy secretary that had to be informed that his time on the Place de la Concorde was up.

Q: That was the end game of Watergate.

PENDLETON: Yes, before Nixon's resignation, and he was then given the embassy in Paris. So of course, the ambassador in Paris had to be moved. That was just one of the occasions when it fell to Bob Ingersoll to give the bad news to the incumbent.

A "funny" thing happened involving Larry Eagleburger at Christmas of '75. Kissinger, as I recall, had gone to the Caribbean, and Ingersoll had gone to Aspen, and about the 18th of December, Ingersoll was instructed by Kissinger to find a new Deputy Under Secretary for Management and to do so by January 1, as I recall. And that was not a job that was easy to fill. There were a number of people who had expressed interest, including a mayor of a city in upstate New York, and I was asked to lead this job hunt over Christmas and to come up with recommendations for Kissinger. I really threw myself into it, but there were very few names out there, and it was hard to think of other names, and it was supposed to be somebody from outside the Department. I remember calling Governor Rockefeller's executive assistant to find out what the governor thought of this particular mayor, and she

called me back the next day and said, "Mr. Pendleton, nice guy, no balls, that mayor." So we didn(t want him.

In the end it occurred to me, as I was sleepless over Christmas, that the only person who could really do the job properly and speak on Capitol Hill on behalf of Kissinger and the Department who actually cared about the Department was Larry Eagleburger. This was not what Larry wanted to hear, at all, and he had said that he didn't want to be considered, but I told Ingersoll, "Really, the others just don't hack it. Larry's the only guy who can do it." Ingersoll agreed, and had me draft a cable from him to Kissinger in the Caribbean(he was in Aspen, as I said(saying that Larry was the only logical one, and Eagleburger found himself a couple of days later with that job, on top of being executive assistant to the Secretary. I don't know how that affected our ongoing relationship, but it probably wasn't career enhancing for me. And Larry, as always, did the job with vigor and commitment —if not total good grace.

Q: Well, did you notice, where you were, any change in, sort of, how the State Department operated and reactions overseas and whatever(but anyway, basically, the efficiency of the Department with the resignation of Nixon in '74?

PENDLETON: Well, if I might back up just a little bit. The resignation of Nixon, to me, was almost inconceivable. But one day late in the game I was in the shower, and it suddenly occurred to me that this man may really have to resign(which now seems self-evident but did not seem so at that point. And I thought, if he resigns, we're going to have to do a lot of things on the foreign policy front just in the first 12 hours. And so I decided I'd better rush in the office(this was about six in the morning(and I went in and made a checklist of things we'd have to do in the State Department if the President should have to resign. And when the deputy secretary came in about seven, I gave it to him as a starting point. It didn't seem to surprise him that the President might have to resign, he being a wiser fellow than me. At about eight, as I recall, Ingersoll was called to Kissinger's office, and when he came back he told us that we'd better start working on preparations for the resignation of

the President, —which was quite a shock to me. But we, including Larry Eagleburger and others, but a very, very small group, went into the deputy secretary's conference room, which incidentally had served as the State Department room in which the X-Committee met during the Cuban Missile Crisis. They could sneak up from the basement of the State Department in the deputy secretary's private elevator into that room without being patrolled by the press. And we started drafting, for instance, cables about the continuity of American foreign policy despite the resignation of the President. Of course we were tailoring cables to friends, allies, enemies, neutrals, et cetera and trying to personalize them in advance to the individual presidents and prime ministers, et cetera, with whom we would be communicating. We also prepared cables to foreign ministers; and it gave us a little bit of a leg up when Nixon, I think the next day, did resign.

And you know, a funny thing happened. When Nixon's helicopter left the White House to take him into exile, it was a cloudy day, and those of us who worked for Ingersoll were in his massive office, looking out the windows over this gorgeous view of the Lincoln Memorial. And as the helicopter went into the clouds, the clouds opened and a ray of light came down and hit the Lincoln Memorial. I couldn't believe it. We were just quite amazed. And I said a few minutes later to Bob Ingersoll who was seated at his desk, "This must be hard on you." He said, "No, it isn't." He said, "The man was a crook," which surprised me. And I think that people of Bob Ingersoll's rectitude found it extremely hard to accept what had been going on, even though he was sworn to and did serve the President with all diligence.

Now, that doesn't answer your question about what changed thereafter. I did not sense, as long as Kissinger was Secretary of State that there was a massive amount of turbulence in the wake of Nixon's resignation. And it may be my own naivete, but it seemed to me that a great many things, as long as Kissinger still had his hand on the tiller, were going ahead as they had heretofore. And one of my aims in doing that checklist was to make sure that people understood that the United States has a process and a momentum and a continuity that's built into the system, that they need not worry about the arrival of a new President.

The arrival of a new President did, in very parochial ways, have some effect. For instance, President Ford wanted to be reelected, and he started appointing a whole lot of people to be ambassadors at the very end of his tenure, when they could hardly be confirmed, much less get to post. This was largely for political reasons. And there was that kind of internal disruption in a variety of places that ideally wouldn't have taken place. But it almost looks like child's play compared to today, where we seem to think nothing about, as a nation, leaving key ambassadorial posts unfilled for a year or more.

Q: Well, often a job at that level, as special assistant to somebody, the second-ranking person in the State Department, usually means that you've got a good chance of almost naming your next job. How did you find it?

PENDLETON: Well, perhaps naively(this is something that I've not necessarily been very good at, as the record will show(because I had had the good fortune, while in the deputy secretary's office, of reaching the O-1 level(the old O-3 level(

Q: Approximately colonel-level.

PENDLETON: (really quite quickly, after about eight or nine years in the Service. And some were not amused by that, but I hadn't seen much of my family during that time, so I felt, well, I'm not going to protest. I also felt that I had taken a route from overseas back through the Op Center, secretariat staff, the deputy secretary's office, where once I was in Washington I was in a position more or less to tell other people what to do but I didn't have to do it myself. And I think I was quite good at anticipating what might be needed and in encouraging people to tell the real story so that the deputy secretary wouldn't get caught, et cetera, but I didn't have to stay there(I was there at eight at night(but I didn't have to stay at my desk as a desk officer at eight at night scribbling. And I thought, the big issues really are still East-West; I should try to go to NATO and learn what NATO's about so I could get an introduction to multilateral diplomacy at a manageable level without doing the 150 countries of the United Nations. I wanted to deal with key issues that affected the

Western Alliance and affected East-West relations, and it would sheep-dip me even as an O-3 in stuff that a lot of people as desk officers would have done in the Department earlier on. So I went after that, just to be a regular political officer at the US mission to NATO. Bob Ingersoll, obviously, was helpful in letting the bureau know that I had this interest. Ed Stabler who was our extremely able deputy chief of mission at NATO, was not amused, and understandable, because I did not have the background that he would have selected for a person coming in, and he had his eye on somebody else who had served him on the NATO desk. So when I got to Brussels we had to go through the normal sort of healing that I suppose has to go on, although I was a fairly small cog in the wheel.

I wonder, before we leave the deputy secretary's office, if I could say one thing about human rights that goes back to my interest in Burundi and the massacres there. That is that while I was in the deputy secretary's office, some members of Congress began to be itchy about arms sales to countries which were abusers of human rights and, among other things, began demanding human rights reports on countries which had a pattern of gross violation of human rights while receiving arms from us. And Kissinger was not keen on producing such a report, which is now a staple of the State Department's year and its approach to dealing with foreign countries. We're now in a very different era, but Carl Maw, who had been Kissinger's private lawyer at Cravath, had become the Department's legal advisor. He told Kissinger that he had better be prepared to do this or there would be a hornets' nest. And Kissinger, as I understood it, said no. But Carl organized a small group, including myself, which began to map out what would be included in human rights reports. We didn't get all that far with it, but a growing number of members of Congress who felt that Kissinger was dragging his feet set up a meeting with Kissinger and read him the riot act. Kissinger then decided that we'd better obey what had become the law. And the first reports were produced. They've been refined, and they've been tinkered with politically over the years, unfortunately, but by and large, they are a very well and carefully done product with a significant impact.

Q: What was Ingersoll's reaction to the human rights report?

PENDLETON: Well, I think that here is a man who had a strong humane feeling and slightly less of a bureaucratic feeling than some, and he felt that we basically had to be responsive to the Legislative Branch on this. Whether he paraded in and added his voice to Carl Maw's with Kissinger, I do not know. He rarely paraded. But he was certainly comfortable with having me work part time on this project. And it was hard to work in any detail on projects when you were constantly dealing with a lot of paper and various alarms and excursions..

And with the fall of Saigon we lost the remarkable Lionel Rosenblatt, which is a tale in itself, one you know separately, but Lionel was the other special assistant. One Sunday I went into the office, and to my surprise, Lionel was there getting his passport. And he said, "See you later," and went away. And the next thing we heard, he was in Saigon helping to rescue former employees of the United States Government in Saigon, along with Craig Johnstone. The two of them had gone out together. I assumed this was not going to be helpful to Lionel's career, however admirable it was Ray Seitz called me from the director general's office and said that he couldn't imagine how Lionel would survive, just walking out of the deputy secretary's office. But eventually Lionel came back for a little while, and he and Craig were convoked by Kissinger. We all expected that they would be fired. But after he reprimanded them, Kissinger took them to the door and put his arm around them and told them that if he were younger he'd have done exactly the same thing and said bravo —being a refugee himself. Lionel left not long thereafter to work with Julia Taft on reestablishing refugees and then went to head, eventually, Refugees International, which he does with terrific vigor to this day. I think he's one of the heroes of the second half of the 20th century, basically. Craig Johnstone also went on to a really distinguished career.

Q: I knew Lionel in Saigon back before.

PENDLETON: Lionel's departure added to my burdens because, while Steve Worrel, for instance, came to help part-time, it took us a fair while before we could lasso Bob Beecroft to come back from Europe and join the office, and it just meant that we were constantly(Bob Duemling and I and the others(dealing with more than one wanted to cope with.

Q: Well, getting out of the sweat box, in '76 you went, what, to NATO?

PENDLETON: I went to NATO, yes.

Q: You were in NATO from when to when?

PENDLETON: '76 to '79.

Q: What was your job?

PENDLETON: I was a political officer at NATO.

Q: This was in Brussels.

PENDLETON: Just outside of Brussels, at the US mission to NATO, out near the airport in a place called Ev#re. And I started out largely with regional issues, which were perhaps easier to chew on than MBFR or proliferation issues. Some I could even imagine, such as Malta; some I could imagine but couldn't deal with, such as the Greek-Turkish element at NATO. Those folks squabbled without ceasing. They intervened in every single discussion of the North Atlantic Council, pointing fingers at each other. It wasn't a surprise, but you could be talking about building a telecommunications link between the Netherlands and Belgium, and find that the Greeks and the Turks were at each other's throats over some aspect of that. And I must say, you learned that working at NATO or at any multilateral organization requires a lot of ability to sit and listen carefully and not let it go by but be patient about it. A lot of it is theater, and if you don't like theater, then

you're probably in the wrong place. I dealt with Mediterranean issues more broadly, and I backed up on a whole variety of issues, such as writing the policy planning document that Washington required for the year. That lasted through the tenure of Robert Strausz-Hup# as ambassador, and then he was replaced by Tapley Bennett, who had come from New York, where he had been the number two ambassador at the US Mission to the UN. I had met Bennett in New York once when I was advancing a trip for Ken Rush, when Rush was deputy secretary, and I remember going into Ambassador Bennett's office in New York and saying to the Ambassador,—who had been around a very long time at that point but looked young and very dynamic—, "Mr. Ambassador, I'm terribly sorry but I'm going to have to steal your desk for the deputy secretary of State." And he said, in his courtly Georgia way, "Mr. Pendleton, I have emptied my desk, and it is yours, and it is the deputy secretary's, with pleasure." He was a man of some considerable wisdom, I think, in terms of not letting his ego on such an occasion get in his way, not that he didn't have an ego, and his ego, along with his experience and wisdom, helped him in many respects.

Bennett rather snared me to work with him, after he arrived, on something called the Perm Reps Lunch, which took place every Wednesday. The permanent representatives to NATO would have a working lunch every week, and in many respects, that's where a lot of what George Bush liked to call the "heavy lifting" would get done,—in a more private environment than a council meeting. And my job became increasingly to patrol the whole mission, military side and State Department side, and prepare and brief the ambassador for everything that might conceivably come up at these luncheons. Prepare him with all the points that we wanted to make on behalf of Washington and to respond to the concerns of other perm reps. When you are in a multilateral arena such as that you can't wing it. This may be self-evident to most people, but initially it wasn't necessarily self-evident to me(you can't just speak as Sammy Jones; you are speaking as a representative of the United States of America, so you have to be instructed. Frequently you try to generate your own instructions: "Unless instructed otherwise, I intend to make the following points at tomorrow's perm reps' Lunch or at the NAC tomorrow which has just been called." And

Washington would have to run around and bless the approach. So all these preparations had to be done very carefully. I also would go into the ambassador's office after lunch, and he would decant what had happened. If you had a serious ambassador, like Bennett, who could remember very well most of what had happened, —or who would take good notes—you were in good shape. But there was also the danger that you would be told some days that "And then the Greek ambassador in marginal French said something about Egypt," and you would find yourself having to call over to the Greek mission to find out what the heck the point was that the Greek ambassador was trying to make and cobble this all together into a cable which would have to go out that day to Washington. You were always caught trying to get to Washington, which meant you were always caught there rather late at night for institutional reasons. The same is true at the UN. But because of doing this, I also attended the daily staff meetings the ambassador had. Then I was the lowest ranking flunkey who could go around and follow up on other things that came along, and so I ended up doing that sort of thing as well, and I learned a great deal that has stood me in good stead over the years. But I can't say it wasn't painful on occasion.

Q: What was your impression? Let's go through some of the major delegations, what you were getting and our reaction to it. What was your impression of the French representation, although they were not in NATO, were they a player that you would see?

PENDLETON: Absolutely. They were important and they didn't refrain from stating their case at all or coming up with new notions. They played in the North Atlantic Council just as actively as anybody, and their observers on the Military Committee were very active. What one has to understand is that even though the rhetoric coming out of Paris at that point would make the average Frenchman feel very much distanced from NATO on the military side(and indeed, of course, NATO had been kicked out of France and had ended up in this basically temporary shopping mall in Belgium because of De Gaulle's decision. In reality and on the ground, the French were collaborating with us militarily in a fashion which was very important. So we listened to them; we had to pay attention to them. You never quite knew when they were going to heave a piece of salami in from the side that would be

very difficult to cope with. And we worked rather hard at trying to work with them. Doing so, however, was nowhere near as easy as with the Brits. I thought the Brits had, under Sir John Killicks, an astonishing capability, through hard thinking, a lot of cerebral talent and an excess of confidence. They had a weight in NATO which was totally undeserved in terms of their military might at that time. It was the period when they were accused of being nothing but one brigade and eight bands, or whatever. And NATO was quite preoccupied by the weakness of the United Kingdom militarily in the late '70s. With the election of President Carter, we became relatively weaker than we had been, and that didn't go totally unnoticed, but the Brits were the ones who got their knuckles rapped.

The Germans had problems, not only because they were Germans but because, when I was at NATO, an inordinate number of German citizens, both in the mission and on the NATO staff, were arrested for spying. And that always was troubling in terms of NATO secrets and in terms of the German role at NATO. Still, they did a good solid job for a country which had been fighting with almost everybody else in the Alliance not too long before. They were careful about that, and I think they must have just wept over the spying incident.

One nation, which wasn(t a NATO member, but which I would like to mention, is Spain, because one thing I participated in quite actively with my regional hats on was to try to help educate Spain about what NATO membership might mean. There was a measure of interest in Spain in joining NATO and no understanding of what being a member would be like. We went down to Madrid any number of times, with blessings from the Council. People came over from Washington as well, and one of the untold tales of diplomacy related to the Iberian Peninsula is the job that the United States took the lead in doing in educating the Spaniards about NATO membership so that when they came in they were in to stay. They did come in rather quietly and they did stay. It's not been easy, and there is to a degree, the French sort of problem, as I understand it. But in the initial education process we went from briefing 80-year-old lieutenant colonels down to briefing, over time, 35-year-old disinterested lieutenant colonels and their civilian whippersnapper brothers,

who were helping educate the generals. Then we began to find the generals around the table. And by the time Spain decided to enter NATO, there was really no reason why they wouldn't have had a good sense of what the benefits and the obligations would be. And I think that was important, but they really started the process with a 19th century view of Europe.

Q: Well, this is the thing, I think, that's often misunderstood, that NATO is not just "Gee, sign up with us and we'll protect you," but it means that you have to meet certain military standards, which are quite severe and very professional, aren't they, as far as ability to produce competent troops and all that?

PENDLETON: Yes, and commit them to helping people whom you may not wish to help if they are attacked. And so there's a really important obligation which comes with NATO membership, and it can't be taken lightly. That's why we needed to have perhaps more of a debate than we've had in this country over NATO enlargement.

Q: With the Spanish, by this time Franco had died, and it was beginning to move into the new regime, weren't they?

PENDLETON: Yes, but slowly. I mean, we were surprise, those of us who were not experts on Spain, how slowly they were going initially, and particularly the military.

Q: Well, the military was essentially the same military that had won the Civil War back in '38.

PENDLETON: Absolutely, that's why we were dealing with all these '75- and '80-yearold lieutenant colonels, and their notion of what Europe was like really stopped at the Pyren#es and in the past.

Q: What about Portugal at this time? Portugal had gone through the trauma of its revolution, young officers taking over, an extreme socialist government moving back

towards the center. By the time you got there, had Portugal sort of reentered the acceptable government stage?

PENDLETON: Yes, it had. And NATO as an institution was anxious to try to help Portugal. There was a Portugal frigate program, in which nations were to contribute frigates, and assistance in the building of frigates that would help Portugal's navy. There was an attempt by NATO as an institution and by many of the countries that were members(and it was a modest attempt, but it was an attempt(to make gestures to strengthen democracy in Portugal and to strengthen Portugal's defense robustness and confidence as a country. I would say these were, in my judgement from that perch, fairly marginal, but hearts were in the right place.

Q: What about countries such as Sweden, neutral but very much feeling the Soviet menace, you might say? Were we making periodic gestures, or were there loose ties with Sweden?

PENDLETON: In the NATO context, Sweden was pretty peripheral. Our ambassador to Stockholm came down and visited and spoke to permreps [permanent representatives] and discussed Sweden, but the way Sweden fit into the process, I think, is really quite interesting. It fit into the NATO process through Denmark and Norway, and so did Finland, because in particular, Denmark tended to be the "spokes-country" for all the Nordics. Iceland had its own representation at NATO although we provided the Icelandic armed forces. And so if Sweden had a NATO-related concern, it would make its concerns known to Norway and Denmark (and Iceland, I assume), and they would be factored into the process through those NATO members who were closest to Sweden. Was Sweden a major preoccupation? No, but you got some funny things.

One of the institutional things about the EU, then the EC, which struck me most was the day when in '78 there was a discussion in the North Atlantic Council about expanding the Committee on Disarmament (CD) at the United Nations. There was talk about expanding

it, which all of the Nordic countries were behind(for domestic political reasons(with considerable vigor. So who would be on the expanded group representing NATO? That had to be decided at NATO. And I remember a debate that went on all morning, where understandably but unpredictably both Norway and Denmark wanted to be a member of the expanded CD. Usually they would work out such an issue between themselves in advance. We broke for lunch, and it was clear that Denmark and Norway were squabbling in public. At lunchtime the permreps went to an EC lunch, where the issue was raised (although it should never have been), and it was, I gather, voted on, although the EC isn't supposed to vote. Ireland (a non-NATO country) tipped the balance. And they went for Denmark, probably because Norway wasn't a member of the EC. When lunch was over, they went back to the meeting at NATO and suddenly announced that they'd like to have a decision on who it should be, and it went to Denmark, with the countries which in the morning had been unwilling to commit suddenly coming out for Denmark. It was one of the first times that I suddenly realized what the EC could do inside the NATO body, and a bell went off in my head, and I said to myself, "Well, let's watch this for the future."

Q: Did you get any contact with the Norwegians? Were they concerned by the fact that their people had opted not to joint the EC?

PENDLETON: They would only discuss that with you privately, of course, and I think that the kind of officers and diplomats who served at NATO from Oslo were much more inclined to have a European optic than the majority of their countrymen. They wouldn't hide their own personal beliefs if you were having a cocktail or if you were having lunch in the cafeteria speaking privately, but of course, in Council meetings or in committee meetings they would be scrupulous about what they would say since it was being reported by notetakers from all the other NATO missions.

Q: What about Italy? What kind of role did they play?

PENDLETON: Italy played a really major role at this point. This was the period of the question of bedding down nuclear missiles and where the enhanced missiles would be placed, against widespread European public opinion. Italy took a bunch, really in a leadership role.

Q: We're talking about the SS-20 versus the Pershing missile issue, aren't we, or was this before that?

PENDLETON: This was before that, I believe. I've lost the thread, but we very much wanted to station more missiles in Western Europe, and the publics - quote, unquote - of many of the Western European countries did not wish to do so. Italy leaned very far forward and allowed us to do so. Belgium eventually came on board, as they say, and Italy time and again took steps to be supportive of NATO decisions, even at some risk to those perpetually tottering governments. The deputy secretary-general of NATO was Italian. When his term was up the Italians said, "Look, we're doing so much, we demand that his replacement be Italian." That was a tough fight for Italy, and in the end Rome won. I must say I was on their side, because they were pulling so much more of their weight, at a greater political cost, than most other countries that I personally couldn't help but admire them and what they were doing. Issue after issue, if not out front, they were responsive to the more thoughtful(i.e, US(needs of the moment.

Speaking of the deputy secretary-general. The secretary-general was Joseph Luns, who was a Dutchman, former foreign minister, an imperious soul who went all over Europe in his most elegant and expensive Rolls-Royce, provided him at NATO's expense(somewhat over the dead bodies of a lot of people in Washington, —and I don't blame them. But I have to say that Luns could be, when the crunch came, very helpful to the United States and was consistently helpful to the United States. We tested him constantly in ways that he didn't deserve to be tested. I think principally of the so-called neutron bomb of President Carter and the President's approach to this enhanced radiation weapon, which would allegedly kill people without destroying the buildings. As you may recall, the United States

went backwards and forwards on this issue at the highest levels, and at NATO, people just can't bear it if the United States doesn't know what it's doing. They'd almost rather have us take the wrong decision but be decisive about it than be wishy-washy; and we were being varsity-level wishy-washy about the neutron bomb. This was driving Tapley Bennett, as Ambassador, crazy, and it was driving crazy almost anybody who had to explain to foreign colleagues U.S. positions that seemed to change by the day. It was at this point that (a) I accompanied Tapley Bennett when we went to have breakfast with Joseph Luns and give Luns our final Presidential decision on the subject, which was a turnaround from what we'd been saying the day before and the day before that and the day before that. Luns couldn't have been more gracious. He sat there and, for breakfast, ate chocolate bonbons and then said he would do all he could to bring the Council along. He was polite enough not to lecture Tapley Bennett, whom I'm sure he knew was as frustrated as he was. Bennett, incidentally, played a brilliant professional's role in trying to influence the decision, and after one of the next-to-last flip-flops, he had drafted three cables to Washington. One was a cable from him to the National Security Advisor, a personal cable which was written in a very straightforward, non-bureaucratic, personal style(brilliant cable. Another was to one of the President's Georgia advisors - Bennett was from Georgia - and he wrote it in downhome Georgiaese, which only one Georgian could have written to another Georgian. I never read anything like it in my life. And he wrote another cable, with a little help from his subordinates, which was your normal embassy or mission straightforward, reporting-witha-twist, pleading for a specific decision by a specific time. And he laid these all out in front of him and- (end of tape)

Q: You were saying he adjusted and selected and finally sent out these cable, to no avail, essentially.

PENDLETON: No, I may have it wrong. It came out a lot better than he had hoped at one point, but it was just emblematic, his approach, to me, what somebody with a great deal

of experience can do, artfully, when they decide that's where they're going to put their energies for a given period of time.

Q: Well, particularly the way the neutron bomb thing ended up. This is when President Carter kept changing his mind. It wasn't really the government(

PENDLETON: No, Carter.

Q: (it was Carter, and it was one of the things that I think turned off many professionals about Carter, and essentially the voters(not this issue, but it was this personal managing of things but no real consistency.

PENDLETON: Yes, that was a major problem for those of us who were representing the government overseas. The Carter approach to human rights was also a challenge to us (one with which I agreed. But at the outset of his administration, as he was trying to articulate and then institutionalize an approach to human rights which was different from what his Republican predecessors had had, you can imagine that at a place like NATO, where there is a strong security focus, you did not have adequate appreciation for issues that were messy. And integrating human rights into our overall strategic policies and military policies and defense policies tended to have some messy elements. That was hard to put forward on behalf of the Carter Administration. So it was really rather an uphill battle. At the same time, U.S. defense spending was falling. However, the Administration did send around Andy Marshall from DOD to brief Europeans using overhead spy satellite pictures of the Soviet military buildup (particularly of the Soviet Navy) that had quite a dramatic impact in terms of an understanding of what was being manufactured on the military side in the Soviet Union. We obviously knew precious little about the broader Soviet economy. The briefing effort was useful, but I think that it was initially more of a thrust by the bureaucrats than by the White House.

Q: In this period, '76 to '79, how did we from the NATO side see the Soviet threat?

PENDLETON: Well, we were (and almost everybody at NATO headquarters was of course(quite preoccupied with the Soviet threat, and particularly the naval threat. There was a moment when the naval threat seemed to be the most acute, and we were really afraid of being outdistanced. That possibility was given a great deal of attention, and the sense that there was a naval threat(it proved to be less severe than we had thought, needless to say(was increased by the sharing of the spy satellite pictures I previously mentioned, which had a dramatic way of capturing one's attention. I hoped that we weren't showing the same picture 12 times, but who knows. At any rate, these were shared with European cabinets in capitals and with officials at NATO and others(at very high levels(and they tended to have a dramatic impact, and helped in the process. At the same time, we began to make progress in getting not only Italy to accept missiles but Belgium as well. As a matter of fact, Alfred Cohen, who was the political director of the Belgian foreign ministry at that point, came to my house for dinner, and our most industrious deputy chief of mission, Mike Glittman, was there(this was a dinner party, about 20 people(and Mike looked extremely happy at the end of the dinner but wouldn't tell me why. It wasn't just the wine and the good meat; it was that Alfred had told him that Belgium would accept our missiles. That was a big breakthrough from our point of view.

Q: Well, in listening to you talk and to others who were concerned with NATO, one comes away with the impression that here were a bunch of difficult countries(for whom we had the greatest respect but they're still difficult countries(to get them to do what we wanted to do. How about other NATO countries seizing initiatives and bringing us along on issues?

PENDLETON: Ha, ha! I'm giving you a blank look. I'm laughing, yes. You're getting a blank look because to an astonishing degree the United States drove the Alliance in that era, whether we deserved to or not, but to really quite an astonishing degree. The French did attempt to put some more conceptual fiber into the relationship near the end of my tenure, but with notions that were so typically French, divided into three parts, that people didn't know what they were getting at. And they eventually made some sense. But in general, we

drove it, and there was a saying at NATO that I referred to earlier that the only thing that NATO nations can't stand more than having the United States know where it is going is having the United States not know where it is going and lead the process. And we came up with more than our share, in Washington and even at the Mission, of ideas as to how to get through some of the really profoundly substantive issues but also the theater that surrounds NATO. An example was the two percent annual increase in defense spending. I think we all did a miserable job of dealing with Greece and Turkey, and Joseph Luns tried to intercede without great success and his own love of Turkey, given the passions. But there were not too many initiatives that I recall that really weren't manufactured in Washington or in collaboration with the Mission.

Q: I was thinking in dealing with Greece and Turkey(I've served four years in Greece(that the Greeks look upon Turkey as the enemy, and essentially, the Turks look upon Russia, or the Soviet Union including Bulgaria, as the enemy. I would have thought that the Turks would have been somebody, in a way, you could deal with, except for the fact that the Greeks kept interceding.

PENDLETON: Yes. The Turks I found quite easy to deal with. At the Turkish mission, they were under a lot of pressure because it was the time when Armenian terrorists were attacking Turkish diplomats around the world. But that wasn't key to the relationship at NATO. The United States has always had a relationship with Turkey that runs deeper than that of a lot of European countries, and we are to this day, I believe, blamed for having brought Turkey and Greece into the Alliance in the early '50s. We're the people who sponsored them, and after you've sat through your 180th meeting on subject X or Y or Z, all dominated by Greece and Turkey squabbling with each other, people would moan and say, "Why did the United States ever let them in?" But whether it's with regard to EC entry or with regard to their role in NATO, the United States has taken a robust approach toward Turkey, and certainly in the '70s, that was appreciated by Turkey, which recognized what we were doing. Now in terms of their own preoccupations, yes, they, like Norway, had a border with the Soviet Union. But I recall in 1976 going to Turkey and being in a

military briefing room in Ankara and noting that all the maps in the room and all of the indications of where the planes were headed were towards Greece and not towards the Soviet Union. That was a preoccupation in the capital of Turkey that probably went beyond just the military. Incidentally, I found all the Greek maps I saw suggesting that Turkey was the enemy.

Q: By the way, were you concerned at all about, you know, there was a lot of sniggering about some of the troops(I think the Dutch particularly(wearing their hair in hair nets and the Dutch and maybe the Danish navies' not staying overnight or always putting in on the weekends and things like this. Was this a matter of concern?

PENDLETON: Well, it was a matter of concern, but it was a concern we had to temper, to a degree, because it was also a time when European and American TV was doing a fair bit of coverage of US troops in Germany and particularly of troops taking dope, troops overindulging in alcohol, troops who seemed frequently(as portrayed on TV in Europe(as undisciplined. It was also a time when interest rates were so high at home that the economy was fragile. Our youngest troops, particularly in Germany, who were married but did not have permission to have their wives, in most cases(spouses anyway(with them but who took them anyway were living very much on the financial edge. They were trying to live off-base on very little money and in need of help. And Europeans, who have a social consciousness which is more acute and historically rooted than ours, I think it's fair to say, heard a lot of all of this. As a result, the hair-nets and putting into port, et cetera, had to be balanced in one's mind against what one saw when one turned on the TV(and there were some fairly horrific documentaries.

Q: Was there any concern about anti-NATO political movements within the NATO community at this time?

PENDLETON: There was certainly concern, but I don't think that there was a belief that we could do all that much about it. There would be discussions, even at the political level,

but it the kind of thing which one always had to be careful about, and this led to a certain amount of trimming in terms of decisions. I had never, before I went to NATO, heard the word publics used so often. "Our publics will not tolerate . . ." "Our publics will not abide . . ." Our publics will not stand for. . . " "Our publics will not accept . . ." And this is where you got the line in the sand frequently, in terms of decisions which we might be encouraging other nations to take but which, because of public opinion at home, were unpalatable. Did people think they could change the views of their publics? Not to any great extent. Did people try? Yes. Every permrep would go around giving lectures. Joseph Luns would go around giving lectures, but we all know that there's a limit to the impact that you can have with that. And frequently frustration is based on larger political and economic(in particular(forces that bureaucrats sitting at a mission abroad are not going to be able to affect in any mighty way.

Q: All right, this is a dirty question to ask, but 1979 you left NATO. Were you and your colleagues looking for the collapse of the Soviet Union internally in 10 years? Was that in the cards?

PENDLETON: No. Definitely not. And I don(t think I was looking seriously at it until I was in London almost 10 years later.

Q: I think this is true, but I think we should always try to put this into perspective on this type of thing.

PENDLETON: Absolutely, and we were very fearful about what the Soviets could do and what they might do and what we had to do to be prepared for it. There was certainly a very large measure of consensus on that, and that's part of the glue(if not the glue(which held NATO together in that era.

Q: Well, then, in 1979 you left this NATO job, and where did you go?

PENDLETON: Right. I went to be a student at the National War College here in Washington, at Fort McNair. And that was an assignment which I welcomed, and I welcomed it in part for personal reasons. While at NATO I had been discovered to have a very aggressive melanoma, which I fortunately noticed, and I had it excised (without knowing what it was) at SHAPE hospital, and they told me they would let me know if anything was wrong. I had never heard of a melanoma, but I had something that bothered me on a mole, a birthmark mole. And they forgot to let me know, and I was too dumb to follow up but they called me a month later and said, "Oh, dear, our pathologist was moving into his new quarters, so he didn't analyze it right away, but it seems you have a melanoma and we want you to go to Germany." I said, "Nothing doing," and my wife and I called all over the US and found out where they did the best melanoma work. And to make a long story short, I went back to Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston and was operated on and returned a couple of weeks later(they excised it(to NATO. But that was an interesting thing to have because when I was discovered with it, basically, I think everybody there at NATO and amongst my colleagues tended to write me off for dead. Then, to prove I wasn't dead, I started working even harder than I had been, and that was probably a mistake. So the assignment to the War College seemed to be a civilized way of transitioning professionally and personally at that particular juncture in my personal life and career.

Q: So you were in the War College from '79 to '80, I guess.

PENDLETON: Right, I was there for that one, basically, year long.

Q: How did you find the War College? I mean, you'd been in this military or quasi-military atmosphere for about three years anyway, and NATO, and how did you find the War College?

PENDLETON: Well, personally I liked it very much, and it was very hard not to. You had a lot of fungible time, you had fascinating lecturers from everyone from the Undersecretary

oState to Bobby Inman, who was at that point running all of our intelligence intercept capabilities at NSA. You had a chance to discuss issues at great length. At the same time you had(I remember- Bobby Gard, who was President of the National Defense University, in our first week, where most people were looking for a change of pace(most people had been coming off some pretty tough jobs(and he got up and said at the opening session something to the effect of (you're probably not even years later supposed to quote it("We hear that some of you want a change of pace. We hear that some of you want to play tennis. And we hear that some of you are counting on going on trip to Asia," and whatever. And everybody began getting very nervous that he was going to change the whole curriculum, and he said, "We want you to know that we agree wholly with your approach." So you could dine # la carte at the War College. You could meet people with whom you would work later, on both the civilian and military side, people from the State Department, like Mark Lissfelt, with whom I worked in Paris later, or Phil Wilcox, who replaced me running the Israel Desk in 1984.

Q: Both of whom I've interviewed.

PENDLETON: (or Jack Sheehan, who became CINC-Atlantic after becominMarine four-star general. And that's, of course, one of the intentions of these senior service schools, so that some years later, when I was in the Under Secretary for Political Affairs' office, Jack Sheehan was executive assistant to Will Taft as deputy secretary of Defense. There weren't many occasions that we had to work together, but if I needed to go to Jack, he had the measure of me and could tell whether I was off the wall or not. That sort of thing is, of course, one of the reasons why the State Department has, since its outset, been a sponsor of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF).

Q: Did you find the military preoccupied with the problem we've mentioned before, the sort of almost moral degeneration of the military forces at this time?

PENDLETON: I wouldn't say it was a preoccupation, but it was certainly a concern, and yet that element did not fit well into the course of study at the National War College, which tended to focus on things ranging from global strategy to regional security, so you tended to deal with the issues you mention more anecdotally and more on the side, in terms of luncheon conversations or conversations in your committee rooms or what have you.

Q: Did you find yourself as sort of a source for people, military, wanting to know about the rest of the world?

PENDLETON: Oh, absolutely, and our military colleagues were gracious about it, and we from the State Department were gracious about their skills. We had in our class several fellows who had been prisoners of war in Vietnam. We had from State people who had served in Vietnam but none had been a prisoner of war. We had the previous lead pilot of the Blue Angels in the class, and we from State knew full well that we could not fly a plane, much less be shot down and be in the "Hanoi Hilton" for five years without wishing we were elsewhere. And at the same time, people came to us, the State Department types(and there were a lot of other civilians, from the FBI to the Library of Congress(for a vision of the larger world. There also was a kind of undercurrent which I couldn't quite understand, which I hadn't seen so much at NATO headquarters, which was a kind of military sense that the State Department is what we're so often charged with being: kind of cookie-pushing striped-pants guys. And you had to work to a degree to overcome that. I found that those who later became generals and admirals seemed to have less of that notion than those who retired as lieutenant colonels. They may have felt threatened and were not willing to learn as much. But by and large, the class and professors were terrific, and the vast majority had excellent careers and have made a great contribution. But sometimes there was kidding and sometimes you recognized it went a bit beyond kidding, these undercurrents that are almost inevitable (but you hope that at the end of the year people will have a new respect for each other. I think they do. Part of it came from

traveling together. I was anxious to go with the group visiting Korea and Japan since I had never been to the Far East. And I did.

Q: Well, then, in 1980 you went where?

PENDLETON: Then I went to the UK Desk at the State Department as the principal United Kingdom Desk officer. That isn't necessarily the post that I would have chosen at that point. I would like to have been a deputy office director and felt that I was prepared to be a good one. I found that I'm not so good, perhaps, at going around knocking on doors seeking jobs. I've knocked on plenty of doors, but I also found initially a real fear amongst quite high-ranking people, because of my melanoma, that I would collapse on them. I thought I'd already proven that I wouldn't, but it was interesting to see their apprehensions that somehow I would die of cancer and leave them in the lurch. A number of people shared this concern with me later. So I went to the UK Desk, and I went to the substance of that Desk with considerable enthusiasm. My father had studied in the UK. My wife's father was a British diplomat, and I'd had strong ties with the UK. Moreover, the UK is involved in everything, so you can run around, if you are aggressive bureaucratically, and play in a lot of ponds. But you also were perpetually, in that sort of job, overwhelmed by visitors who need to be taken care of, and that can take up too much time. It's interesting, often worthwhile, and I'm friends to this day with some of the people who came through like Chris Patten, who became the last British Governor of Hong Kong(but it can really take time away from trying to move things ahead that you think should be moved ahead in the larger bureaucracy.

Q: You were doing this from '80 to(

PENDLETON: Now, let me say, miracle of miracles, I was doing this for about two months when the deputy office director decided to leave, and I approached Bob Funseth, who was the office director, who had been Kissinger's press spokesman, and should have been a Deputy Assistant Secretary at leasHe was doing a truly energetic job of looking after

Northern European Affairs, and Northern European Affairs at that point included the United Kingdom and Ireland, which were a handful by themselves, the Benelux countries, and the five Nordic countries. So he was supervising Desk officers for all those places. And he went to bat for me to be deputy office director, and I still bless him for that because it gave me an opportunity to break through into a supervisory level that I hadn't previously had the chance to reach. Along with it came the obligation to write efficiency reports on large numbers of people, including our charg#s overseas and that sort of thing. And so I moved into the deputy office director job, and I did that basically for two years.

Q: To '82. Your responsibility, then, was still the(

PENDLETON: I gave up the United Kingdom per se, and I was the fellow who ran the mechanics of the office and was responsible for filling in substantively for anybody who wasn(t there to cover our ten countries and Bermuda. And again, it was a period in which we were absolutely flooded with visitors and ambassadors-designate. The reason was that we had a new President, Ronald Reagan. Everybody wanted to come to Washington, and there were a hell of a lot of Northern European types who wanted to come meet the new Administration. At the same time, we had 10 new ambassadors, and we had to do all the briefing and preparation of them for their hearings (not all the briefings, but we had to set up all the briefings(so again there was the danger that form somehow would bury content in the process. We dealt with a lot of substantive issues, a vast array of them, from Northern Ireland and peace therein to whether Sweden would be allowed to buy jet engines of a sort they wanted (the Pentagon was quite skeptical about sharing with "those Commies", or at least socialists(and there was plenty to keep one busy. It was a moment when I think I became aware, really, most acutely of the good sides and the bad sides of having political appointees as ambassador. We got some extraordinarily nice and basically able people who came along, but we got a fair number who were not equipped to be ambassador in significant posts. We tried to help equip them, but I suddenly realized, you know, that I would probably be spending the rest of my life serving folks who have

worked hard for the President-elect or contributed money to the President-elect but who may not really be ideal representatives of the country abroad.

Q: I just this morning did an interview with a man who was DCM in Luxembourg to two nice but ill-equipped ladies who were ambassadors to Luxembourg, but the world is not going to end. Nobody really cares about that. But still, I mean, it was time-serving, and these ambassadors were making no contribution.

PENDLETON: Well, I worked for some political appointees who made a great contribution, one of them in this group, Charlie Price, who went to Brussels first and then to Britain second. His wife was very close to Nancy Reagan, and he ran the Price Candy Company and was a banker in Kansas City. I served with him later in London, and he was a fine representative of the United States, in part because he was authentically American. He was open of spirit; he would engage with you in listening to you and then decide whether you were crazy or not. Over the years that he served in Brussels and London he became a friend of the President's in a way that his wife had previously been a friend of Nancy Reagan, and it meant that he could plug in at the very highest level. That worked, and that was a pleasure. However, another nice gentleman told me, when we went to have lunch the first day he was in Washington, that he was a little worried about dealing with the U.S. government because he was a rancher, and while he'd been a Mormon missionary in the country to which he was assigned, he had never been to Washington before. Another person who was going to a major NATO capital, I gave him my desk and gave him briefing books and said, "I'll come back in a few minutes." I came back in a few minutes, and he didn't look happy. I said, "Is something wrong," and he said, "Well, you know, I haven't sat at a desk for 10 years, and I just don't know what to do." Frequently, these sorts of appointees can be protected and made to look good, but you can get into a crunch where they really have to be more than looking good, and then the country as a whole pays. And that was dispiriting. It was also dispiriting to bring back from, say, Finland, where he'd been

doing an absolutely magnificent job, Jim Goodby, who was one of our finest professional diplomats, to replace him with somebody who had made a campaign contribution.

Q: Well, I was thinking, you had the UK on your plate during this time, I mean, among many others. There were two real tests of this during this whole relationship. One was over the Falkland Islands, and the other was over Granada. Did you get involved in the playing out of that, or how was that?

PENDLETON: Grenada, no, not really, in terms of timing and role. When we invaded Grenada in 1983, I was no longer dealing with Northern European Affairs, but it was instructive. I actually had been told, two nights before the invasion of Grenada, that the Secretary had just approved the invasion. I had no reason to be told that, and I thought it was a joke and couldn't believe it. But the Falklands I was involved in from day one to day end, after all those weeks of the fleet sailing south, and I think that(s something that is worthy of some attention, in terms of what happened from my perch. It almost takes more time than you probably want to give it.

Q: It would be very interesting to talk about your perspective of the Falklands business, because at first we tried, much to the horror of the British, to remain somewhat neutral because we had Latin American considerations(

PENDLETON: Right.

Q: (which the British really didn't. And so it took a little while for us, you might say, to get our ducks in line with the British.

PENDLETON: Absolutely.

Q: Can we talk about that? This is when you were(what was the title?

PENDLETON: Well, I was deputy director of the office of Northern European Affairs, but at the time of the Falklands, I was acting director of the office and, as I was for months on

either side. So it turned out that during the Falklands I was the senior person(albeit quite junior in a way, because I wasn't a senior officer(on the Falkland Island Working Group from the European Bureau, and that marginalized me in some ways and put me at the center of some of the discussions in other ways. But there were insights that I gleaned.

Q: Could you explain what the Falklands problem was first, and then your perspective of it?

PENDLETON: I can try. I must say that sitting in Northern European Affairs at the State Department and looking after our relations on a day-to-day basis with 10 Northern European countries, the Falklands were not at the top of my hit parade. Perhaps they should have been more on the screen than they were, but... The British had an interest in the Falklands which I was not sufficiently attuned to, and it came up a couple of times before the Argentines invaded on the 2nd of April, 1982. I might mention that we had had a go-around with Al Haig, who was Secretary of State, and his assistants over a briefing memo for a meeting he had here in Washington with Lord Carrington, the British foreign secretary, in which Carrington led off with the issue of the laundering of New Zealand butter. This was not anything anybody in the Department had anticipated would be on the agenda. Moreover, the British Embassy hadn't betrayed this overwhelming interest when we discussed what might come up, and so Haig had found our briefing memo deficient. And the next time Carrington and Haig were to meet, we did an issues list which was incredibly lengthy in order to avoid the laundering of butter sort of problem.

Q: I take it the issue was probably one of receiving New Zealand butter here and then sending it somewhere else.

PENDLETON: Carrington was annoyed about it, and I don't know why. But when they met the next time, Carrington led off with, of all things, the Falklands. This issue was also not in our briefing memo. So we'd failed the second time, although everything else you could imagine was there. And I asked the deputy chief of mission at the British Embassy why

the subject had come up. It turned out that Martin Moreland, the political counselor of the British Embassy was from one of those families that had interests in the Falklands, and he had been chatting the previous night with Carrington about the Falklands. Carrington had decided, with this in mind, that he would say a word to Haig, I think, laying down a marker about British interests in the Falklands.

I had had a marker laid down earlier to me, rather opaquely, when I had visited London and had gone around and met with everybody from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Northern Ireland Office. An official in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had asked me which bureau in the State Department was in charge of the Ascension Islands. I hardly knew where they were, but I said I would find out when I got back to Washington. And he noted that the British might want to work with us on some occasion with regard to the Ascensions, so I dutifully, when I got back, asked Keith Smith, who was at that point the able UK Desk officer, to try to find out who had the authority. We went to the geographer, and the Africa Bureau said that they didn't; the Latin America Bureau said they didn't; the European Bureau didn't claim to(probably should have. But the night of the invasion I found out(I'll cut to this(that I had the responsibility for the Ascension Islands. At least in the process I had found out where they were, and it became all too clear why the British might be interested.

I can't speak for the Argentines, insofar as the Falklands were concerned. But I can speak with some authority about the British concern because it was quickly made manifest. The Argentines did decide, under that bevy of misguided generals who were running the country, to invade the Falklands, and they took initial steps, which included sending alleged scrap dealers to the South Georgia Islands in March, at which time an Argentine flag was raised by the alleged scrap dealers. And we had intelligence reports on those, which were shared with me only belatedly. I was fully preoccupied with a whole range of daily min-crises, and I was not(I have to say(expecting an invasion of the Falklands. Nobody was. The Argentine generals, I'm sure, thought that gaining sovereignty by war or peace over the Falklands would be a tremendous boost for them with the Argentine

people, and they were misguided in their evaluation of what the British reaction might be. After all, the Falklands are comprised of two major islands and a whole bunch of small islands 300 miles to the east of the Argentine coast, and not an area in which the British should be expected to be able to protect with any great vigor or-to recapture once captured. But on the evening of April 1, it was clear from intelligence signals that the Argentines were planning to invade, in the hours just ahead both Fort Stanley, the principal town, and the rest of the Falklands.

Al Adams, who was by then deputy executive secretary, called me to his office, and on behalf of the whole Seventh Floor apparatus, said that they were setting up a working group, which became an interagency task force, and that I should report to the Operations Center and be prepared to do what was necessary in the hours ahead to get that rolling and pay attention to our substantive interests and the interests of American citizens as, apparently, an invasion would take place almost immediately. We and the American Republics Bureau (ARA) called people from Northern European Affairs, ARA, and a whole lot of other places and, supported by the Seventh Floor, staffed up the task force overnight. And the invasion did take place the next morning. (End of tape)

Q: You were saying, your first job was to look out for Americans.

PENDLETON: Yes, and it was difficult to ascertain whether there were any there, in part because the Falklands turned out to be in the consular district of Jamaica. I'm quite sure it was Jamaica. It was one of the Caribbean countries-

Q: That makes sense(it's the closest British one.

PENDLETON: (in order to avoid having it be looked after from Argentina or the expense of looking after it from London. We placed calls to Embassy London and to Jamaica and to Buenos Aires in this regard, but with the help of a longtime, very senior and very savvy INR (Intelligence and Research) analyst, we were able to unearth an airgram that had been written a couple of years prior to the invasion by a junior consular officer

from Buenos Aires who somehow had ended up paying a visit to the Falklands. He had noted that there were 11 Americans, apparently, there, —most of whom were Mormon missionaries. And with that in hand, we knew we had to do what we could to help them, which was precious little. All I could think of to do was to send a flash cable to our embassy in London instructing them to approach Her Majesty's Government and ask that HMG request by flash cable that the Governor of the Falklands give every possible protection to our citizens. At that point we were reluctant to let the Argentines know that we knew that an invasion was impending, even though we had tried to, on the phone, talk around the issue of whether Americans were there. It was fairly hairy as things were moving fast, and the governor himself was taken prisoner almost immediately after the Argentine invasion at first light the next morning. The request that he protect our citizens, of course, became something of a fool's errand, but it was an earnest of our preoccupation and concern.

Q: Had it been considered that we would ask, or did we ask, the Argentines, then, to make sure that the Americans weren't mistreated?

PENDLETON: Well, by the next day, we were certainly able to do a whole lot of things that we were reluctant to press in the hours when we were only going on the basis of intelligence analysis and intercepts about what would happen. Overnight, the question of Ascension came up as well, because we got from Lord Carrington in London a cable to Secretary of State Haig saying, among other things, that the British probably would be needing our help with the Ascensions, and I suddenly found myself having to find out quite urgently what the heck was on Ascension, if anything, what our ties were, etc. And it turned out that the Mil-Rep in the Operations Center (the military representative), who was a lieutenant colonel, I believe, next door to where we were working in a task-force area, was well enough plugged in at the Pentagon that he was able to discover overnight that we had a downrange tracking station on Ascension operated by Pan-Am to track missile launches at a base which was used during World War II called Wide-awake, named for the birds with white eyes and black bodies that look wide awake when one finds them

on the Ascensions. There was a US army lieutenant colonel stationed there working with the contractors from Pan-Am on the downrange tracking station. That lieutenant colonel became, over time, a central figure in the collaboration between the United States and Britain revolving around shipments through Ascensions, and the supply of petroleum products to the British fleet through the Ascensions— and other things(I've lost track of some of the activities on the Ascensions. But they were, indeed, as the British had foreseen, crucial in terms of sending a fleet from the UK ro recapture the Falklands.

Q: But the Ascensions were British territory.

PENDLETON: They were British territory, but the UK had made Wide-awake Field available to us for strategic reasons, which included this downrange tracking station. So I was able to say to myself not only that I knew who was now in charge of the Ascensions, that person now being me, but also a little bit about what was going on. I was able to go in early the next morning and tell Secretary Haig about what we had on the Ascensions and about the British preoccupation. It wasn't long thereafter that Lord Carrington resigned, feeling that he had not provided his fellow ministers and his prime minister with adequate guidance about the possibility that something might happen in the Falklands. They had found themselves flat-footed, and he felt he had no honorable way out but to resign. We got that cable from Embassy London with word of his resignation about six-thirty or something in the morning, and John Campbell, who was the outstanding number two on the UK Desk, (who is now a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Oceans, Environment and Science, and is a longtime British scholar), and I whipped up a cable for Secretary Haig to send back lamenting Carrington's departure and wishing him Godspeed. I was able to walk into his office with it at seven in the morning(he was there(and get it signed off and out to London in a way that you might do in a small embassy but you rarely got a chance to do in the highly layered State Department. And because we appeared at the Secretary's office with a draft reply within about ten to fifteen minutes after the cable had come in, that was considered a quick turnaround in the US bureaucracy.

Q: I wonder if you could do something. I'd like to get a snapshot of the first day, practically, of this Falklands crisis, because it did put a real strain on the internal bureaucracy, where we were going. Was there a consensus within the task force, and maybe among others, how this thing was going to play out, or was there a split between, sort of, the British side, which you were on, and the American Republics, ARA, side about what this meant, and all? And then also, could you talk about your initial impressions of Haig when this thing was tossed in his lap, I mean before he got really, you know, just hit it?

PENDLETON: Well, yes, I'd be happy to. The first day I don't remember all that much of, because the first night, I was tired by the end of the previous day, and then staying up all night, I began to run almost immediately by noon the next day into the problem that was going to haunt me throughout this couple of months that followed: how guickly you can become fatigued and how quickly you can find that the constant din of the people working around you and TV's going and stuff could kaleidoscope what you were doing and make it very fractured. But one thing that was clear was that we quickly developed a rather major fracture in the interagency task force, which reflected the split that one saw from the top of the government on down between those who thought that we should tilt towards the British versus those who thought that we should tilt towards the Argentines. Hemispheric concerns and the help that the Argentines were beginning to give in Central America, which were a major preoccupation of the White House and, as a result in the rest of the bureaucracy. So within the task force, we had a line-up, really, of European types on one side of the table, initially, and Latin America types under the day-to-day supervision of Bob Service, who later became ambassador in Paraguay and a couple of other places(I'm going to have to check(and with Tom Enders as Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs looming night and day behind his team.

That made for a fair challenge in terms of collaborating on those things that we had to do(the internal deadlines of each day, which included press guidance, dealing with the public, dealing with Congress, et cetera(and how we were going to approach the larger

question of where we would come down politically vis-#-vis the Brits and the Argentines. On the side, if one can call it that, of those who felt we should be very attentive to Latin American concerns: you had Jeanne Kirkpatrick, our outspoken ambassador to the UN; you had Bill Mittendorf, who was the ambassador to the OAS; you had Tom Enders in his six-feet-six, first-in-his-class-at-Yale quasi-imperiousness(all with the ear of the Secretary of State, and many with the ear of the President. And that made it a bit of a challenge, because in the European Bureau, Larry Eagleburger had moved up to be Under Secretary for Political Affairs from being Assistant Secretary for Europe, but he was traveling as well as getting into a whole variety of issues that he hadn't been involved with immediately before. Alan Holmes was acting as Assistant Secretary for Europe and frequently had to do the work of two, three, and four people.

And it was hard for anyone to believe at the outset that this would drag on as long as it did and that it meant so much to the British and that it would be preoccupation for the Secretary of State, who himself said at a meeting I attended at the outset, "I will not have a war in this hemisphere. Haven't they heard of the Monroe Doctrine?" That was aimed more at the Brits than at the Argentines, at that point.

Q: If one side invaded and they were sitting there, essentially a war has already started, but does this mean that initially you thought that Haig was ready to try to negotiate something around there, or thinking in terms of Argentines grabbing their piece and keeping it?

PENDLETON: Well, that brings up the interesting point I just mentioned, that I trooped into Haig's office a couple of times early on, but the building quickly got this thing routinized so that, in a way —particularly once the Brits decided to send a fleet to recapture the Falklands— I found myself, day by day and week by week, in the eye of a hurricane, where from the task force area I could not participate fully and easily while at the same time working full time in the task force. Some of the deliberations that really affected where we were going as a nation, were, of course, closed to me, and that's one of the anomalies:

you may know a lot, but you may know too much as a result of sitting there. However, I think it is clear that Haig saw an opportunity fairly early on to try to shuttle and to mediate. And I had always assumed that Haig had wanted, # la Kissinger, to be a shuttler. Indeed, he proved more than willing to shuttle those terribly long distances to London, Buenos Aires and back, and over the weeks that proved to be a very good thing. One meeting in which I participated before he undertook his first shuttle was a large meeting in his conference room, where he made quite clear that he was prepared to shuttle, but the question was, about what? And the question was whether he would plunge into the issue of sovereignty, which he saw as the ultimate issue for the Falklands, or whether he would try to deal with some of the more immediate issues that came from the invasion and to back the Argentines away and find some kind of compromise which wouldn't immediately bog down over the issue of sovereignty. At that meeting, I found myself in a somewhat awkward position because the Secretary of State asked Tom Enders to give his views on what he thought should be done. Tom was a remarkably eloquent and thoughtful individual, very assured of himself, as I suggested a few minutes ago, and he gave a longish disquisition on the need to resolve the sovereignty issue if the entire Falklands problem was going to fester indefinitely. I was not, at the meeting, the senior European Bureau representative. One of the deputy assistant secretaries, who did not normally deal with that part of the world, was, so he deferred to me, and Secretary Haig said, "Well, what does the European bureau think?" And I said, "Mr. Secretary, I was interested in what Assistant Secretary Enders had to say, but I would ask one questions simply: when one goes to the Middle East to deal with the peace process, does one start with the thorny issue of Jerusalem, or does one start in the Sinai?" Period. Then I stopped. After Tom Enders' fifteen-minute narration, that was considered quite brief, and Haig turned and said, "That makes sense to me, doesn't it to you?" So that point was pretty well resolved in a very public-private meeting in which I played a minor role. But then Haig got entwined with the question of getting the White House to cough him up an airplane, which has been much written about, and I happened to be in his office, another of the rare times I was, when somebody on the White House senior staff called and was yanking him around

about the airplane. They finally gave him one without windows, which seemed ridiculously cruel, and it was a bit embarrassing because Haig's staff members didn't want me hearing how the boss was being yanked around by a senior staffer at the White House(which he was, clearly(and he was an unhappy Secretary of State over that issue of the plane.

But he was determined to get in there and play an important role. And it proved absolutely essential that he do so, because when he got to London it really dawned on him how determined the British were, that they were indeed going to send a fleet. And when he got to Buenos Aires he became aware at first hand what a bunch of comic clowns the Argentine generals were and how they could not compare as allies to our British NATO ally, the country with the "special relationship," so-called —even if it was very hard for Americans to understand why they would send a fleet all the way to the South Atlantic, including drawing down forces that they'd committed to NATO.

Q: Had reports been coming in about the initial reaction of the British Government to this, and was it pretty clear where the British were going to come out, or was this sort of iffy at the beginning?

PENDLETON: Well, that's a very good question. It was iffy, I think, because of our American mindset. We couldn't imagine them being so preoccupied with the invasion that they would actually go down and recapture the Falklands. And Al Adams, who had dispatched me to this working group, said to me a number of years later, "I remember so well you coming in my office and saying, 'Don't underestimate the British intent. There will be blood." And he said, "I always remember your words, 'there will be blood." And I said those words because I was talking with, among others, the charg# Ed Streeter on occasion in London and fairly regularly with Dick McCormick, who was the political counselor, and they were making abundantly clear how intense the reaction was in London at all levels, including, of course that of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. You also had, early on, the first Saturday meeting of Parliament since World War II, which was a signal if there ever was one of the level of concern. And yet I sensed that this level of concern was

not understood by most people in Washington. Many senior officials who had invested a great deal in the hemisphere and had a different view than, perhaps, those of us who were more Eurocentric did about where our fundamental long-term interests lay.

Q: I think, too, to understand the period, normally, Europe is our major concern, and Latin America is pretty far down the list. Correct me if I'm wrong, but at this point, the President had become very much personally engaged in the El Salvador-Nicaragua business and the concern about Communists, and if the President was concerned, the White House was concerned(and that sort of set the stage for this.

PENDLETON: You're absolutely right, but when you started looking at how the Argentine effort to be supportive of us in Central America really was extremely limited(extremely limited(in my mind it didn't add up. But of course, I couldn't get my mind around the whole Central America preoccupation of the White House, and that's partly my own failure but was also partly a failure of the White House, in a way, and I tended to believe that our long-term interests lay elsewhere, in terms of hard-core US national interests.

Q: I wasn't retired at the time, but I was sitting off to one side, and I couldn't imagine that in the long run we wouldn't support the British on this invasion of their territory. I mean, it just didn't occur to me that we wouldn't come out there. But, again, this is, you might say, the mindset of an interested observer.

PENDLETON: We were, from very early days, doing a lot to help the British, even while we were trying to pretend to be totally balanced in our approach. If the Argentines wanted, for example, landsat pictures of the Falklands, which you could practically buy on the open market, or wanted to buy Spot pictures from the French or wanted to buy Exocet missiles, about which the British were very concerned because of the impact it could have on any ships which might make it all the way down there, we put them off. We weighed in, we provided all sorts of help, which has all been heavily documented. Cap Weinberger, as Secretary of Defense, who was very close to the British, went out of his way to be helpful,

and Larry Eagleburger coordinated, from well before the moment of our public tilt towards the British.

Q: Well, it sounds like, in a way, the bureaucracy had essentially made up its mind what it was going to do, and the Defense Department, while the political figures around the White House and all were still contemplating their navels and scurrying around. Is that fair?

PENDLETON: Well, it does sound that way, but I am not in a position to characterize it for history. Clearly, Jeanne Kirkpatrick had very much the President's ear, and the President had this innate sympathy that helped him to be more balanced than simply having a kneejerk positive reaction to the plight of a NATO ally —even Margaret Thatcher. But it is clear to me that Cap Weinberger got out ahead for a while of where we were publicly, and probably privately. In the end, the President made a decision, particularly after Haig came back(I think from his second shuttle(and reported on the disarray amongst the government in Argentina. We decided to tilt publicly and overtly towards the British. And I was asked to deliver at least one of those messages at three in the morning to an officer at the British Embassy, who was a friend of mine. I called him at home and woke him up. And he said, "Can't it wait till morning?" I said, "No," and he said, "Well, I'm going to let it wait till morning." And I said, "You will want this, and I think you will regret it if you don't come get it." And so we agreed to meet at the British Embassy, which was on my way home. I drove over there and gave it to him. He was still grouchy, but he was less grouchy the next day. He thanked us for the decision.

How many other channels the message was communicated through I do not know, but in a way, that made it easier for the task force to work coherently, as we had to do, because the British made the decision early on to send the fleet down. The invasion was on April 2nd, and the counterattack on Fort Stanley in the Falklands wasn't until May 21. The surrender of the Argentines wasn't until June 14. And in the meantime, I faced from my very parochial point of view, this very dreadful situation of having to run and staff a working group and deal with all the daily questions with people calling in with suggestions

as to what might be done and trying to strategize about what could be done to avoid a confrontation that seemed almost inevitable (if you listened to the British) and do this week after week.

At the same time I was still trying to be in charge of day-to-day relations with nine other countries where a lot was going on, including a state visit by the Queen of the Netherlands, which I was supposed to be in charge of(at least, Lee Annenberg, who was the Chief of Protocol, told me that she and Nancy Reagan were counting on me to make sure it went well. And that was an overlay on the Falklands that was hard to do. I hadn't had much sleep for weeks and hadn't even been to a barber shop, and I was called to the White House to be in a welcoming line. And there's a picture of the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, looking at my hair with considerable consternation. Without colleagues like Keith Smith, John Campbell, Ras Smith, Peter Reams, and many others, it would have been a totally impossible task.

Q: Well, from what you were seeing, were the British pressing as hard, calling in all their chips and everything?

PENDLETON: The British pressed us very hard on all levels, including public relations. They pressed in London, they pressed through allies, they pressed every way that they could. And I used to call Sir Nicholas Henderson, the British ambassador at this point, and again at the time of the invasion, the "Mazola Man." I told him, "You remind me of the Mazola man, because at that era, the Mazola margarine company was taking out ads on NBC, CBS and ABC all at the same time, so if you flipped the channel, you were going to see a Mazola ad whatever happened. And if you flipped the channel you would see Nico Henderson making his case to the American public. But I can assure you he made it very vigorously, as did everybody else from Prime Minister Thatcher on down.

And it was interesting, I fortunately had worked closely with the British Embassy before, and now that we were undiluted allies again, it was useful that Nicol Henderson had

served under my father-in-law at the British Embassy and indeed had appeared at my wife's fourth birthday party dressed as a horse. The deputy chief of mission had visited our summer house in Maine along with the UK political counselor; and one of the younger political officers, Steven Wall, who's now the UK ambassador to the EC, became John Major's executive assistant. Others worked very closely with us, and we had an extremely easy rapport, in terms of speaking frankly and straight to each other. That's usually been the case with the Brits, but in my case it was made even easier at this point because of ties that preceded the outbreak of the Falklands war. That is one reason nations have embassies.

Q: How did the Latin American contingent in the task force feel about the Argentine group? I mean, this was pretty repugnant. They were both clowns and then there were the disappearances. This was not only a clownish but nasty group of people. Were the Latin American types becoming converted to the idea that this was not a group we can stand with?

PENDLETON: Well, yes and no. I realized the minute I used the word clowns that that was being excessively polite, but I think that Haig was affected by the way they operated -or didn't operate-. But everybody was smart enough to know about the "disappeared," about the human rights violations and about the problems. But if you have worked much of your adult life in Latin America(and with regard to Latin America(you put a kind of investment into our relations with our own hemisphere that is pretty important. It used to drive Kissinger to distraction. He called them "the ma#ana boys," and the reason that he put a hold on transfers worldwide in something called GLOP when he was Secretary of State was, in part, because he was just appalled to find how many people had served in Latin America and no place else, had Latin American spouses, and Kissinger felt that they were losing their perspective.

I found on the working group that there was strong feeling that it was going to go the way of the British but that they were going to fight hard to make sure that our interests in this

hemisphere were not overlooked and that that was their role, to a degree. But under Bob Service, Tom Enders, and Tony Gillespie (later ambassador to Columbia and Chile) the obviously took direction from the Secretary of State. Once we tilted, it was not much of a problem. But people withdrew from the working group and went back(the ones with the more substantive focus(to where they could write more easily the papers that would affect the outcome. That meant that you had an inter-agency group of people who were volunteering to work on the task force as it ripened who did not bring the same approach, necessarily, to things. And I found myself being in charge of it in general, and we worked fine together. The biggest problem was to find people who were willing to work around the clock, seven days a week(in shifts, albeit. But most of Alan Holmes's (Acting Assistant Secretary for Europe) and my discussions, I'm sorry to say, as the weeks and months dragged by, were not about the substance of the matter but how the heck we could continue, as the European Bureau, to staff the working group, and what other things were slipping if we had good people who were there but getting tuckered out.

Q: Was the feeling, once the British started coming, that they were going to retake the Falklands?

PENDLETON: Yes. There was an absolute British determination to retake the Falklands. Our analysis was that they had more than enough resources to do so, despite the long supply line. We were quite confident that they could do so, but it was really unclear what the costs might be. And there was a major preoccupation on the part of the British, which we were involved in and reflected also, as I mentioned before, on the Exocet missiles, because they were capable of doing a lot of damage to ships which were crowded with troops. The British, obviously, wanted to do everything they could to keep the Exocets out of Argentine hands and protect their troops. We never gave up on the notion that we might be able to find some way to avoid bloodshed, but it was hard to do. As an incredible number of callers phoned in with suggestions —related often to the sovereignty issue — generally dividing the two major islands between the Argentines and the British. And Roger Fisher, the author of Getting to Yes, and a Harvard Law School professor, called

one night and talked for half an hour with one of the people on the task force about how to negotiate this issue, and it was only at the end that we realized that it was the famous professor

Q: When the British submarine torpedoed the Belgrano, with considerable loss of life and all (which is actually an old, obsolescent American cruiser which we'd given to the Argentines), did that have any effect? That was really the first real blood, wasn't it?

PENDLETON: There had been some before, but that was the major indication that this could be really bloody. And in terms of its effect, I'm afraid I'm going to have to defer to others. I know I remember one thing that taught me a lesson about the Belgrano, though. It has to do with CNN and the modern world and also about how you run a task force. My son Nathaniel was at that point, I believe, nine years old, and he was very interested in the Falklands because he never saw me, just knew I was working on it, and I hardly ever came home while he was awake. He called the task force and said to me, "What do you think about the Belgrano?" And I said, "What do you mean?" And he said, "Well, she's been sunk." And I said, "Nathaniel, if the Belgrano had been sunk, I would certainly know about it because I'm here in the midst of the task force, we have one of the finest intelligence operations eight feet away in the Operations Center, and nobody has said anything about it." And he said, "Well, are you watching TV?" I said, "Well, we've watched TV for ten weeks and we're so numb we can hardly put our eyes on them." We had six screens going at once. He said, "You watch your TV, and you'll find out the Belgrano has been sunk." And we did, and I had to call him back five minutes later and tell him he was right and we were way behind.

That was reflective of what happens when you get a surfeit of information and you get people who are bombarded day after day and week after week with more than they can deal with and they're working in a noisy environment. The Brits came over after the Falklands and sent a guy to see how we had staffed the Falklands War and what we did about Operations Center and task force area, and one of the main things I said to him was,

"We all have got to get more side rooms which are totally quiet, where people can actually write and think and stay away from this perpetual hubbub."

That doesn't answer your question about the impact of the sinking of the Belgrano, but it does give a little insight.

Q: How about Jeanne Kirkpatrick. She had really gotten her job as ambassador to the United Nations by writing an article saying we have really got to be nicer to these rightwing dictators in Latin America because when the chips are down they're on our side. And so, in a way, she had staked her career on that. She had the ear of Ronald Reagan, who I think really took to powerful women, as with Maggie Thatcher. Did you have the feeling she was weighing in, I mean, was causing problems or going off in a different direction, or not? Did you get any feel for this?

PENDLETON: Well, we knew from day one that she had (a) the President's ear and (b) very strong opinions and that she was not going to be reticent about making her opinions known. I saw her from my humble perch as perpetual background music, sometimes coming to the foreground in public statements which were not, even after we had tilted, totally in line with what I would have scripted. But that seemed inevitable. I had no dealings with her personally and had nothing but, kind of, reverberations coming in through either people who did have some direct dealing or through the public. We had more contact with Bill Mittendorf, our ambassador to the OAS, who obviously was very worried about the impact on the entire hemisphere south of the border, and he came to the task force quite often. He came, as a matter of fact, on the day(I thought it was kind of sad(he came in tails(of his daughter's wedding, when he should have been at the wedding reception. I found him always gentlemanly and willing to exchange views on issues, even though he had a clear preoccupation which I didn't a hundred per cent share. But Jeanne Kirkpatrick(I can't give you any historical insights that you wouldn't already have from others.

Q: Were you picking up, though, on the Latin American team that was there, the fact that, even among Latin Americans, the Argentines traditionally have been kind of odious to most of us. I mean, they really didn(t like the Argentines. They were more European than not, and they kind of looked down on the rest of Latin America. The rest of Latin America just didn't like them. I mean, was this coming through at all?

PENDLETON: Events happened which forced each country in Latin America to line up one way or the other, whether it would be votes in the OAS, votes in the UN or incidents which might affect Chile or Brazil in particular. We had a major preoccupation with Brazil.

Q: A UK bomber landed in Brazil.

PENDLETON: Right, and the question was, you know, what would happen to it. This was later on, but it became clear, even to somebody like myself, that Argentina was not the most beloved country in South America and that other countries, particularly Chile, were trying to keep a measure of fraternity while being sensible about what Argentina was getting the entire hemisphere south of the Rio Grande involved in.

Q: Turning to your other responsibilities, which were basically the major countries of Western Europe, did the issue come up of, you know, if we don(t stand by the British on this thing, a feeling that maybe the United States might be turning away from Europe? In other words, the confidence of how the United States would stand up with NATO in, essentially, a Soviet attack some time, was the United States turning elsewhere or something? Did that come up?

PENDLETON: Well, I think, it was of course a very real concern at the outset. Haig was right in a sense. Europeans do not understand our long-term hemispheric preoccupation, and they, therefore, tended to react with some puzzlement, to be very polite, about how we were trying to balance the equities at the outset. But we tilted toward the British publicly soon enough so that those concerns were nipped in the bud. We also expressed

enough concern about any draw-down of NATO capabilities from Europe to be used in the Falklands, that other European countries recognized where our interests continued to lie. And I don't believe it was a major problem.

The Brits had to weigh in very heavily with their EC partners to gain the level of public support that they wanted and felt they needed, but because we made our decisions early enough to go public with where we really were on the issue, there was not a major threat in terms of unraveling our ties with the other European countries.

Q: How about how we observed the British? Now here they were mustering their might: it wasn't terribly impressive. I mean, when you get right down to it, a country which has always been a real military force, when it came to projecting itself down there it really had to scrape the barrel. Did this sort of make us understand the weakness of the British militarily?

PENDLETON: Well, I think that those who were in policy-making positions and at Defense were pretty well aware of the weakness of the British. We discussed it earlier in terms of what we saw(or I saw(at NATO five years earlier, where the British were a point of some preoccupation with all the Allies because of their growing military weakness. I think that I was surprised that even scraping the bottom of the barrel they could get a big enough fleet to go down and do the job, with our help, but none of us had a monopoly on virtue when it came to having capabilities in the Southern Atlantic. The US did not have overhead capabilities that were anything like what we had in more logical potential hot spots of the world. It was hard to rearrange satellites, to provide proper coverage. This is all well known and fully reported in the press. And we certainly did not have large forces stationed anywhere nearby. Perhaps that was a great relief because we were not going to be asked to come and fight side-by-side with our allies. Of course, it was out of the NATO area, the Falklands, so that must have been a relief as well to the highest policy-makers, that you didn't have to do anything under the NATO Treaty. So all of us had lessons to learn from the process.

Q: Did the Soviets play any role at all in there? Was that a concern?

PENDLETON: I don't remember.

Q: That probably answers the question, then.

PENDLETON: It may, it may not. I have to repeat that I was in a funny eye of the hurricane, and I'm sure there are things that went on around me which got totally suppressed through the process of supervising the production of press guidance and other things that were more peripheral.

Q: How about when the British invaded and took a little while but essentially showed how inept(except maybe for the air force(the Argentineans were? Did the wind-up cause much difficulty for you, or not?

PENDLETON: No, not really, but we knew that we had to start thinking quite quickly about the long term, and people were pretty tuckered out and had other growing preoccupations to think about. What one would do for the future in that region(although we tended obviously to defer to the British(but there were some interests that we became more aware of, such as oil and gas. And at the same time we became aware that in terms of American citizens, there were more than 11. I think we found 23 in the end. In terms of the British, we came to realize that, while the British fought for their people who were down there, there were very few of them as well. It became evident that a few influential landowners in London still were the ones who were calling the shots for the British Government to a degree. But it was a traditional emotional issue for the Brits, and I think most people in Washington involved with the issue were very happy to put the Falklands aside at the end and try to take a bit of a breather and catch up on some of the things which had not gotten full attention while the Falklands was going on.

Q: Well, let's turn away from the Falklands, then, I think, at this point. You were on this job from when to when?

PENDLETON: I went to Northern European Affairs in the summer o1980, and I left in October, 1982.

Q: Well, now, something I mentioned before: did you see the relationship(this is quite early on in the Reagan Administration(between President Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher develop? I mean, was this an apparent two people really getting along very well and seeing things in sort of the same light, or was that as apparent then as it became later?

PENDLETON: It wasn't all that apparent to me, and as I mentioned previously, it became much more apparent when I served in London, '85 to '89, and this relationship had really developed over time. It's rather hard, even from that position in the State Department to suss out the chemistry of the relationship. It can be done if you are in constant touch with the NSC staffers who monitor telephone calls between the two principals. It was clear that there was a lot of UK frustration over our initial reaction to the invasion of the Falklands. There was a lot of frustration over certain elements of the Northern Ireland issue. There was frustration that, however, was always worked through because our President was so likable and Mrs. Thatcher was so savvy that she knew where to pull back despite her fierce intensity on issues that she cared about. They both worked to keep the relationship going. And of course, once we tilted on the Falklands, it was easier, but then it would fall from the Presidential and Prime Ministerial level to the bureaucratic level.

Q: What about(I don't think we discussed it(Grenada? It was rather interesting, there was British territory, and the British, from the top down, were rather cool to what we felt was an imminent threat, and this came rather close. Did you have to deal with the Grenada thing?

PENDLETON: No, I didn't. It happened after I left Northern European Affairs and went to look after the office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, and my preoccupations changed rather a lot. I heard about our plans to invade Grenada in advance, but I think I said I dismissed them as being ludicrous. But you are putting your finger on something that to this day still rankles a lot of Brits, and it rankles a lot of Brits in part because the Queen got very, very annoyed that we had invaded one of her Commonwealth countries. And she probably is the biggest supporter of the Commonwealth in Britain. She was ticked(royally ticked(and that reverberated down through the government and bureaucracy in a way that led to intemperate remarks that went on for years about Grenada. I think that Albion can be as perfidious as any other country I know about because they are sophisticated about their perfidy (if that's a word), but they believe that we hit an all-time low with the surprise move on Grenada.

Q: Which was very popular in the United States, particularly after seeing the students come off the plane, and frankly, looking at it, I think the British had a very weak representative on the island, from what I gather, and there was real danger. I mean, these were pretty nutty people on the Granada New Jewel Movement, and all that.

PENDLETON: Well, I believe they were, but I also believe that we were incredibly lucky to have succeeded to the extent we did. Everything I've heard since about our military preparedness for an invasion there leads you to scratch your head about our own lack of capability right in our own back yard. The Administration was extremely fortunate in terms of the reaction of our students studying in Grenada who publicly blessed the US for rescuing them. One of the oddities and sadness of history is that the Grenada invasion took place at the same time that the Marine barracks in Beirut were blown up, and I was on that task force, starting at four in the morning, and I'll get to that when I move on to the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs. But it's a reminder that you may think that this weekend's event is going to be the invasion of Grenada and it's manageable, and George Shultz and Cap Weinberger have gone down to Augusta, Georgia, to play golf; and then

you have, totally out of left field, another event, a tragic event for us which washed it aside. But to go back to where you started, I can assure you that the British didn't wash it aside.

Q: Were there any other issues that you were dealing with in Northern Europe during this time that we might cover?

PENDLETON: There were constant ongoing issues, none of which broke through the surface in any way comparable, and how did I find myself distracted. It was more the state visit, more the problem of having to write efficiency reports in the midst of all this on not only a very large office, both doing it as acting director (with no reviewing officer) and I had also had to write efficiency reports on a large number of charg#s overseas, whom I had not directly had contact with because we were still in the process of preparing ambassadors to go to post. And during that year, many DCMs had been for very large periods of time charg# d'affaires. And we had issues that were quite time-consuming, including health issues, at posts that needed attention and other things that you would think we would not be involved with. In one case the ambassador had a heart attack. The people who were in Northern European Affairs who were not also having to worry about the task force did an absolute marvelous job of going ahead on a day-to-day basis. I tried to run upstairs and downstairs a lot, but Peter Reams, for instance, who now looks after Caribbean affairs, did a super job of taking on the responsibility of coordinating very fine officers who were dealing with the day-to-day issues. But I cannot give you insights of great note into other problems that were exploding all around us.

I had been acting for some months because Bob Funseth had gone on extended jury duty and then had been pulled into another project, —including going with Haig on the shuttles— and I was a mid-level officer. So we obviously needed a new office director. Bob was reassigned, basically. And Bob Morris came back from London, where he'd been economic minister at the embassy, and was made office director while the Falklands were still going on, but Bob was a very well respected economist and diplomat, and it was clear that the economic bureau was after him. He lasted just a couple of weeks before

he was made Deputy Assistant Secretary in EB and I was back running the office again. And then the remarkable Jack Binns, who'd been ambassador in Honduras, came from Berkeley, where he'd been a diplomat in residence, and at the end of my tenure, became the office director. I spent a great deal of time trying to decant to Jack what I had managed to learn over the previous two years. He was an outstanding old pro and didn't need much decanting, but we'd been through a fair bit.

Q: I was wondering, the Reagan Administration came in with their batch of ambassadors, and always the fanciest ambassadorial appointments are to Northern Europe. Were these a temperamental bunch of people you had to deal with? Were they causing problems, or did they fit in? I'm talking about the political ambassadors.

PENDLETON: Right, well, I commented on them previously to a degree, and in general, they were a very nice group of people who were anxious to do well but uncertain, because of their lack of prior experience, how best to do well and very willing to listen to people's advice by and large. I generally liked these eight people a good deal, but I didn't always have the happiest time thinking about what they would actually bring to developing relations that I cared about. And many did get very mixed reviews in their countries of assignment. They varied a great deal from, say, Charlie Price, who was close enough to Nancy Reagan (and eventually to the President), who was going to Belgium, was a very energetic, dynamic fellow to somebody like John Lewis, who was ambassador to the UK, who was not certain what he was going to do and how he was going to do it. When he got there, he remained uncertain and he actually was in the United States during the outbreak of the Falklands War and eventually had a hard time reestablishing his ties with the British Government, to the extent that there were such ties, because he had decided not to go back because of some family obligations. And frankly, that was just fine with Al Haig, who wanted Ed Streator as charg# to continue to do what he'd done for four or five previous years.

Q: This was in the newspapers, as I recall, that Lewis, who was, what, a Chicago businessman or something(

PENDLETON: Lewis was one of the heirs to the Johnson Wax fortune, and he had not had to take on any particular decision-making roles in the previous decade or two. He lived on a vast estate outside of Chicago, with a private golf course, and basically clipped coupons. He was a very decent and gentle man who didn't hide from anybody the fact that this appointment was a surprise to him and one he wasn't quite sure how to cope with. He gave an interview to The New Yorker, which was quite devastating, about how he just went, once he got to London, to wherever his staff told him to, and he often didn(t even know what town he was in when he arrived. He was much criticized for being in the States at the time of the Falklands. Knowing precisely what the Secretary of State wanted, I didn't order him back to London, and I have mixed emotions about that to this day, because it manifestly would have been better for him if he'd gone back, but it, frankly, would not have been better for the nation.

Charlie Price had introduced the Lewises to the Reagans at the Annenbergs' annual NeYear's get-together in California two months after election day, and I believe that one of the Lewis daughters was a God-daughter of the Prices. And when the phone call came from the President a couple of weeks later, it was, I think, somewhat astonishing that the Prices were invited to go to Brussels and the Lewises were invited to go to the United Kingdom. Certainly the Prices were astonished. Eventually they made sure they ended up in London, where they did an excellent job.

Q: In 1982, you moved over to the(

PENDLETON: (and became the Director of the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs.

Q: Sounds like a nice, quiet job.

PENDLETON: Yes, rather quiet.

Q: And you did it from '82 to when?

PENDLETON: Sometime in '83, when I moved to be Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost's executive assistant.

Q: Today is the 29th of September, 1998. Kim, in '82(what was the situation Arab-Israeli?

PENDLETON: Well, at that point the Arab-Israeli seemed to be more a situation Lebanon-Israel and Lebanese-Israeli. But when I moved from Northern European Affairs to look after the office olsrael and Arab-Israel Affairs, the first thing I was told, really, was to get Israel out of Lebanon, which was a fairly tall order. And the context had been really rather dreadful. I moved in late October, and the previous June we had a new Secretary of State, George Shultz. He had arrived and found that his hands were full with what was going on in Lebanon, including the Israeli move into that country and eventually the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. There was a great deal of dismay in the United States about the Israeli movement all the way to Beirut, the semi-destruction of Beirut, the need to involve ourselves in getting the Palestinian fighters out of Lebanon. All of this was a cauldron with which I wasn't fully familiar. And it had become such a preoccupation with George Shultz that he had been working night and day with Charlie Hill, who was my predecessor as director of the office, and Shultz had taken Hill up the Seventh Floor to be an executive secretary right near his office with a Department-wide mandate but with a continuing and ongoing interest in this issue in which the Israel desk had been very much involved.

Q: Why this, Kim, at this particular juncture, moving from the Office of Northern European Affairs? Here you're talking about probably one of the two or three times the most complicated problem, and why somebody who'd been working on Northern European affairs?

PENDLETON: Well, that's a very good and fair question, and the answer, to a degree, is fairly simple. I was sitting at my desk in Northern European Affairs, and I'd just been promoted to the senior officer level, which allowed me to become an office director, and Wat Cluverius, who was a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Near East Bureau. called me and asked whether I would be interested in replacing Charlie Hill in this rather monstrous job. Wat was basically an Arabist, but we had served together in Israel in the late '60s, and thank goodness, from a substantive point of view. Most of our best Israeli watchers and Arab watchers of the modern generation have served across the borders, and that's been a tremendous help in terms of the peace process. And Wat said to me, "I think it's terribly important, and so does Nick Veliotes, (the Assistant Secretary), that whoever runs the Israel Desk have some understanding of Israel from the ground and of Israelis, particularly of Israelis (what are the fears and angst and motivations that they bring to the table when they look at the world. You've served in Israel, and you have a lot of Israeli friends, and you could bring that dimension. You also have been through the Falklands War and you have a proven track record of being able to cope with complex guestions." And Larry Eagleburger, who was Undersecretary for Political Affairs at that point, said to me, basically, "You like wars. You can do this job. If you will go, I will direct the assignment." And I, frankly, thought about it for close to a week, which was perhaps dangerous, but at that point my family hadn't seen me for quite a while, and I knew that this would be a seven-day-a-week job with the Israeli cabinet meeting on Sundays, but I swallowed and they swallowed, and we agreed that I would do it. I finished up on Northern European Affairs on a Friday, wrote efficiency reports like mad all weekend, studied the Middle East on Sunday night, and represented the office at my first NEA staff meeting on Monday morning(so it was a fast transition.

Q: Because timing is so critical, when you went in October '82, where were, sort of, the Armies at that particular point?

PENDLETON: Well, the Israelis had basically withdrawn further and further into the southern Lebanon but still were very anxious to control any threats to their northern border, and we wanted to get them out altogether. Lebanon, on which I'm not an authority, was in a state of considerable chaos and division. The PLO, the most vigorous of the fighters, had been removed, I was called up to the deputy secretary's office after about five days on the job, and found myself there with ambassador Phil Habib and Ambassador Morrie Draper, who were doing a great deal of the Lebanon brokering, both on the ground and back in Washington. Ken Dam, who was deputy secretary, told us that he had instructions from the White House (and he meant the National Security Advisor) to have a plan for Israeli withdrawal from all of Lebanon and have it blessed on an interagency basis and have it completed by five o'clock that afternoon! This was about 10 in the morning. Ken Dam said to Phil Habib, "Who will write it?" And Phil said, "Kim will." That was a fairly tall order for me, but I realized that the people who had been working on the Israel desk and across the hall under the able David Mack on Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and other countries were a superb group, as they've proved to be. My role really came to be to gather them together and make sure that we, as a group, developed a tenable withdrawal plan(which we did that day(and we had an interagency meeting at four in the afternoon, with Jeff Kemp and Howie Teischer coming over from the NSC. We rammed enough through to get Ken Dam something that was worthwhile that day that we could send over to the National Security Advisor that night.

So I was really thrown right into the midst of it, and I couldn(t have done a thing without the support of the remarkable people who worked in NEA. It was a bureau in which decision-making frequently seemed to fall to a lower level than I had been used to, but there was very open communication with the Assistant Secretary and on up the line. People in NEA were willing to kill themselves and, I think, served the nation extraordinarily well in both an operational and policy-making capacity. And there was a tremendous amount to be done. Nothing was achieved overnight, obviously.

Q: In a way you'd been away from this and you came back and you'd had the Israeli army led by Ariel Sharon go into Beirut when they said they weren't(you know, this sort of thing. Did you sense a different feeling within the professional staff about Israel? Did you feel you were up against a different breed of cat almost?

PENDLETON: Well, the first day that I was on the job, Robie Sable, the political counselor from the Israeli Embassy came into my office and said, "Welcome, you have a job to do. It's a terrible job. You're going to have to defend Israeli interests here in this sea of Arabists. We have only one country desk here, and there are all of those offices that focus on the Arab countries, and you will be outgunned in the bureaucracy. We expect you to do something about it." As he was speaking, it was a terribly low moment in terms of Israeli-US relations because of Sharon's intervention and because the American press had covered the invasion of Beirut in a way that made it graphically clear that the Israelis had, in the eyes of a great many people, run amok. At the same time, I found throughout the Department and in NEA and with Nick Veliotes, who had been deputy chief of mission in Israel, a very real understanding of why the Israelis could be so inconvenient and why they were motivated to take steps which we frequently saw as frequently overreaching. The Department's leadership also understood how Israel interlinked globally with decisions that were taken in world capitals through the Jewish diaspora, a real sense of the American political environment. And it was a complex issue. It was not the time when one really wanted to be mindlessly supporting Israel, but I don't think that we ever did. It was also a time when the pot was stirring enough that President Reagan got involved in his Middle East peace initiative of September 1, 1982, much of which had been cooked up by Charlie Hill and others in NEA. So I think there was a feeling that there were some opportunities here but at the same time that the clock was ticking (the clock was ticking on settlements, the clock was ticking on Lebanon, the clock was ticking on the larger peace process(a difficult moment. I think if I had really thought about difficult it was I would have been less na#ve about wandering into the middle of the thicket.

Q: Did you find yourself at all acting as sort o"Mr. Israel" in a sea of Arabists?

PENDLETON: Well, obviously, part of my role was to try to explain Israeli motivations to people who tended to be suspicious, but, as I have suggested the leadership of the bureau included a great many people who had spent a good deal of time working with both Arabs and Israelis and who knew that everybody was going to have to be part of the equation(there was just no doubt about it. But there was a great deal of impatience, and rightly so, with the Israelis at that point. Sharon was not exactly a role-model. I found myself inadvertently, for instance, energizing a decision that we would not welcome Sharon to Washington when he wanted to come down from New York, where he'd been involved in this trial against Time Magazine, as I recall. And he wanted to stop by Washington on his way to Florida to see a space launch. This was brought to my attention as I was walking out the door of our office, and I said, "No, we don't want that man here in Washington at this point." So that went forward from my office, without my even paying adequate attention to it, as the recommendation of the Israel Desk. And it stuck all the way up to the Secretary of State and the White House. For the first time in the history of the State of Israel, an Israeli defense minister was not welcome in Washington. I wish I had thought more carefully about my rather flip reaction, but it was typical of the way I felt(and a lot of people felt(at that point, and while there were many in the NEA who would subscribe instantly to that, you had the balancing wheel of Charlie Hill, who was considered a good friend of Israel, up on the Seventh Floor, and George Shultz, who was not initially considered a friend of Israel but who became a damned good friend of Israel over the period of his tenure as Secretary of State.

Did I feel beleaguered on occasion? Absolutely, but I mainly felt respect for the intelligence and the diplomatic savvy of those who were, unlike me, spending their lives on either the peace process or various aspects of our relationship with the Arab World and the Middle East in general.

Q: What were you getting from our embassy in Tel Aviv about what was happening, because this must have put quite a strain on them since what Sharon had done was with the tacit, or not so tacit, backing of Begin? I mean, it turned into a big mess for the Israelis. What were you getting from our embassy as far as how they were seeing this and the tensions in Israel?

PENDLETON: Well, we obviously had different channels of communication with the embassy. Some were personal, through visits. Some were with the ambassador by telephone. The embassy was also doing superb reporting by cable

Q: The ambassador was?

PENDLETON: Samuel Lewis, the indefatigable former head of the policy planning staff, who by then had been in Israel a long time and was to stay even longer, and then there was the normal embassy reporting and lots of discussion on the phone also with Bob Flaten, who was the deputy chief of mission —and with whom I had served in Tel Aviv. I thought the embassy reporting really was excellent and professional and(to use a word which supporters of Israel hate(balanced in its view. There may have been a good bit of frustration underlying it, but you got a fine snapshot of how Israelis from the "peace now" end to the most rabidly aggressive end of the spectrum looked at issues large and small.

Then we talked a great deal on the phone with Sam Lewis, who was considered to be a superb friend of Israel(and this distressed some of his colleagues at the senior levels in the Arab countries. Sam always argued that you cannot make a dent in Israeli thinking without reflecting a profound understanding of their concerns. And he was both excellent at listening and outstanding at pushing both the Israelis and the American bureaucracy at all levels. He used the secure phone line nonstop, and, of course, a significant number of his calls were to Larry Eagleburger, as Undersecretary, and on occasion to the Secretary of State. Phil Habib and I spent a great deal of time in a secure phone booth in NEA that was sweating hot, talking to Sam Lewis on the secure phone and getting(let's say Sam

was not reticent about giving instructions to those he felt should fight Israel's corner on a given issue. In the process, he could give me firmer instructions than he could give Phil Habib, but he was never shy about trying. I did my best to explain to Sam what the thinking was in Washington and how it was evolving so he could decide whether he wanted to weigh in. I never worked with such a strong, assertive ambassador in my life, and certainly not one from Washington. He knew what was going on really hour by hour, sometimes minute by minute, and he fought his corner with a tenacity which was most remarkable. Sam never stopped. I was briefed on this by my colleagues in the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs when I arrived, but they were a little bit too polite about it. It took me a while to figure out that he considered me to be his assistant and that I should carry the water on anything he wanted. Sometimes that simply wasn't possible.

Q: We'll come to the events, but first I'm trying to get the atmosphere. Did you sense, because of what had been reported and was on TV, either a split or a difference within the American Jewish community- (end of tape)

-during this particular period because of the really very bad impression that the Israeli attack on Lebanon left? What was happening with regards to the prime lobbying group, the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)?

PENDLETON: Yes, although I had not worked with them prior to arriving on the Desk and therefore can't be the best judge of the evolution of the organization. AIPAC, when it started, had been under the direction of Morrie Amitay, who passed the baton to Tom Dine not long before the Lebanese invasion. Ironically, Tom's visit to Israel in 1992 had been to visit us, and his wife Joan had been my wife's roommate at boarding school. They invited my wife and myself to go out to Morrie Amitay's house with him for the reception to honor Tom's arrival as the professional head of AIPAC. Elisabeth and I were probably the only couple at that point, —because I was working at Northern European affairs here—, who were not working on the region or on Capitol Hill paying attention to it. After October 1982 I had a slightly bizarre relationship with Tom, who is an unbelievable understander of

people and maker of deals(he's now running Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, in Prague, having left AIPAC and gone into AID some four years ago. He was in the building a great deal, generally cooking up things with Larry Eagleburger. These deals were frequently so politically loaded that mere bureaucrats like myself were not necessarily welcome to know about them. Tom was a generous enough friend to try to keep me from being totally blind sided, and a lot of what you did as Director of the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, if you didn't want to be wasting your time, was rushing up to the Seventh Floor to make sure you and your office weren't way behind the power curve. Tom regularly came to my office and gave me a whiff of what was going on, which was helpful in terms of prodding others.

Almost the entire American Jewish community was troubled by what had happened in Lebanon, and it was reflected in AIPAC. Tom Dine kept looking for ways to make things better, and he was never shy about telling the Israelis what the mood was in the United States. In that sense, he was a fine facilitator. And he was the kind of person who could talk with Jews as a Jew and with gentiles as the spouse of a gentile, AIPAC dinner that fall, right after I'd taken over the job, Tom was gracious enough to introduce me to the 1200 people there as a friend of Israel and a person who would do a fine job. And he helped to tutor me somewhat about the American Jewish community and their concerns and to try to raise my level of sophistication in terms of communicating with the community. I should say that at the AIPAC dinner, there were, as I recall, over 300 Congressmen and senators. This is, to me, an extraordinary turnout at a time when some might have wished to turn their back, but I think they knew, and they knew from their friends, that this was a moment to show an interest and to stand firm. It was also reflective of the kind of influence that AIPAC had on Capitol Hill, an influence which, of course, distresses many who question what impact the organization might have on our own political system. Tom, who knows the Hill intimately, always said, "Hey, we live in a democracy; in a democracy you push for what you have decided is worth pushing for, and the other people push back, and you see how it comes out." That was his approach to it.

Q: Moving more to the events, now. In October, 1982, rather shortly after you arrived, you had to come up with this Israeli withdrawal plan. How did that put together? I mean, what was the plan, essentially?

PENDLETON: Well, this was a day's activity which melded into the background, but we had a withdrawal scheme which involved getting the Israelis back over time past various streams and geographic dividers closer and closer to the northern border of Israel and that would allow them time and the right to have a buffer zone while they sorted things out. The plan didn't last all that long because it evolved into actually having a formal buffer zone, which we blessed, to protect the Israeli settlements in the Golan and in the North. Like so many of these things which you do(the notion of withdrawal was general and good; the mechanics are affected by the reality on the ground. What happens when buses are hijacked and children are killed? What happens to make one side go more slowly? But the main thing we had to do was to lean on the Israelis to convince them that this was what had to be done.

Q: Did you have the feeling, though, that basically there was a change in who was calling the shots in Israel? I mean, was Sharon becoming discredited at this point, and was there a general feeling that the Israelis did want to get the hell out of this mess?

PENDLETON: We profoundly hoped so, but I went to Israel in early December and not all that much had changed. One of the deals I had with Nick Veliotes as Assistant Secretary was that I would go to Israel as soon as I could after getting settled in and becoming somewhat familiar with the issues. I went to Israel for an orientation trip, and it turned out Phil Habib was planning to go at the same time. He told me that I could go but I had to say nothing and lie low. So I was a little chagrined when I got to the hotel in Jerusalem and saw my name and picture on television on the Israeli Arabic station, and then only as a trailer did they mention Phil Habib. The next day I met with the acting Prime Minister, the President, and the acting Foreign Minister and others. But when Phil, Morrie, myself and others had a meeting with the Israelis led by Sharon, in which we were going to make

some Lebanon-related proposals, we hoped that Sharon would be overshadowed by Habib's strength of character and panoply of proposals. And he wasn't. Sharon basically hijacked the meeting, said he didn't really want to listen to the US proposals, he wouldn't really listen to the US proposals, and he announced that basically he'd worked out with all the factions in Beirut an Israeli plan which was quite distinct from our own. The Israelis were to continue to be much more involved than we had expected. And I left shaking my head about Sharon, thinking that this man was going to be there forever and that our ability to cope was going to be much more negligible than we hoped. Nevertheless Phil was his normal self, remarkably resilient, and he brilliantly ingested what Sharon had to say and dealt with it and put aside portions of our plan while we figured out how to cope with it. But, to me, it was a bit of a shock to find Sharon so much in control.

Q: Did you have the feeling that Sharon, by force of presence and all, had pretty well seized the leadership of the Israeli Government at that time? Begin, I think, had resigned or was out, retired?

PENDLETON: No, Begin was still there at that point. He resigned in 1983. He was becoming less and less in evidence, however.

Q: His wife had died, hadn't she?

PENDLETON: Yes, and he'd become very gloomy, but he was still to be very much reckoned with, and we did reckon with him. George Shultz had a good dialogue going with Begin, of written communications, some of which Charlie Hill scribbled, that were very personal and were reflective of the role we still saw for the Israeli prime minister. And I recall the Christmas of '82 I spent Christmas Eve, when you want to be hanging up your stockings, writing a personal letter from Shultz, who was out in California at that point, to Begin. We sent it that night, after it had been faxed out to Palo Alto and cleared and sent back. And I would not have allowed Christmas to dissipate, and neither would the Secretary of State, if Begin still hadn't been a force to be reckoned with. Increasingly

the interlocutor for George Shultz became foreign minister Shamir and his guys like Eli Rubenstein(and that was appropriate in the sense that this was the foreign minister(but it's hard for me to remember and to determine exactly how much weight Sharon had month by month as time went on.

Q: Well, during this time, when you arrived, had the Marines been placed in Lebanon?

PENDLETON: They had been placed in Lebanon. I'm not sure of the dates but, you know, we made decisions such as to send one of our few operable World War II battleships(

Q: It was the New Jersey.

PENDLETON: Sending the New Jersey in September, 1983 gave me great qualms because we were heaving Volkswagen-sized shells at targets that couldn't possibly be hit, and we hit a great many civilians. We hit hills that were miles and miles away from potential refined targets. We were demonstrating our might, as we often do, but that was not, in my view, the way to go about it. President Reagan, however, decided to do that.

Q: How much of your feeling on this complicated thing was due to the President(this is President Reagan(and his NSC? How much were they, sort of, weighing in on things during the time you were dealing with Israeli affairs?

PENDLETON: The President had really gotten involved before I started, in terms of the September 1 peace plan, and I was surprised to realize that he was personally involved. But President Reagan was not, on a day-to-day basis, the one who was. He was not inclined to be overly involved, as far as I could tell, and on occasion when there were meetings, he would seem to drift away. I did not attend these meetings, but I had immediate first-hand reports of them. Jeffrey Kemp and Howard Teicher and Bud McFarlane at the NSC were all intimately involved in everything related to the Middle East —more than I knew at that point, because of the Iran-Contra part of the equation. And they

were operationally as active as you could ask any three people to be. And probably more so than they should have been.

I got some insight into the President's role one holiday mornings in December of 1982. I think Bud McFarlane convinced him that he should have a detailed briefing on settlements. Settlements were a major problem, as they have remained.

Q: Could you explain when you say "settlements" what you mean?

PENDLETON: These were the building of Israeli villages of settlement for Jews in the occupied territories, in a sense, creating "facts" on the ground that would make it very difficult to give back all of the occupied territories to anybody(to Jordan, to Palestinians, to whomever. The settlements around Jerusalem and elsewhere on the West Bank were linked, and are linked by a massive grid of high-speed roads, which go through numerous olive orchards. The settlements on the Golan Heights made it increasingly difficult to return the Golan Heights to Syria. And the settlements became a major American preoccupation, particularly after Wat Cluverius got to Jerusalem, replacing Brandon Grove as Consul General, and the CIA watched the settlements like a hawk. Settlements really threatened the President's peace initiative of September 1982, because if construction continued at the rate it had been going, one might wake up and find that the clock had, as they say, passed midnight, and it would be too late to go forward with peace plans which would involve tearing down the settlements or abandoning them, or whatever.

A decision was made to brief the President on this— what turned out to be in the midst of a big snowstorm. A key participant was Bob Ames, who was later killed in the bombing of our embassy in Beirut. He was the chief CIA analyst for the region, and a brilliant one at that. Brandon Grove came back from Jerusalem, where he was consul general, and a briefing was scheduled for a Saturday morning. The only way people could get to the White House was by foot. Brandon walked. I have been told that at the end of the briefing, the President thanked Brandon Grove and put his hands on Brandon's shoulders and said

to Brandon, "Well, you have a real problem, don't you?" And it sounded to me as though the President thought it was fine that other people were working on it. Clearly, if it had been Jimmy Carter, Jimmy Carter would have seen it as his problem. And obviously, the Consul General in Jerusalem couldn't do anything about it if the President didn't.

Q: Were we making representation through your office at all about the settlements to the Israelis?

PENDLETON: Oh, absolutely. That was a core part of the discussions with them at all levels. But Israelis had been traumatized to a degree by Lebanon and there was a major split within the country between those who had massed and rallied for withdrawal from Lebanon and those who thought everything must be done to protect Israeli security. Lecturing on settlements in private, to the press and as part of our overall peace plan concept was just one of many ongoing discussions which the Israelis learned to live with because, at the same time, we were increasing aid to Israel. With its Camp David partner, Egypt, Israel has gotten over half of the foreign aid that the country supplies to other nations. On a per capita basis it was quite extraordinary. I think our aid came out at that time to something like \$800-900 a person per year in Israel, and there are plenty of American who would have welcomed an infusion of \$800-900 per person in a family of, say, six. I think the Israelis took our lectures with a grain of salt when the Congress was continuing to vote more and more money. And then, over time, we became more responsive to Israel's concerned as George Shultz became, I think it's fair to say, more sympathetic to Israel and more in tune with the thinking of some of Israel's supporters here in the United States. And the total mix allowed the Israelis to do as they would in terms of settlements.

Q: Looking at it, did you make any private attribution to why George Shultz moved from(he had been involved in construction with Bechtel mainly in Arab countries and all, so he was more familiar with Arab concerns than with Israeli concerns. What moved George Shultz, do you think?

PENDLETON: Well, I would mislead you if I said I knew, but I was convinced that he did move. I was with him when he had his first meeting with the presidents of the major American Jewish organizations, who eloquently expressed their concern(and they're often guite divided amongst themselves (about the future of Israel. Their concern, in the case of a number of them, was that Israel might be its own worst enemy in terms of what it was doing in Lebanon. I sensed that George Shultz over time saw the relationship with Israel in a rather refined domestic political context here at home. I think he was very well aware of the concerns of the supporters of Israel. He became very well aware of the value of the Community's support also. I think he may conceivably have had an interest, in a sense (because he was the most fair-minded man), of overcoming the notion that he was the "man from Bechtel." But I don(t know. I would have to ask him, and I'm not sure he'd tell me. I think that he decided in a very logical way that there were gains to be made by being more forthcoming with Israel than he might have been inclined to at first, perhaps in terms of the peace process. He got into the peace process very slowly, and that was unfortunate, to me. I don't think he went to the region until late April of 1983, as I recall. And since he became Secretary of State in July of 1982, I think he should have gone to the region that fall. But he's very savvy, and he doesn't like to wade into things that he's hesitant about being able to influence, and I think he wanted to be cautious. I think he had a lot of respect for Phil Habib and thought Phil could do better than Phil could do. Phil had some analytical flaws related to his advice on the potential Syrian rule in Lebanon. I think the Secretary of State miscalculated with regard to when to get involved, and he got involved rather late and he got stung in the process. I think that may also have been a factor in tilting towards Israel, which he did.

Q: We're really talking about Shultz going out there and thinking he had everything lined up, and Assad told him "no."

PENDLETON: Yes, that's in a nutshell, as I recall it, what happened in April of '83. He had a meeting not long thereafter in his office in which he announced that we would pay more

attention to developing ties with Israel. Dick Murphy, then Assistant Secretary, called it the "Arabists get back under your rock" meetings. I was at that meeting, and initially was pleased but it struck me that Shultz perhaps was pushing the pendulum too far. I said something to that effect, which annoyed Larry Eagleburger, who was a great friend of Israel and who didn(t feel it was my role to so say. There was a certain silence on behalf of those who I think were the most stunned and aghast that the Secretary would be thinking in that direction. It meant, for my own office, a great deal more work as we tried to beef up the relationship in a variety of ways, including strategic, in response to the Secretary's decision.

Q: I know that on this Assad thing there, there was a sort of a classic confrontation when our ambassador to Damascus, Bob Paganelli, told Shultz that Assad would not go along with this, and Shultz got very mad at the messenger, you might say, Paganelli, for saying this. It does represent often the problem in Washington, where you get all your ducks in a row in Washington(through the NSC, through Congress, through the Pentagon and the media and all(and you go out and find that there are "them foreigners" out there who don't go along with you.

PENDLETON: Yes, I have every sympathy for all concerned, but I would like to say that George Shultz, I'd think, would rarely get mad at the messenger. He has a capacity to get mad, the way anybody does, but I found him the most decent and fair-minded and respectful of the professional help he got from career types of anybody I can think of. I have a great deal of time for George Shultz, and a great deal of affection. I watched him when I was in Northern European affairs try to solve the gas pipeline issue with Europe, in terms of the export of Soviet gas. He met on the issue with the foreign ministers of almost all of "my" countries in Northern European Affairs at that UN in September '82, and then on the back of an envelope on his way to Canada, where they would meet again as NATO ministers, he figured out a solution. This is a man who has served his country with his own energy and candle power in a way that few of us can hope to do.

Q: What was the role. You initially had Nick Veliotes as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, and then you had Phil Habib as a negotiator. How did you see the relations between the two, and what were they both doing? It sounds like a complicated procedure.

PENDLETON: Well, it would be, except for the fact that both their gruff personalities were offset by respect and affection and the fact that their doors were forever open and that Phil wasn't there full time. He would sometimes be in his house in Florida or whatever. and then he would come back and reappear. The Bureau was absolutely bizarre, in a way. Nick Veliotes, as Assistant Secretary, was one of the world's most approachable people. You could go in and have your say and be crisp about it and leave, and you would leave with quidance. For the first year that I was running the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, Morrie Draper supposedly was the Deputy Assistant Secretary to whom I reported. Morrie was in Lebanon or Israel or Jordan or Syria about 320 days out of the 365 in the first year, and so I reported directly to Nick Veliotes. He tended to look at our office as a kind of SWAT team. We were just across the hall from his. He knew that he could clap his hands at nine at night and six of us would arrive. And he could say, "All right, by six in the morning I need X or Y or Z." Frequently it was something he should have asked another country directorate to do. It might be a project involving Kuwait. I remember one. We did it, though, and then I would have the unenviable task of telling one of my colleagues that, "Well, we just worked all night on your country."

And some old hands were sufficiently beaten down by the process and not anxious to be there at nine at night that it happened. Now Phil came and Phil went, but Phil was like a tornado when he was there. It was good for all of us because he had strong views and we could all gather and work them out in a very open way. And I appreciated that. After my first year, ambassador Bob Pelletreau came back from the Pentagon, and he became Deputy Assistant Secretary. So I suddenly was reporting to him. But I had known him since we sat at the same pew at school 25 years before, and he had a lifetime of

experience in the region and a willingness to roll up his sleeves and do whatever was necessary. While I might have enjoyed more of the verbal jousting with Nick Veliotes, I couldn't help but respect Bob profoundly for the way he took on more than his share of the burdens—and the experience and wisdom he brought to every issue and every challenge.

Q: Was there any disquiet about our military presence, basically Marines, in Lebanon? It always seemed to me a bit unclear what they were supposed to be doing.

PENDLETON: I think it was very unclear what they were supposed to be doing, and that's one of the things which we live with to this day, along with Vietnam and Somalia. And yet, I think that there is a sense that if the United States is committing Marines, the United States probably knows what it's doing and is certainly involved. And there's a kind of global respect for that, and it's only later, after the Marine barricade bombing, that it become clear we didn't have much of a notion as to what the Marines were supposed to be doing and why they were there, other than to show the flag.

I was not, and am not worried about injecting American power, but I do worry when we aren't sure what the objective is. I worry when we use a battleship when we should probably use something more sophisticated.

Q: Did you have the feeling that these manifestations of power were coming from, sort of, beyond, from State Department people who were dealing with the matter and trying to figure what to do? Were these sort of thrust upon the professionals(the battleship, the Marines, that sort of thing?

PENDLETON: The battleship definitely; the Marines I honestly don't know. I think that Cap Weinberger was not keen to have troops used to no specific end. I had the sense that this, by and large, came from the White House, and that there was a projection of power and a need to be seen to be doing something that would be acceptable to the American people and not too much of a risk to our fighting men. It proved to be otherwise.

Q: Were you running the Israel Desk when the Marine barracks was blown up?

PENDLETON: Yes, I was. It was a horrible day. I was called about four in the morning by Bob Pelletreau and told about it and asked to go to the Operations Center and help establish a task force to deal with it. I didn't live very far from the Department, particularly at four in the morning. I got there and was joined a few minutes later by Phil Habib's daughter, who was an expert on evacuations and helping American families in emergency situations. We set up a task force which was unlike the Falklands, a brief but extremely sad and bloody one, and it was a task force that was largely focused on what could be done to help get the survivors out and to American hospitals. Among the things that I remember the most clearly was by about eight at night, having been there from four in the morning, and being fairly tired, and I got a call from Bob Flaten, our Deputy Chief of Mission in Tel Aviv. He said that the Israelis were extremely upset that we were flying our wounded Marines to hospitals in Germany and not taking them to Haifa, which was only a few miles south. I must say, I didn't have much patience for that. I was irritated and talked to Bob about when my wife had our daughter in an Israeli hospital, and my wife was on the labor table for 24 hours. We had done Lamaze in Hebrew, and when the nurses found that we understood that they were increasingly concerned that the baby would not appear, they switched to Polish, which I didn't understand. I remember saying to Bob Flaten that so much of recovery really is being in a culture where you understand the language and you feel that you are being taken care of. So I thought the Marines should go to American hospitals in Germany.

However, our decision became, for the Israelis a kind of emblem of whether we really were going to cooperate with them and trust them. They also had some marvelous capabilities with big rubber(what are they called? "Sponsets..." Anyway, they could be inflated to lift heavy rubble off people, just as they have been used in the last six weeks in Nairobi, where they helped us a great deal. And one of the things, in terms of military cooperation, which was strengthened after this was an agreement that we would do more in the way of

turning to Israeli hospitals and Israeli teams. But you know, to invite Israeli teams back into Beirut at that point, whatever the Israelis thought we should be doing, was not the easiest thing to do. That's a sidelight on how nothing is really straightforward in the Middle East. You can work all day thinking you're doing the right thing, and find that your clients, in this case the Israelis, think that you've absolutely undermined them. And they were quite fierce with our embassy about this.

Q: After this bomb explosion and we rather quickly withdrew our Marines from there, did that change the equation at all in that part of the world?

PENDLETON: I don't believe so, sadly, because I don't think it was changed very much when they went in. When you're dealing with Lebanon, you have to think just as much about Syria as you do about Lebanon. As you know, the Syrians don't have an embassy in Beirut because they consider Beirut to be part of Syria.

To help an Israeli withdrawal and to encourage stability in Lebanon, we had to be very proactive. But we had to be diplomatically skillful, and I give a great deal of credit to Morrie Draper, who attempted for a couple of years to carry this out. This was not a place where brute military force could do all that much. And we needed to protect our diplomats. Our ambassador's residence in Beirut was under perpetual threat. I didn't think we had done enough to provide protection to Reg Bartholemew, our ambassador. In part it was a question of whether we had underground bunkers he could be in if he was at home. There were other issues like that which were side-shows, but I don't believe that the insertion of the Marines or their withdrawal effectively changed the dynamic on the ground.

Q: Was there any questioning after the Israelis came into Beirut and all about the Israeli army? I mean, the Israeli army did not acquit itself too well, I don't think, I mean as far as how it conducted the war. Did this cause any disquiet, do you think?

PENDLETON: I think there was disquiet, but there was disquiet in Israel that was pretty profound and manifested by manifestations. By the time I pitched up, though, some of the immediate concerns had subsided.

Q: What about looking at the Israeli political scene? How did we feel about the Likud government?

PENDLETON: Well, we weren't very happy with them, but the were the government. And we weren't very happy about their representatives in Washington, where Moshe Arens, who later became later defense minister, was the ambassador, and Bibi Netanyahu, who is now the prime minister, was the deputy chief of mission. Over in Jerusalem we were dealing with Begin and Shamir and others who were difficult to communicate with. But let me say this. We made every conceivable effort to communicate with the elected officials of Israel and to communicate in a way that was forthright and reflective of their concerns, to which we tried to allow room for a peace process and allow room for a number of our profound interests—including the plight of the Palestinian refugees—, while at the same time respecting their security concerns. George Shultz led the way in this.

Q: How did we view the Israeli Arabs, the Arabs there? Did we feel they were adequately treated, represented and all, or was there concern?

PENDLETON: One of the things which happened after the instituting of the human rights report was that, of course, we had to, around the globe, pay much more attention to the situation of peoples who may be in a minority in another country.

The annual report had been mandated by Congress about a half dozen years earlier and were beginning to be institutionalized as really quite a fine product. The human rights report for Israel became, for our office, a challenge, shall I say politely, because the embassy would do its best to write a draft report, which obviously tended to be careful about not having any misstatements about Israel. Wat Cluverius, as our consul general

in Jerusalem, could not abide some of the Israeli activities such as settlements, road-building, destruction of olive trees, et cetera; and Wat would write a very tough report from Jerusalem. And they had to be melded, and you could never satisfy both the embassy in Tel Aviv and the consulate general in Jerusalem. I remember a Sunday spending most of the afternoon in Eliot Abrams' office, when he was Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, going through much of the human rights report for Israel line by line. Eliot decided what it would say in the end. Eliot was not unsympathetic to Israel, but he had a very tough job at the State Department, and because the Israeli report was going to be looked at extremely carefully(and indeed, the Israeli Embassy came to us in advance of its publication about parts of it each year that they somehow managed to obtain and would protest them(we knew we had to get it right, and we needed high-level backing for each phrase that was used.

So to go back to your question about looking at the Palestinians within Israel itself and also the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, it always came to a head over the human rights report.

Q: What was your impression of how the Israeli Government was treating, first, the Palestinians within Israel and then the Palestinians in the West Bank?

PENDLETON: I had a sense, including from seeing some things when visiting and from dealings with the Israelis as we tried to look after Americans of Palestinian descent who had been arrested, that you had an occupying power dealing with a community they feared and dealing frequently quite harshly, by American standards. Yet, one knew why this was the case, in a sense. I had lived within sight of the Mediterranean in a suburb just north of Tel Aviv, and from my front porch I could see the hills that had been in Jordan only 12 kilometers away, on which there had been guns pointed at downtown Tel Aviv, where there was a skyscraper which made a marvelous initial target. That sort of experience, just looking with my own eyes from my house in Israel's narrow waist, helped me to understand the Israeli angst about security. But I recall, when I later was working for the

Under Secretary for Political Affairs, we went to Israel and we were being driven by a consulate general driver through one of the occupied towns when we came upon some Israeli soldiers mistreating some women whom they'd decided to search. We just pulled back and got out of there as fast as we could, but it was an ugly picture, an ugly picture which rests in my mind, and one that no nation would like to have on TV.

Q: Was there much give and take with the shadow government there at that point?

PENDLETON: Less than I would have expected, given that we tended to think more like Labor than the Likud government. I called on Shimon Peres when I first went to Israel and was received by him in his office at, I believe, the Parliament. It was a funny discussion. I think I was probably too low ranking for him, in a way, but I never saw a man who seemed both so discouraged and so bored at the same time, as if it was just kind of hopeless, what Israel had been through in the previous year and the chance of getting out of it.

Most of our working contacts, however, were, of course, with Likud, and they were the ones we had to influence, and they were the ones we had to deal with, and of course, there were a remarkable bunch of people, even in the Israeli Embassy in Washington. The Secretary, George Shultz, was extremely generous to Ambassador Arens, and would frequently invite him to come over to his office on a Friday afternoon, if Shultz was in town or in the early evening. They would sit and talk in the back office with their coats off. Shultz would normally wear one of his famous sweaters. And I would be there as note-taker. During the first meeting, when I was taking notes by writing them down, they both asked me to stop. And I had to then, for maybe an hour and a half, memorize the conversations, which actually made for a better report in the end because you've memorized the important stuff and didn't get dragged down by the trivia. I couldn't go home until I'd done a cable principally to Sam Lewis in Tel Aviv that we would send out that night. I would then usually stay up and call Sam Lewis secure, and brief him on the conversation when he arrived in the office. He always wanted to have it immediately,

and it extended my day, because I would be back in the office at eight the next morning oSaturday to my family's distress.

Bibi Netanyahu, as deputy chief of mission in Washington, was plugged into everything and everybody, but our office heard from him almost daily about press guidance(what he thought should be in the State Department's press guidance and what we were planning to put in it ourselves. He would call and he would talk with me or, more often than not, with Ed Abingdon, who had been the able acting director before I arrived. There was no shyness on Bibi's part in terms of laying down the law as the Israeli embassy saw it. And Ed was a past master at putting the US position in both a very direct yet understanding manner. Now on the first day I was in the office I mentioned that the political counselor, Robbie Sable, had come in and had tried to buck me up to be aware of the embassy's concerns, and he described life at the embassy as being like World War I. He said, you know, "We are here at the embassy, and we are in the trenches, just like World War I. We never know when we're going to have to go over the top." And the funny thing is the embassy was frequently "over the top," in the British sense of the phrase. But they saw themselves on the front lines, without any doubt, and had no hesitation about wading in to do anything they could to make it right from their perspective.

Q: What was your impression of Arens? Was he his own man, or was he doing the job of really representing the Likud government at that time?

PENDLETON: Well, I sensed that the interests were identical, that he was a Likudnik through and through, steely and quite chilly, although he tried. I never really warmed to him. It was much easier to warm to Bibi Netanyahu, who had extremely strong views but who was more engaging. Arens, to me, seemed a bit of a cold fish. I think he didn't really like having me in his meetings with the Secretary of State, and yet the Secretary of State went out of his way to treat the Israeli ambassador very much as the ambassador would like to be treated. I remember going to the airport when Arens left for good to return to Israel and taking a letter from George Shultz (which I had drafted) wishing him farewell at

the very last moment that his plane was on the ground in Washington. I went aboard the plane and gave it to him and retreated before the plane took off. I felt somewhat relieved when he was airborne. But there was a dialogue; there was a respect. But would I like to go on a camping trip with Moshe Arens? No, and maybe not with Bibi Netanyahu either.

Q: You were doing this from October 1982 until about when?

PENDLETON: Well, I've lost the thread as to when I left. I was there just a bit less than two years.

Q: During the time you were there, what were the major developments that you could see? Were we just dealing with the aftermath of the Lebanon invasion?

PENDLETON: Let me say that the peace process was actually moved into its own little unit down the hall, so that our office was not leading the intellectual and procedural charge on the peace process, which was probably just as well, because we were busy as hell. You had not only the relationship with Israel, but the relationship with the American Jewish community and with everything that spun off from the interaction amongst all of us who were involved in that fragment of the Middle East at that point. So for instance, one could be involved with the Justice Department in the deportation of a former Nazi. One could be involved in attempts(successful, by and large(of a number of people to get the maps changed as to how US geographers registered Jerusalem and the West Bank, et cetera. There was just an absolute torrent of day-to-day small but highly-charged issues along with the much larger issues such as getting Cap Weinberger to agree that we could release the technology to Israel which would allow it to construct the fighter aircraft with a stronger wing, which was an issue which went to the Secretary of State. As a matter of fact, we prepared the Secretary to discuss that question down at Augusta with Cap Weinberger when they were playing golf, the weekend when (a) we invaded Grenada and (b) the Marine barracks were blown up. There were legal issues: Taba, which is a zone just south of Eilat in what had been Egyptian territory in the Sinai, where there was a

question as to who historically had sovereignty. There were just a zillion issues that were complex in both the political, legal and diplomatic sense. Then we were always dealing with portions of the peace process.

And as time went on, the Secretary decided that we would strengthen the security relationship with Israel on the military side, and we spent a great deal of time developing a stronger military and general defense relationship, which involved having generals visit back and forth, having joint sessions with the Israelis in a form that we hadn't had, moving them through from being friends to partners to allies. And this was one of the major decisions which George Shultz made when he, to a degree, tilted towards Israel. Our office had to put the tilt in place. At the same time, our office was lobbying for more aid to Israel and for forgiving Israeli loans and converting them into grants. We were attempting to communicate with friends of Israel, not always easy. For example, I went out to Pittsburgh to address the annual meeting of the Zionist Organization of America in late April of 1982. I followed Senator Biden to the podium. He was quite wound up and turned to the crowd and announced that we had a pin-stripe diplomat from the State Department, one of those traitors to the State of Israel, and that he hoped the entire audience would smash me with questions. He added that unfortunately he had to leave and couldn't hear my attempts to respond. And that was pleasant. People lined up behind a microphone and let loose with some of the rankest emotion that I've ever been subjected to in such a setting. It was my daughter's birthday, and I was missing her birthday party to do this (and I told them I was, and that she'd been born in Israel and that I would appreciate a bit more civility).

There were many things to do, but all within the context of trying to get Israel to do what we wanted while respecting what they were about and, as time went on. Strengthening our military ties with Israel(which wasn't easy because Cap Weinberger's approach, whatever the Secretary of State wanted, was quite different.

Q: Did you sense the not exactly friendly relations between Weinberger and Shultz? I mean, was this apparent at the working level?

PENDLETON: Well, it was well known, and it was documented from time to time, but it was not something which the Secretary of State would take to commenting on in the sorts of meetings that I attended. I went to meetings usually when there were anywhere from five to 10 people, or maybe even 20, involved, if it was a formal meeting in his conference room, such as to prepare for a visit by foreign minister Shamir. If there was a meeting of five, other than the ones where I was with Moshe Arens, you would obviously have a couple of members of the Secretary's staff, including Ray Seitz as executive assistant. I think this is a question that Ray Seitz would be able to respond to much better than I would.

Q: I corresponded with him, and we may pick this up at some point.

PENDLETON: Good.

Q: What was your reading on this closer cooperation with the Israeli military. You can have it two ways. One is maybe we're going to fight a war together or something like this. The other one might be a matter of having some concern about the Israeli military and you want to be in with them and try to maybe influence them, as in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Did you sense either?

PENDLETON: I sensed more of the first, which may have been my own naivete. Obviously, diplomatically, when you're serving abroad, you always want to get in with the military, and you want to be able to communicate with them directly, but I don't think that the principal motivation was really to think that somehow we could affect Israeli military thinking. Israelis are very disciplined, and as you know, they do milo'im, which is reserve duty, on until their mid-fifties. I have had the experience of, for instance, having an Israeli in my office who was very anti-Likud, anti-government, spilling his guts to me about how

awful the Israeli government was, and then arriving in Israel a month later and seeing the same person in uniform doing his reserve training and assigned to show us around and to give us the party line, which he did. There is a kind of discipline there.

We, I think, saw, and the Secretary of State saw, increased military cooperation with Israel as being a strategic decision that had merit in the long run in terms of increasing Israeli confidence in a way that would help with the peace process, which has remained an undercurrent of American thinking throughout the last 30 years. And I think our motives were really quite strong and our deviousness was fairly limited.

Q: What about the prohibition on talking to the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Organization, at the time? Was this considered an inhibitor? It's a little hard to carry on a peace process when you eliminate, sort of, the major other side.

PENDLETON: Well, that's a very good question. I don't think that I thought very creatively about it. Some others in my office who had much more experience with the Palestinians and Arabs did. I was lectured no end by Sam Lewis about the hate in Israel for Arafat, and I could see, when I heard others talk about Arafat with more respect than I could personally engender in my own thinking(and also against the backdrop of Sam Lewis's effort to educate me and others about Arafat(I felt that what I should put on the table was the depth of Israeli dislike of Arafat, and his ilk, which I thought should not be misunderstood by decision-makers in Washington. But obviously, over time, more sophisticated thinking appeared on the scene, which has been good for all of us. It was not the moment after Beirut, however, to be too creative with a Likud government in power. There were other things which needed more attention.

Q: As you were dealing with what were called "terrorist organizations," was it ever in the back of your mind that Begin and Shamir were deep in the terrorist business themselves, early on?

PENDLETON: Oh, absolutely, but time marches on. They're in different situations, and I was with, for instance, a very distinguished British Jew in Jerusalem once, riding in an elevator as his guest, going to his room at the King David Hotel, when Begin got in the elevator, and my host stopped the elevator at the next floor and said, "We'll get off here." He said to me, "I will not ride in a lift with a terrorist like him." So there were feelings that lasted long after they became respectable politicians. Obviously, we knew a lot about the background of Begin and Shamir, and when you want to try to understand Israel you have to peel it away in a fashion that is fairly complex. I was reminded of that by Ehud Olmert, who is the present mayor of Jerusalem. Olmert, John Herbst, (who is now our consul general in Jerusalem these many years later and was the junior officer in the office at that point), and I, had lunch together up on the eighth floor of the State Department, and Olmert was telling us how his family in Poland had been friends of the Begins. But beyond that, he said, to really understand Israeli politics, you can't stop in Poland. You have to go back to these families being friends in Harbin, China. And if you don't know who lived in what neighborhood in Harbin in that era(a city which produced, for instance, Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal here in the States, (who went back to Harbin and was in tears, visiting his childhood home)(you won't understand present-day Israeli Ashkenazi Western Jewish politics. And I won't say that I ever got that profound an understanding of them, but I do understand that the complexities are there.

Q: Were you having any feel for Israel(it obviously changed greatly when the Soviet Union collapsed, but prior to that(that the political complexion of Israel is changing from being Western-oriented to becoming more Middle Eastern?

PENDLETON: As one looked a the demographics, the answer certainly had to be yes, and as one looked at, for instance, language use, one could sense the evolution. When I served in Israel one didn't really need to know Hebrew at all; by the time I was looking after the Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, the embassy needed desperately to have people with a good knowledge of Hebrew. We soon found ourselves dealing with a foreign

minister who was a Sephardic Jew who spoke very little English, which was the first time that had ever happened(after I left the desk(and with, I believe, 13 children, which was indicative of demographic change before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the arrival of a great many Soviet Jews. But the transition in any 18-month, two-year period is hard to measure.

Q: I was just wondering the difference between when you were in Israel before and then coming back. It was a different country in a way, wasn't it, or did you feel that way, or not?

PENDLETON: I didn't feel that it was all that different, but, of course, I was in Washington most of the time. It seemed more different in terms of what had happened with Lebanon. When I was first in Israel, the Six-Day War had ended about six months before I arrived, and the Yom Kippur War didn't happen until after I left. There was a kind of delicious tranquility in Israel at that point, and a spirit of optimism. By the time that I hit the Israel Desk, there was a great deal of distress on the part of many Israelis of the softer line, peace now group. And many of our personal friends were really quite frantic about the future of the country and where it was going to go with the sort of government Israel had at that point. I was more aware of that: the exhilaration had disappeared and anguish had heightened its profile.

Q: As a country director you're supposed to be in charge of relations with the country, including the disbursement of money and all that. Was there any frustration about the fact that no matter what we might consider might be an adequate amount of money or anything else like that, Congress was going its own way and usually handing out more than we might have felt professionally was justified? Was this a battle?

PENDLETON: Well, I felt frustrated, but at the same time, I felt that the office had an obligation to put the case within the bureaucracy. However, putting the case could mean pointing out that we might be losing leverage over getting settlements removed. We tried to balance the equities.

I think that those above me were perhaps more sophisticated about the American political process than I perhaps was. The real office director for Israel was Larry Eagleburger, and Larry, as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, did not try to be all things to all people. He focused on a number of countries very, very hard(Pakistan, amongst them; Israel was perhaps his principal focus; and of course, Yugoslavia, where he had served early in his career and to which he became ambassador. And the Israelis and friends of Israel who were trying to deal and make deals were not coming to the office director. They would go to Larry. That's one reason why I spent a great deal of time upstairs on the Seventh Floor, trying to make sure that I was not left in the dust in terms of what was happening. Robin Raphel was careful but helpful in this regard.

George Shultz wasn't office director, but he certainly supervised the office director quite carefully, and he would carve out immense hunks of time for Israel-related issues. If there were going to be a visit that he was involved in, he would set aside as much as a day of doing almost nothing else but meeting on Israel. He gave a great deal of guidance in the process. And then if, say, Shamir came, Shultz would pull out all the stops. He would have meetings with Shamir that would go as many days for as many hours as were needed to get everything our on the table. And he would spend a great deal of time thinking of how he could treat his guests as civilly as possible, to the point where his wife had to try to do kosher cooking at home(which you can't do(and whatever. I remember the first time we heard that Shamir wanted to come on a particular visit, only three days later. Basically the Israelis could invite themselves in a way that no other country could. I got up to leave the room, and George Shultz said, "Where are you going, Kim?" And I said, "I'm leaving you for a more important issue than figuring out the agenda. I'm going to get a kosher caterer." We had to; we were behind the eight-ball. It was like that. I mean it was a very real dynamic of personalities and politics and politics jumbled all together.

Q: Well, what about Congress on this? I mean, the thing like Joseph Biden(this is sort of a gratuitous slap in your face.

PENDLETON: Yes, I told him so when he came through London later, and he just kind of laughed and said he couldn't really recall the event.

Q: What was this? I mean, did you find that there was almost a sort of mindless subservience to "whatever Israel wants we'll give you" in certain circles in the Congress?

PENDLETON: Well, among certain people. Biden, for instance, is a very good friend of Israel. If you are going to agree to speak to the Zionist Organization of America, which is more firmly committed to Israel than many other organizations, you know you're going to have a crowd that will be sympathetic if you say things which show that you are with them even though the opposition is strong. Ironically when he did so in Pittsburgh, George Shultz was in Jerusalem, and it was just interesting to me that he would pull the stops out quite so far.

In terms of dealing with Congress generally, though, I didn't have to testify before Congress on Israel. They usually wouldn't hold hearings if they couldn't at least get a deputy Assistant Secretary. And during my first year that meant getting Nick Veliotes, and they were always tough on Nick. Sometimes he would mutter that they were like the Knesset, the ones who were the most devoted to Israel and the most involved in that region of the world. But in general, when I went up to have smaller meetings, I found a good bit of tolerance for, perhaps, my position. I think most of them realized that where I was in the pecking order wasn't the one who was really calling the shots. If a meeting was in quasi-private, they knew histrionics weren't going to get them anything, so they would be more civil.

Q: Well, maybe this would be a good place to leave this. I'll just put at the end here, where did you go(it would be '84, wouldn't it?

PENDLETON: Right. I'll look it up, but I went to be executive assistant to Mike Armacost when he became Under Secretary for Political Affairs, replacing Larry Eagleburger.

Q: And you did that from '84 to(

PENDLETON: ('86 or the end o'85. Again, I'll have to look it up. I have it all written down.

Q: Well, I mean, all these jobs you had, what about your family life?

PENDLETON: Well, that became more of an issue as it went along. On the Israel Desk, with the Sunday cabinet meetings, which had to be patrolled and stuff, on top of the Falklands and my previous job, family life got pretty much swept aside. And it got even worse when I went to Mike Armacost's office. I'll get to that, because I think it's a factor in the story about how you make decisions about your own careers. I was obviously both fatigued and exhilarated by these jobs, and they had a cost. For instance, on the Israel Desk, I was going back to my office from Nick Veliotes's office at about 9:00 one night, and there were some men stripping the floor wax outside my office door. They signaled to me to cross, and I stepped on a film of polymer they had put down and went up and landed on my elbow, breaking it into eight pieces. I was hospitalized for two weeks and operated on, and the anesthesia disoriented me a lot. Then to go back into the arena of the Israel Desk feeling just really in pain and lousy was quite a heavy burden. You pay these burdens. At that point my wife was working flat out as an attorney, and the accident was really extremely inconvenient. My elbow hurts to this day.

Q: Looking at what you were doing, one is struck by the personal sacrifice one had to make on this. Well, we'll pick this up, then, in 1984.

Q: Today is the 2nd of October, 1998. Kim, we're back to 1984.

PENDLETON: When exactly I'm not sure.

Q: We'll stick to the year. I don(t need the(

PENDLETON: Well, I had been plugging away as director of the office of Israel and Arab-Israel affairs, and that meant spending a lot of time running up to the Seventh Floor, particularly up to Larry Eagleburger's office, as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to try to make sure that I could scoop up as much material as possible that may have been going on unbeknownst to us Munchkins down below. And one day, Robin Raphel, who was Larry's very able Middle East watcher, amongst many other things, mentioned to me that there was going to be an opening for a new executive assistant, when Larry left. That person would work for the incoming Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who turned out to be Mike Armacost, with whom I'd worked a bit when I was in the deputy secretary's office and he was on the policy planning staff in the mid '70s. Robin suggested I make my interests known in that job, if I had an interest(and suggested I should have an interest. Her former husband was Arnie Raphel, who later died as ambassador to Pakistan aboard the same plane with Zia when it crashed, Arnie was very much a friend of Mike's and a friend of everybody's and a kind of putter-together of people in the Department. Arnie started pushing me to pay attention to that potential opening. He had worked in the undersecretary's office when I had worked in the deputy secretary's office in the 1970s, so he knew I was familiar with the Seventh Floor. We were friends, and I still miss him.

To make a long story short, I was interviewed by Mike Armacost when he was "designate". I knew I was up against two or three other people he was interested in, but it seemed to me it was a good moment to move on. It was a good moment in part, I'm sorry to say, because Sam Lewis had complained that some of his most sensitive cables had gotten all the way down to the Desk, which he had realized when he'd been back on home leave. I complained to Sam that I simply couldn't continue to serve him very well(much less anybody else(if I wasn't going to be on top of what was going on and on top of what his thoughts were, and I shouldn't have to get them all from phone conversations with him, at least,(I should be able to see the cables. He and I had a bit of a parting of the ways over that, and I made it very clear that I wasn't happy, and he made it clear that he was somewhat bemused by the reaction. But I just thought, damn it, if I'm going to camp in this

building seven days a week, I'm certainly not going to be here twiddling my thumbs, so moving to the under secretary's office seemed like something that might be interesting and fun to do, and I had a tremendous respect for Mike Armacost.

How did I get the job? I think I got it in terms of beating out other candidates through a fluke. Mike and I were both at Bibi Netanyahu's, deputy chief of mission at the Israeli Embassy, one night for dinner, and it was a jolly time. Bibi's now the prime minister of Israel, of course, and on the way out, I said to Mike something like, "Well, I've enjoyed the evening, I'm Kim Pendleton and I hope to see you around again some time," which he found rather amusing because he was in the process, it turned out, at that moment deciding between me and another guy. He had very much in mind that not only would he have to share his office life with his executive assistant on the plane but traveling abroad he'd have to sit next to whomever he selected on an airplane, and he wanted somebody with experience, competence, and a sense of humor.

And the upshot was that he offered me the job, and I accepted after making a couple of deals with him(on the basis that you can't make deals once you've accepted something, you can only make them when the guy's decided he wants you. And one of the deals I made was that I would write the efficiency reports on all the staff members (there were a dozen), but he had to do the review statements himself(none of this delegating it to me to pretend I was he (which he readily agreed to. That was a tremendous help to the very able staff because Mike really knows how to write and really knows how to express his appreciation for people who have served him well, or his lack of appreciation if they hadn't. I made another deal with him that I should not be cut out of meetings unless it was absolutely necessary, even if they were very small, with his old buddies, and that I should travel with him when he went abroad. And there were a couple of minor things, all of which, I think, he found manageable. I told him if we could reach agreement, he would have my body, soul and mind for as many hundreds of hours a week as it took. And so we

agreed, and I went up to join him, to say farewell to Larry Eagleburger, and to start building a staff and start the preparations for his hearings before Senator Helms's committee.

Q: Before we move on to this, I just want to get something. You were doing this from '83 to when?

PENDLETON: Till the summer of '85, but I can't remember exactly when I started. It was about a year and a half, and it came to an end prior to the contemplated time that it would have ended on either of our parts(no, I'll tell you about that later.

Q: When we get to that. Could you give, for the record here, a quick review of Armacost's career up to the time you started serving together?

PENDLETON: Yes, Mike, who is an extraordinary person, started as a civil servant on the Policy Planning Staff at State in 1969 after being a university professor. He was assistant to the ambassador in Tokyo for a couple of years and then returned to the Policy Planning Staff from 1974-77. I knew him quite a bit at that point. After NCS and DOD stints, he became principal DAS in the East Asia Bureau before going to Manila as ambassador in 1982.

Q: Essentially he was pretty much a Washington, both Defense and State Department, civil servant.

PENDLETON: Right. But, as I noted, he was made ambassador to the Philippines in '82 and served there until '84, at a time when the Marcoses were very much in power, and he had to deal with them. The story I heard was that he did not know George Shultz but that George Shultz came to a chiefs-of-missions meeting that was held, I believe, in the Philippines, although it may have been someplace else in Southeast Asia. Shultz was so taken by Armacost's ability to state things clearly and(what Shultz considered(correctly, he decided that he really wanted to have Armacost closer to him and offered him the job, eventually, of Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the number three position in the

Department. This meant that Mike had to build his relationship with Shultz, to a degree, because they were not intimates. However, Shultz chose the right guy, which is, of course, the gift of a number of people who've gone through life at the top, knowing exactly who to choose to be their right-hand people.

Q: You say how he chose his staff. In the first place, what does the undersecretary of State for political affairs do, or at that time?

PENDLETON: Well, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs basically handles political problems for every region of the world when they get above the level of Assistant Secretary and related issues, whether they be international organization or political-military affairs. A great deal of what that person does depends on what the Secretary of State wants them to do. And I think I mentioned earlier in our discussions that Joe Sisco said at one point, "I am not going to be just the undersecretary oState for the Middle East." And yet one of the things that became clear to me as we were saying farewell to Larry Eagleburger, when we thought he was retiring for good from the State Department(he later returned as deputy secretary and became Secretary of State for a brief period at the end of the Bush Administration(it became very clear that the way that Larry had managed to spend so much time on the Middle East, and particularly on Israel, was because he didn't pay any attention, to speak of, to a great many parts of the world. In passing the baton to Mike, he made quite clear that it is impossible to be all things to all people. While you might get memos through you on which you could express opinions, it was just impossible to avoid having some sort of focus. Yet I think Mike's tastes were much more catholic. I think one of the reasons that he hired me was that I'd had some African, Middle East and European experience. Although he'd studied in Bonn and actually written a book on Europe early in his career, he really was much more knowledgeable about Latin America, and, particularly, Asia. And in that sense, substantively we rather complemented each other, which was, I thought, helpful for him, and I think he thought it helpful. I also had had a good deal of Seventh Floor experience.

This particular undersecretary was looked to very much by George Shultz to give Shultz his advice and to carry the water on a tremendous number of political issues worldwide, from Afghanistan to the Pak nuclear issue, from intelligence cooperation globally (because he was the link also with the intelligence community) to patrolling what the Pentagon might be cooking up in the way of SWAT teams which may need political oversight, to thinking about the future of the Philippines and trying to navigate that (and that's something I urged him never to overlook; if he thought he was spending too much time on the Philippines, I tried to reassure him because it seemed to me that if things went wrong in the Philippines no other senior official in Washington was going to be so vulnerable as he, having been recently ambassador there. That was his instinct as well and that of some of his buddies).

There were areas in which he could make a big dent, and there were areas in which it was extremely hard. He had a very hard time on international organization issues because the Assistant Secretary, Greg Newell, who was a political appointee, was not very responsive to oversight. He had been a White House advance man. I could gladly have strangled him on any number of occasions when things bounced into our lap when it was too late to really influence them, and that was not a happy story. Mike, on the other hand, had long-time and close personal relationships with strong professionals like Mort Abramowitz, whom he got a job as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research; Nick Platt, whom encouraged the Secretary to ask to be the executive secretary, and others like Bob Oakley made it very easy for him to keep his hands on all the tillers that there were around the building. He had drop lines to Bud McFarlane and John Poindexter and others, at the NSC. Mike went out of his way at the outset to meet his opposite numbers in a whole lot of agencies and to try to put his ear to the ground more broadly than he had to in the past.

Q: How about the confirmation hearing that you helped prepare Armacost for? How did you see what the thrust might be?

PENDLETON: Well, it's fair to say that, then as now, there's a fair bit of apprehension about how Senator Helms might take to you or not take to you. These apprehensions

were exacerbated by the fact that Helms sent questions, as I recall, before the hearings and questions after the hearings, well over 100 of them, that had to be answered, —in a fairly typical Helmsian move to both suss out what the candidate thought about issues and also to find out what the Administration's thinking about issues might be. They were issue oriented. We prepared the undersecretary-designate with the normal murder board(

Q: A murder board is?

PENDLETON: A murder board is a roundtable of questioners who might be playing the role of potential Senate confirmation hearing Senators, who would ask you tough questions and then give you advice on how best to cope with them. And a murder board at that level usually has somebody from outside, from the White House or an experienced lobbyist or somebody who really has some insights into the process and hasn't simply been living too much in the building at Foggy Bottom —at the State Department— to not be aware of what the world up on Capitol Hill might be like. I remember it as quite a challenging period but a relatively brief one before the confirmation hearings because much of our time was devoted to building a staff and trying to get started as an office. To be focusing as well on all the issues that might come up at a confirmation hearing was tricky but essential. The hearing itself, when it came, went very well, and Senator Helms couldn't have been more gracious. While he did send along a fair number of questions afterwards that had to be answered straightaway, it was not a hostile hearing at all, and I was relieved.

Q: Well, looking at the situation, I'm wondering(one of the very hot issues of that time was Central America, particularly Nicaragua, El Salvador. Was that sort of almost off limits, or how was that handled at that time?

PENDLETON: We were fairly heavily involved in it, and yet a lot of it didn't affect our office as immediately as it might have. George Shultz was, when the issues became very hot, very much involved himself, very much involved with the lawyers, very much involved with

the intelligence and research people. Mike was deeply involved with the intelligence and research people. He was somewhat caught between the White House, which had at that point Ollie North and others doing their thing, which was very hard to get a grip on, and I had a sense that Mike made a conscious decision not to try to handle the action in that part of the world where it was almost impossible to keep up with all that was going on and where it was a potential quagmire. But you couldn't avoid it, if he was trying to avoid it(and he might disagree with me(he would become acting secretary of State on occasions if the Secretary and the deputy secretary were both gone. We had the transition from Ken Dam to John Whitehead, when Mike would be the number two person in the Department, and it was not easy. I also felt uncomfortable with these issues and deferred to our excellent specialist in the area, Bill Brownfield, for Africa, and Mike Brannenburger. They kept in very close touch with the bureaus and help Mike through the quagmires. But the Latin America Bureau which Eliot Abrams had its own ties to the conservatives in the White House and to many others outside the Department.

Q: Why don't we take the Philippines during this period? What was happening there?

PENDLETON: Well, it was the period when the Marcoses were still in power but you had the growing prominence of Mrs. Aquino. We saw the growth of human rights concerns about the Philippines in the United States. I think that a lot of people thought that Mike Armacost, probably because he'd had to deal with the Marcoses, was too close to them. I was convinced he was a person who could see through to the heart of the matter and do what was right for the country in the process. But I went with him once to the Philippines. He certainly was a much celebrated person there, and the Philippines were in transition. However we did not hit the kinds of moments of crisis that came after I left the office, even in terms of the base negotiations. We tended to think at that point that you could have normal base negotiations, that something would be worked out. And we spent a certain amount of time worrying about the health of Marcos and the leadership, a certain amount of time simply trying to figure out how to anticipate what the nature of change might be. And Mike spent a lot of time on it that I certainly was not intimately involved

with because we had on our staff Will Ito, who is now our ambassador to Thailand. Will knew the Philippines backwards and forwards and all the players. So I had the pleasure of deferring to Mike and to Will. It gets to a degree to the job that I had.

You might say, "Well, if you're deferring to all these staff people, what were you doing?" We had eight superb, professional staff members who were experts either on regions of the world or functional subjects. Bill Courtney, for instance, did the Soviet Union. He later became ambassador to Georgia and to Kazakhstan, and he worked night and day with the NSC as well as with us. I patrolled everything from about 6:30 in the morning until, usually, 10 at night that went into Mike and tried to prioritize amongst the breaking issues and see where his energies should go. If I was comfortable with a subject, I would have my say in writing or in person. If I wasn't, I deferred to those who knew in detail what they were talking about.

One thing that I had learned in working for Bob Ingersoll when he was deputy secretary of State is that a person at that level is to a degree isolated, and if he trusts a member of his staff and the member of the staff makes a disparaging remark about a potential ambassadorial candidate, not knowing the group that may be in front of him, the undersecretary or deputy secretary would pay attention to what is said. It could really screw up a person's career. And I counseled those with whom we worked that they could not destroy people's careers by mindless comments or gossip or anything that wasn't thoughtful and solidly founded. And the same was true for knowledge about a particular subject or country. I insisted that you had to know what you were talking about if you were going to influence the thinking of the undersecretary. Otherwise you should tell him you will find out.

The professional and support staff in his office were tremendous people who have had remarkable careers since. They served him superbly, and he reciprocated in listening to them and having faith in their judgment. They ran interference between the bureaus and the political level of the State Department, and I think the bureaus, by and large(although

there's always a lot of talk about having too many people at the Seventh-floor level(I think that they frequently were able to add more than a dollop of political realism to the thinking of the bureaus that worked on individual regions of the world day to day as to how things were being seen at the Seventh-Floor level. And vice versa(they could take from the bureaus the insights and make sure that the undersecretary understood what the thought processes were down below so he wouldn't get stuck at the last minute with something that hadn't been thought about in advance. And it worked, I thought, extremely well.

Q: How about your role in Middle Eastern affairs? Was this something that he worked on much, or was this elsewhere?

PENDLETON: Mike did not replace Larry Eagleburger as the office director for Israel, —I think a bit to the distress of the Israeli Embassy—, but that was almost inevitable, I think. As Lord Carrington would say(not so diplomatic, just so wise, not to. We were involved in a great many questions that somehow came our way. It was unavoidable. When Mike Armacost went to Israel on a Middle East trip part way through his tenure, he was asked whether he wanted to see Masada and Jerusalem, and I remember he said, "No, I want to see the sand bar." This was a sand bar in the Jordan River that was affecting the water flow to Jordan and Israel and which had been a major bone of contention that he had had to learn more about than he ever wanted to as he tried to help work the issue out. In the end we went by helicopter to Masada, and we spent quite a bit of time in Jerusalem and the surroundings, but we also saw the sand bar with the help of the helicopter. You just could not avoid these issues, in part because the Secretary of State was so concerned about them.

Mike was very careful to recognize that there were times and places to interject himself and times and places where he probably couldn't affect the outcome. He knew there were some issues that really needed careful patrolling, for instance, the Pakistan nuclear program, where he found himself at the nexus of intelligence and policy. He was very deeply involved in that issue almost every single day, and I was surprised a few months

ago, when Pakistan exploded a nuclear device (without us apparently knowing about it) because I do not think, in the mid-(80s, that they could have done that without us knowing in advance. The United States had more capability for analyzing intelligence at that time than we have since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the retirement of some excellent analysts, whether they be analyst-analysts or photo-interpreters or what have you. The care that was given to developments and the policy implications for relations with India, relations with China, were something I think Mike can be very proud of during that period.

Q: That whole Pakistan nuclear issue was tied up with the fact that the Paks were heavily involved on our side in dealing with the Afghan war against the Soviets. This must have tripped us up again and again, didn't it?

PENDLETON: Oh, indeed. It complicated matters incredibly in terms of potential sanctions against the Pakistanis and, of course, made everybody who was familiar with their role vis-#-vis Afghanistan not anxious in pushing them over the brink through any kind of sanctions. However we have laws, and one of the jobs of a person like Armacost was to counsel the Pakistanis on what those laws really meant if they continued the apparent process related to the nuclear issue. At the same time, we wanted to have better relations with India, and when Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister, we saw it as an opportunity to improve relations with India. George Shultz wanted to do so, and Mike Armacost, to a degree, for a period of time before Rajiv's first visit to the United States, became desk officer for India. But it wasn't to last. Mike went out to Pakistan and to India, and he was supposed to go to the Khyber Pass, but it was too dangerous that day. So he went to Peshawar and met with a great many of the refugees and others from Afghanistan who were fighting on the side against the Soviet Union. He was well received, as he might be, since the United States was providing arms and money at that point, largely though the CIA.

Q: How did Armacost get along with George Shultz? How did that work out? What was their working contract?

PENDLETON: Well, it evolved. When Mike first became undersecretary, he didn't know Shultz very well, and I think, like all of us, he wasn't sure to what extent Shultz wanted him to be present or absent at various times. Shultz had a lot of respect for him, and I'm sure it grew. At one point early on, Charlie Hill, who was by then George Shultz's executive assistant, said to Mike when a meeting broke up, a meeting of about eight people, "When everybody else gets up to leave, don't you leave. You and I will stay." And that became the pattern. Shultz wanted Mike's advice, and he would expect Mike to remain(and I don't know about the deputy secretary at that point(so that they could discuss further whatever had been discussed during the larger meeting and look at whatever else was on Shultz's mind. So the two had an intense and positive working relationship. I can't imagine that Mike didn't fulfill every hope that Shultz had. Mike also was superb at representing the State Department at the White House. I know the president respected him and that was a big help as well. He remained, actually, as undersecretary for quite a long while and then was able to go on to Japan as ambassador. He was undersecretary from '84 to '88, and given the work conditions that you work under, seven days a week, that's a long slog.

Q: Were you aware that Armacost was playing any role as an intermediary with his counterpart at the Pentagon because of the frosty relations between Shultz and Weinberger? Did this come up at all? I mean, often the deputies say, "Let's us keep this thing going."

PENDLETON: I think Mike was fairly taken aback initially by the relationship between Weinberger and Shultz and others, and sometimes he had to go to represent the Department at lunches, say, that would have Casey of the CIA and Weinberger and himself and the National Security Advisor, and it was clearly difficult to figure ways whereby everybody could get on the same track and work productively together. He went out of his way at the outset to try to go and meet(he'd worked, for example at the Pentagon(meet with Deputy Secretary Will Taft. Mike worked closely with the long-time Pentagon people, but he knew when to put his foot down when he thought that the

Pentagon was getting off the reservation(such as with the creation of SWAT teams that could be projected globally in times of crisis but which might be launched without proper political consultation(and he would wade in and do battle. I would not say, however, that there was a kind of deputies' or under secretaries' liaison that would make all that much difference. If Cap Weinberger didn't want to do something, it wasn't up to Mike to be able convince the Pentagon to do it. It had to go to the President. That's one thing if the President was Bush; it was another thing if the President was Reagan.

Q: What about the NSC? Was there a disquiet or concern that the Oliver Norths and their crew were getting off the reservation?

PENDLETON: It was hard to judge what was going on. I mean, we heard rumors sometimes that were very disquieting but extremely difficult to put your finger on. And I think that Mike Armacost was a savvy enough individual to recognize that (a) some people tend to be real jerks, (b) it's very hard to control real jerks. He was not against trying but he always wanted to know what he was speaking about with some certainty and it was very hard to get a handle on what was going on with somebody like Oliver North, very hard, and I wouldn't say it was a great success for anybody in the State Department in that regard. You also had Eliot Abrams in the State Department when he was Assistant Secretary for Latin America, who was quite sympathetic to some of the efforts that people like Oliver North were making.

Mike tended to work foursquare with the national security adviser and with the much-maligned John Poindexter, and they had drop lines to each other's desks. I have to say that with Poindexter, whom I talked to a fair number of times when Mike was out, —just carrying the water for the two of them back and forth—, that I respected Poindexter and was quite surprised at the position that he found himself in eventually. I respected him in that kind of operational way you do when you go to a busy person and tell them about a decision the Department was planning to make and looked for political clearance for it. Or you go with a problem and you look for guidance and you find that the other fellow listens

attentively and gets back to you promptly and steers you in a direction which seems to make sense and to work. I found John Poindexter, for instance, very easy to work with. I had found in the past Bud McFarlane very easy, had more contact with him practically when I was in charge of the Israel Desk, and it always came as a surprise to find out how many wheels within wheels there were that you could never quite put our finger on. If you stopped to make that your daily occupation, you wouldn't do anything else.

Q: What was the feeling from your perspective about how much the President(this is Ronald Reagan(was directing foreign affairs?

PENDLETON: Well, I was living with the residue of what I had known when I was working on the Israel Desk, and it seemed to me that he was doing the minimum and was frequently out of focus, and yet he would make some very significant decisions. The motivations for some of them were never quite clear to me, and I tended to think to myself, when I was in the Under Secretary for Political Affairs' office, thank goodness that we have a National Security Council staff which is intelligent, vigorous and strong because you're going to get some thoughtful reactions to problems. And the President isn't, clearly, afraid of making tough decisions, but he's not going to be burdened with very many of the day-to-day decisions. I don't think that I tended to see it much differently than historians would at this point. It was fairly clear that Reagan was a terribly likable man who engaged selectively.

Q: One other question about how you saw things: how did you find Armacost related to the geographic and the functional bureaus? Were there any particular problems?

PENDLETON: Well, in general, he related very well. There were some challenging bureaus, geographic and functional, —and he basically was in charge of the five geographic bureaus—, which meant the world. He, for instance, had no Africa experience at all, and he had a lot of respect for assistant secretary Chet Crocker. We had in the office Mike Rennenburger, who knew Africa well and who had the respect of Chet Crocker. And

Chet knew when to turn to Mike for reinforcement. He would ask to come see Mike or Mike would ask to see him on rare occasions(if we suggested it might be a good moment to get together. I think what Mike did was allow Chet to enhance his own ability to be the policy maker for Africa, because Mike would bless what he was doing or caution him or give other guidance that was useful. I've already mentioned that with regard to International Organization affairs, IO, it was Greg Newell, who was the Assistant Secretary. Relations were sticky, and I don't think they ever improved. But with INR, where before long Mike had arranged for Mort Abramowitz to come and be Assistant Secretary, Mort was in Mike's office somewhere between 10 and 20 times a day making sure that Mike wasn't caught off guard about a fast-breaking event and then chatting with Mike and game-planning issues all over the map. They had a relationship that was extremely close, as it was with Bob Oakley.

I think the relationship with a bureau which affected me most, in terms of my stamina, was that Mike didn't have too much time for Rick Burt, who was Assistant Secretary for Europe. Rick, I think it's fair to say, didn't have too much time for Mike, particularly if Mike wished to interpose himself between the European Bureau and the Secretary of State. And this came to head fairly early on over a memo which George Shultz gave to Mike that had been written by Burt. Shultz asked Mike's opinion of it, and Mike became quite irritated that it had been given to the Secretary directly without him even getting a drop copy, so called. Mike asked Burt to come up and see him, and Burt brought John Kelly, who was a DAS at that point, later ambassador to Finland. John and I, who'd known each other for years, found ourselves in a room with these two gentlemen who were not best pleased with each other. Rick Burt asked Mike if they could talk man to man without anybody there, so John and I left.

But the upshot was that Mike insisted that all memos from the European Bureau go to the Secretary of State through him, and he promised Burt that they would be moved the same day that they arrived in his office, that there would be no delay without good reason. Well, most of us, who've been selected to work in the State Department know that the Assistant

Secretary usually clears out memos before he or she leaves for home in the evening, which can be 8:00, 8:30, whatever, By then the undersecretary and the Secretary may well have gone on to diplomatic functions or something. And I found myself having to stay there, often till about 9:30 at night to receive these memos and make a judgment about them and pass them forward to the executive secretariat for the Secretary. They frequently wouldn't arrive till 8:30 or so. I forged Mike's initials so often that once when he actually sent a memo forward himself, it was bounced by the secretariat staff as not looking like his initials because they were so used to me writing "MHA." I could call Mike at home and do whatever was necessary if something seemed to me to be off the track, but this work schedule had a terrible impact on me, because George Shultz had his staff meeting at 7:20 in the morning, and Mike would arrive about ten-to-seven. To prepare for his arrival, I would have to arrive about 6:30. But if you weren't getting home till ten and having a drink, eating, and going to bed, you had no life, basically. That was a fight with a bureau that I wish had not taken place. In general, I think Mike was extremely well respected. The assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretaries would come to him and know that they would get an open door and some very sage advice and get help and support on supremely tricky and difficult issues, some of which went away very quickly and some of which never went away, so that his relationship with most of the bureaus was really very fine.

Q: What was Burt's background and what caused this difficulty between Burt and Armacost?

PENDLETON: Well, as I recall, Rick Burt had been a reporter for The New York Times, and he also was a political scientist who had gotten into government. By nature he was very self-assured. Mike was self-assured in a nicer, down-home way, but I think Mike just figured that if he was going to work very, very hard to serve George Shultz he wasn't going to have things coming back and slamming him in the kisser that he hadn't had a chance to know about. He simply wasn't going to allow it and he got his dander up. And Burt was a fellow who got a lot of people's dander up. He was extremely able, industrious, inventive,

but had a sly side to him. I don't think Mike had much of a sly side. He was no Ingersoll in terms of being a total straight shooter. He was more adroit bureaucratically, but there were certain times he felt he should put his foot down. This was one of them, unfortunately.

Q: How about relations with the Soviet Union? Did this occupy a great deal of the time?

PENDLETON: Well, this was an area, of course, where Rick Burt had a central role. Mike, in collaboration with Bill Courtney in our office and with the NSC, spent a fair bit of time on the Soviet Union, including the Afghanistan part of the equation. Mike also felt a responsibility to try to look ahead in the Soviet Union, and that's why, I think I mentioned once before, he had the policy planning staff, trying, among many other things, to look at what might happen in the Soviet Union. And it was an exercise of looking ahead which Mike later said became an exercise in "tending the garden," because while there was apprehension on part of the Policy Planning Staff about what the undersecretary might want to pursue.

It was not really clear where the Soviet Union was going, and a great deal of what our office did was devoted more to arms control issues, on which Bill Courtney was a real expert. Mike had actually known a lot about arms control in the past, and he became even more of an expert than he had been. I would say that with regard to the Soviet Union, he gave his judgments to the Secretary of State frequently in writing, dictating short notes. He gave a lot of advice with the help of Bill Courtney on complex arms control issues, but tended to feed those back to the National Security Council, never blindsiding Shultz but maybe blindsiding some of the others in the building, who knows. Once again, the Soviet Union could be your focus only 30 hours a week, not 40 hours a week, and you're spending 120 hours a week on other things. Events just seemed to pop up. Mike had a major obligation to manage emergencies, unexpected events that might require staffing up a working group or a task force(it might be a terrorism event, whatever(and the undersecretary was always looked to be a front-line player in those instances. And yet Mike, particularly with his own intellect and policy-planning background, always wanted

to try to step back and figure out how to deal with an issue that may only be beginning to percolate, while at the same time rushing into battle over things which were the emergency of the moment. I thought he did it brilliantly.

Q: Did Congressional relations cause any problems during that time and were they a factor, or was that taken care of elsewhere?

PENDLETON: They were not a major day-to-day preoccupation, although they probably should have been, and when, for instance, later the Philippines began to really blow up, I know that the undersecretary worked very closely with key members of Congress. There was, of course, the inevitable testimony, which meant getting yourself pumped up on specific issues, but key committees would really only want the Secretary of State if they could help it, in terms of testifying. I think we had a view in the office that there was a limit to how much you could affect Congressional thinking, even though it was really very key to a lot of issues, and that you probably needed to spend most of your time in other areas. We had for part of the time a situation in whicTap Bennett, for whom I'd worked at USNATO and who had been asked to do so by Shultz came back as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations after he had retired. Being the devoted professional that he was he reluctantly agreed to do so. But Congressional relations were not his life's blood, and it was a trying period for him. To a degree, we lost a feel for the pulse of Capitol Hill that a more instinctive former Hill player might have brought to it. And that, I think, to a degree, while I was in Armacost's office, reduced the number of alarms and excursions that actually came to our attention. The Office of Congressional Affairs wasn't ringing the bell as loudly as other offices were, asking for attention. Finally, Tap Bennett retired for the second time and, I think, lived happily, but all too briefly, ever after. He was one of the finest gentlemen and diplomats with whom I was associated.

Q: Were there any other major issues that we should talk about?

PENDLETON: Well, I look back at this period as being one in which I was really professionally very happy, but as we talk, I realize difficult it was to influence the individual issues that came along because you were dealing with hundreds of them a day. In that sense, I had a lot of authority to involve myself in a great many areas of short-term and long-term trouble, but to map the way ahead so that it would stick was really very hard. I recall when I first went to my desk in this office, that I was both bemused and appalled to see, sitting in my in-box, the latest iteration of a memo on Iranian nuclear issues that I had put in my out-box when I left the deputy secretary's office in 1976. That was a memo which had been floating around for eight years in one form or another, and it was a warning that what you could have an impact on was probably smaller than you thoughI suspect even Secretaries of State feel the same way on occasion.

And yet, I discovered that when I had to be there at night, it became clear to others that if you went up to the undersecretary's office long after regular working hours, long after, say, seven o'clock at night, you could find somebody who could make a decision. I began calling it "decision shopping." Some of the more rambunctious staff members, particularly from Near East Affairs, where Dick Murphy as Assistant Secretary had our ingoing ambassador to Jordan were willing to engage at all hours of the day and night Bill Burns as staff aide at that point. He would appear almost every night about 9:15 or something with a whole bunch of decisions to be made and see whether I was dumb enough to make any of them. I made a lot of decisions during this period, most of them between six at night and ten at night. If you thought you knew your boss's views on things, you could decide. And I did.

Sometimes I'd get out ahead. I would not go in on Sunday during the day. We had another member of the staff who would go in on Sunday morning and call me, and I would then call Mike Armacost and brief him. I would go in the evening to prepare for the next morning. But I remember being at the swimming pool and getting a beep on the beeper and answering the phone and being asked if I would clear the dispatch of vessels to the

Persian Gulf to search for mines, which were being laid to block the oil tankers. And I said, "Yes." And I found out later that I had blessed this for the State Department, at least the Pentagon thought so and had run with it. I had a little bit of explaining to do Monday morning, but by and large everybody stuck with me, because we were expecting that sort of request. And I figured that if I got very many of these judgment calls wrong I would be fired, but that I was there because I'd had enough experience to get most of them right.

At times it was heady stuff in terms of your profession. As hard as it is to remember all the issues I dealt with, it was fascinating work because every time I looked in my in-box or every time I answered the phone, there was a totally different problem there that needed somebody to deal with it. I liked that a lot. My family, however, came to like it less and less, and that led to my leaving the Under Secretary for Political Affairs' office before I had intended to or really wanted to, because my family put their collective foot down. They said that if I couldn(t see specifically where the long hours were going to lead, then I should go someplace where we could be reunited as a family. And at one point I was given something of an ultimatum, and I searched out another job in very short order at a post where both my wife and I could pursue our professions. I talked to Mike about it and said that I would like to leave that coming summer of '85 and go to London as political counselor(Ray Seitz had by that time left Shultz's office, where he was executive assistant, and gone to London as deputy chief of mission, and he smoothed the way with Clarke Price. Mike blessed the notion. And I worked another six months, but with at least some end which my family could see as being in sight.

This goes back to what you were asking earlier about what it's like when you really get in these jobs where there's no let-up. It can be like eating peanuts, but at the same time sometimes you get over-gorged in the process. I knew when I was leaving that job that I was getting off the merry-go-round. I didn't know quite how far I was getting off it in terms of my professional chances.

Q: When you say the merry-go-round, what do you mean?

PENDLETON: Well, by that time I had had a fair number of quite highly visible jobs in a row that for, say, the two people who succeeded me in Armacost's office led immediately to significant embassies as ambassador, one in Syria, one in Malaysia. One of them had been a deputy chief of mission and one hadn't, I think, and it is probably clear in retrospect that if I had continued to serve Mike Armacost for another couple of years or whatever in the way that I thought I was serving him that I could have gotten a significant DCM-ship or even a small embassy. That became more of an issue later, because soon after I got to London I got promoted from OC to MC (from one-star general to two-star general), and the clock was really ticking in terms of having to retire in my 40s, which was not something that I wanted to do at all. We can return to that sort of structural issue later, but the decision to leave Armacost's office was, I though, about the flattest commitment I could make to my marriage and my family, and I just wish I hadn't enjoyed the job so much.

Q: Well, you went to London from when to when? '85 to(

PENDLETON: (to '89.

Q: As political counselor. What does being political counselor in London mean?

PENDLETON: Well, that's an excellent question. I tussled with that because you are at a strange level. I used to describe it as being like the filling in a sandwich. You're at a level that isn't high enough to have your host country see you as the key representative of the US or low enough to have the kind of targeted expertise that is respected, about either arms control or the Middle East or what have you. So in a way, I was continuing what I was doing, which was trying to work with particularly the deputy chief of mission on strategy as to where we needed to put our energy and what we needed to do in terms of working with Washington, whether it be formal reporting or informal, and at the same time trying vigorously to find the right level for contacts outside the embassy and develop associations and friendships which you could build into a pattern of communication, —not only with those who were in power but those, in this case from the UK Labor Party, who

were out of power. All the while I was running a fairly large section. I had in London, just as had been true in the previous really three or four jobs in the Department, phenomenally able people reporting to me. Robin Raphel, who had been working for Larry Eagleburger, was there doing the Middle East. Bob Frazier, who was later killed en route to Sarajevo, and became a deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, was covering Africa. He had been very close to Chet Crocker and also did a lot of very useful over-arching domestic political reporting. Sandy Vershbow was the deputy political counselor, and is now our ambassador to NATO. There were many others(in other words a cadre of people(Raphel is now our ambassador to Tunisia(who were self-propelled and who quickly had earned the respect of the British. And so you looked at what the political counselor could do, and it wasn't always easy. Moreover, the deputy chief of mission, Ray Seits, had served in London early in his career and had followed the Conservative Party as well as Africa, at that time and many of the Conservatives he had known as a young officer pitched up again in government or near government by the time he was back as DCM. So I was perpetually attempting to try to find ways to reach out at levels that might be above or broader than what the folks who worked with me were able to do or doing, without intruding on the Ambassador and the DCM's contacts.

But in a way it was great. You could read about somebody in the newspaper and call them up and say, "Would you like to join me for lunch?" or "My wife and I are having a dinner party next Thursday. We're having some interesting people. We thought you might like to come." And more often than not, they would. I never dreamed you could just read about very busy people and call them up, but if you're representing the United States of America, you can, and it was astonishing how this sort of thing could lead to lasting friendships and open doors..

Of course, I had worked previously very closely with the British Embassy through the Falklands war and found that, for instance, the deputy chief of mission of the British Embassy in Washington had returned to London and was the political director at the Foreign Office. We had first met at our summer home in Maine, where he'd come with

another British guest. He had graduated from the same college at Cambridge my father had. So there were ties that were beginning to build that went back a few years that allowed me to have a very frank and easy interchange with the British, which was always pretty easy as it was, and I could play that role. My father-in-law had been a British diplomat, and we had family members and lots of friendships my wife and I could build on, and I think the quality of our reporting was really excellent and the quality of our interaction was outstanding. I think it is more of a challenge for people to be a counselor than you might imagine, and it's a shame that those jobs have been basically degraded over recent years because people are so dreadfully afraid that if they haven't been deputy chief of mission in at least a tiny post, they won't get promoted into the Senior Foreign Service. Being political counselor in a place like London won't do it for you, and I think that's unfortunate.

Q: Who was our ambassador when you arrived in '85?

PENDLETON: It was Charlie Price, whom I had known (and previously mentioned) when he was preparing to go to Brussels as ambassador when I was helping look after Northern European Affairs. He was from Kansas City, Missouri, was a banker and owned something called the Price Candy Company. His wife Carol was close to Nancy Reagan. Over time, both in Brussels and in London, both Prices became closer and closer to the Reagans. I retain a lot of fondness for Charlie Price. He was quintessentially American, a big man, an open man, a man who valued his professional staff, would listen to you and frequently do as you wanted, but good fun to be with. And I think that the combination of him as ambassador and Ray Seitz, who was the quintessential professional diplomat, as the number two actually worked very well. They both got along very well with the upper reaches of the British Government. Ray encouraged all of us, including the Ambassador to pay careful and ongoing attention to the Labor Party folk, who were on the outs. We've had almost all the members of the present Labor Party cabinet in power in Britain to my house for dinner or to my table for lunch. And we had a very good dialogue with them. Charlie Price bought into that as being a worthwhile exercise, although he was a strong

Reaganite and I think, obviously, enjoyed those who were in power, the Conservatives, more. His wife enjoyed the aristocrats and landed gentry more than the rest of us did, but Charlie was willing to try to balance it all out.

Q: Did a new ambassador come before you left?

PENDLETON: Yes, the amiable Henry Catto of Texas. He replaced Charlie Price and then went on to run USIA. I had known him a bit when he was chief of protocol. He came essentially without his wife and seemed both right at home and rather unfocused at the outset. I was reassigned before I could take the full measure of his substantive focus. His arrival did mean that a half-dozen of us could go with him when he went to Buckingham Palace to present his credentials to the Queen. We were presented too. I found her surprisingly shy and stiff despite all the years of putting up with these ceremonies. In recent years Henry Catto has been of help to me in terms of access to a Texas doctor. We both have the same disease.

In my view, the embassy did good work. I thought when I went to London, that maybe the time had come to have much smaller embassies or maybe no embassies at all in some countries. But I quickly changed my mind. It became clear that embassies have a role in terms of building connections which can be very important over time, and they also can be interpreters, in a way. For instance, when George Shultz came on his first visit after I arrived and was pressing the UK foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, about a variety of issues (they each had about 20 cards with an issue on each, and they would work through them really quite informally). Sir Geoffrey said over and over again, "I will have to talk to my partners about it" and blah-blah-blah. It was clear to me that George Shultz didn't get what was being said. The word partners meant "our EC [now EU] partners." To Shultz it seemed to mean either the other people in government or maybe the opposition party or somebody. It didn't mean the Europeans one whit. And I had to send him a note saying, "When he uses the word partners, he's talking about the other EU countries." And

I suddenly realized that there may be reasons to have embassies that I had fallen into the trap of overlooking.

Q: Well, I think one of the things I've noticed in this is how you feel about the diplomatic apparatus depends upon where you sit, and those who've been sort of at the hub of power, as you were with the undersecretary and all, sort of having the feeling that decisions are made here and this is the way it should be. That we're doing it and people out there will sort of take care of it, but it's not of the essence, and it's easy if you're in the center if the action in Washington to lose sight of what embassies do. And that's supposed to keep the relation oiled, to obtain the information, and to sort of explain what is possible and not possible.

PENDLETON: Precisely, and they often do it a lot better than those of us who spend a great deal of time in Washington think. Embassies are an investment which I would hate to see given up, and I came increasingly to hate to see consulates given up, both because they're excellent training ground for younger officers or less experienced officers and because they allow you to have insights into part of the world that you wouldn't otherwise have paid attention in terms of US interests. We were going to close Edinburgh in the mid-1980s, and I see that next month it's going to be the "Post of the Month" in the State Department Newsletter, almost a decade after it was to be closed in an economy drive. But when Pan Am 103 went down on December 21, 1988, if we hadn't had a consulate in Edinburgh, we would have had a much more difficult time dealing with the issues. Not only the issues of the moment but related issues that went on for years, whether they be the legal dealing with questions or the belongings of the American citizens who were killed.

Q: You were there during the end of Thatcher, weren't you?

PENDLETON: As she neared the end of her tenure as Prime Minister..

Q: What was the feeling of the embassy at the time? Margaret Thatcher, did you feel that she was transforming Britain for the better?

PENDLETON: Well, you have to see it against the backdrop of what the Labor Party was like at that point, because the Labor Party —which is in power now— is very different from the Labor Party at the end of Mrs. Thatcher's reign. We did go through the election of '88, when the Labor Party had a number of fundamental questions about relations with NATO, and NATO was key to our optic related to the future of Europe, our role in Europe. In that regard, Mrs. Thatcher, to the end of her reign, continued to look to us like a person who had not only helped transform Britain very usefully but understood the transatlantic bedrock and the role of NATO and the role of course struggling, with what its relationship would and should be like across the Channel. But it was hard not to have a great deal of respect for Mrs. Thatcher, even though she had her guirks, and still does. And we did tend to have a great deal of respect for her and her ministers. But that respect was, I think, enhanced by the fact that we believed there were tendencies within the Labor Party that could really be quite inimical to US fundamental interests. We set out in a very organized way to help the members of the Labor Party who were rising to understand what our concerns were, particularly about NATO, and why we were concerned. And I think we played a very useful educational role in the process. The embassy was often the one place in town, people kept telling us, where journalists and politicians from all different persuasions would run into each other and have a dialogue, because so often, in Britain as in many countries, political life is truncated along the lines of whatever party you're related to, and people don't talk directly to each other; they talk through the television.

Q: Who was the leader of the Labor Party?

PENDLETON: It was Neil Kinnock, who is now one of the EU commissioners in Brussels for the United Kingdom. He was not a very strong (thank God!) leader of the Labor Party, because he had ideas that really were pretty scattershot and lopsided, from our point of view. I think everybody in the embassy who dealt with him liked him a lot, but because he

was the leader of the Labor Party his time was much more sought-after than some others, and we had less chance to sustain a dialogue with him than we would have liked. I think there was a feeling that we weren't going to be able to affect his views to the degree that would be helpful if Labor was to come to power. We wanted him to understand what was on the mind of the crazy Americans.

We also had a continual dialogue with many other senior members of the Labor Party like the gruff John Prescott, the amiable George Robertson, the engaging Jack Straw, and the newly elected Tony Blair, whom the embassy spotted as a comer very soon after he was elected.

Q: In our opinion, what was on the mind of the Laborites that was disturbing to us?

PENDLETON: I think the principal thing was their real reservations about the role of NATO and the role the United States played in NATO. That got somewhat to the core of the issues. In terms of social policy, yes, we have in the United States traditionally taken a rather non-European view about the economy and social policies, and a great many European parties(and I include the UK in this(have a more refined view of what the state owes the individual than we do in this country. But that you just live with, and you can discuss and you can debate, but it doesn't cut to the core. When you still had an apparently robust Soviet Union, and you were worried about a war breaking out between the Soviet Union and the United States/NATO, you had to worry profoundly about what kind of leadership there would be in the United Kingdom and what its approach to NATO might be. That was the core of the concern. The other issues tended to be more peripheral. As happy as Republicans and conservatives generally in this country were with Mrs. Thatcher's economic policies, those policies were not going to assure the immediate survival of the West.

Q: What was our attitude during this time towards the European Union? I mean, it's always been sort of the cornerstone of our policy, making sure that these Europeans,

particularly the French and the Germans don't go at each other again. The closer they're tied economically and all, the less likely they're able to do it. This is, say, then, the one constant that's so run through American policy. But as we've gotten closer to it, there have arisen, and rightly so, concerns about what does this mean for the United States? Is there going to be a closed market? Are we going to find ourselves, as we build up an economic rival, that it's going to hurt us? Was this at all apparent while you were there?

PENDLETON: Yes, I think it's an excellent question and very well put because our rhetoric, historically, has been in support of a strong and united Europe, and that means that you have to support the EC, now the EU. And we have been constant in our rhetoric, but even during the time that I was in the UK, you could see, —as with this little story about Shultz and partners, "We'll have to ask our partners,"—that our ability to influence Europe's thinking, much less its actions, was diminished. All the members of the EC grappled collectively with an issue and came out with an approach to it which, if we agreed with, great, but more often than not there would be some light between us and the EC. This began to become more and more apparent on issues large and small, for instance, Cuba. The Europeans are much like the Canadians. They don't see any particular merit in our approach to Cuba, in singularizing Castro as a monumental danger and trying to punish companies and other countries which do business with Castro. As time went on, talking about Cuba with the British became in large measure a waste of time. They hid behind decisions of the European Community for a fare-thee-well.

And that's just one example of what we began to see, and the EU began to get together and decide how to approach one issue after another. We have always, to my mind, been quite unsuccessful in affecting the EU process. We are supposed to plug into the EU decision-making process through the presidency, which rotates every six months in alphabetical order. I was in London when Britain had the presidency of the EU, and you would have thought that it would be very easy to talk with British decision-makers and get good talking points from Washington and convince them of X, of Y and of Z. But that was not the case at all. The British, increasingly in the mid to late '80s, were trying to become

better Europeans, no matter how painful that was for, particularly, some members of the Conservative Party. They were determined that they were not going to be perceived by the other Europeans as being the United States stalking horse every time the UK got the presidency. The result was that they held us at arm's length during the presidency, in terms of sharing the agenda of various meetings, allowing us to have significant input into the process, and giving us readouts of meetings. Some of the smaller European countries have frequently been very gracious about that for reasons of their own. I think of Denmark and Luxembourg, in particular.

Q: Yes, I'm told Luxembourg, for example, is really a very good place to get information.

PENDLETON: That's correct, based on my experience. London is a lousy place to get information about the EU, and I found that very frustrating, but understandable. The world is changing, and the "special relationship" is adjusting to not only a transatlantic relationship but also a trans-Channel relationship, which is often more important for the UK than the relationship with Washington.

Q: What about the view of the British regarding the changes that were going on in the Soviet Union at that time. Is that something we were spending a quite a bit of time with, sharing impressions, knowledge?

PENDLETON: Well, yes and no. I don't believe that we or the UK had an adequate sense of what really was going on in the Soviet Union. Fortunately, we had on our staff Sandy Vershbow, who was a keeRussian specialist and sophisticated arms-control expert. Sandy had come from the Soviet Desk and was very well respected. He in particular talked with the British about the Soviet Union and about arms control nonstop. But were we able to say to the British that we thought the Soviet Union will collapse? No. I mean, the first time that the economic situation of the Soviet Union really entered my head like a sledgehammer blow was when Brzezinski came and had breakfast with a bunch of us in the embassy and told us about the most recent Rand study, which made much clearer

than direct CIA studies had made that the Soviet Union was involved in a monumental struggle that might lead to its collapse, —largely because of the economic situation of the Soviet Union, not the minorities that the Policy Planning Staff had focused on with. So even though we share more intelligence with the British than with anybody else, I don't think that we were sharing insights that would have put us all on alert about the impending collapse of the Soviet Union. We didn't have those insights.

We were involved with things that needed to be explained. For instance, the Iceland Summit, with President Reagan's movement on arms control, came like a thunderbolt to the Brits, and we had to do a lot of putting into perspective, which was hard to do, about our shifting position. Fortunately the White House sent ambassador Jack Matlock to help brief the British, and of course we briefed at NATO. Yet there tended to be consternation all around. I gave a dinner, for instance, for Matlock with a bunch of British academics and Soviet watchers from the press and academia, and it was a hard sell because we had shifted so far that even having somebody who was there and had been working intimately with the President did not result in much calming of British apprehensions.

Another hard sell we had was Central America. We have presumably talked about Phil Habib. Phil Habib got called upon to explain our Central America policy to people, and he came to my house for dinner one night with a group of Labor Party leaders, including Dennis Healy, who had been a longtime friend of his, and a number of parliamentarians, all of whom were extremely skeptical about our approach to Central America. It was one of the most memorable meals I've ever had because Phil arrived late and started shouting at everybody. And he shouted through the whole meal, and everybody was pretty well lubricated and started shouting back. There was absolute bedlam. Finally Dennis Healy had to really take charge(I couldn't control anybody(and calm them all down. And everybody left kind of early and in a huff. We learned later that Phil had a heart attack two days earlier, and I suspect that from his point of view he was attempting to be very

aggressive to show himself that he was still alive. But he stirred up a hornets' nest, and it was not something I'd like to go through again.

Q: Had John Major been somebody whom we've been working with?

PENDLETON: Major was not somebody whom we knew as well as we wished we had when he became prime minister in November, 1990. For whatever reason, he wasn't as central to our discussions, as many other people, both amongst the Conservatives, amongst the Social Democrats of the middle, and of the Labor Party had been. And that, in his case, wasn't a major problem at all, but it was something which, I think, in retrospect, was uncharacteristic and we would like to have spent more time with him—obviously.

Q: As you sit around with your British colleagues, was there much talk about the role of France?

PENDLETON: Yes, but it was never very profound. The British tend to echo the French in having an abundance of stereotypes in their kit bags which they pull out at frequent intervals. Sometimes, however, on the British sideviews of the French were embellished by the proclivity of well-heeled Brits to have summer houses in France, —which lead them to either buy into the stereotype quite quickly or start thinking a little more broadly. But in general the stereotypes were there, and you kind of had to urge a thoughtful conversation about the role of France. I think that the preoccupation at that era still often tended to be Germany, in terms of power in Europe and the evolution of Europe. I had, I would say, many more conversations about Germany's role in Europe than I did about France's role, and yet I have to confess I know less about Germany(did even then(than about France. But increasingly, we were finding people were looking at the EC and its evolution in block terms and a little bit less in terms of individual national identity.

Q: What about at your level, did you sense a frustration, in looking at both the Ambassador and DCM, of the transatlantic telephone, the flights, the cabinet members and others who would sort of fly over and deal and do things directly and the embassy got kind of left out?

PENDLETON: Yes, of course, although you had to accept that as a reality of modern life, particularly when people speak the same language. To a degree, it was good, and there was no way of patrolling everything that happened. Some ambassadors have tried, and insisted that nobody can even send a message without them knowing about it. This is a day of faxes and phones and the common language, and there was only so much apoplexy one could fall into about such things because, in general, they helped the warp and woof of the relationship. And if the Ambassador really felt crossed and got upset, he could blow his stack, and Ray Seitz, as deputy chief of mission, had no hesitation about ringing the bell if somebody lower down in the bureaucracies got off the reservation. The Ambassador would, on occasion, let the President of the United States know that he found something unacceptable, and that at least allowed him to say, "I've told the President." Whether the President did anything about it is another matter. This would happen maybe every eight months, but it allowed him to help make sure that people knew (a) with whom he was connected and (b) that it wasn't going to get overlooked.

By and large, the visits of really knowledgeable people, both official and unofficial, were very useful in the relationship. And something did surprise me, that we got less Congressional visitors than I expected, in both London and later when I was in Paris. They also often made fewer demands on us than I expected. There were a lot, but it seemed to me that almost everybody who came to London had some kind of private agenda to go with their public agenda, and this was true of members of Congress as well. Maybe a niece was at Cambridge or a son at Oxford or they had some tie that they wanted to resurrect which was of no business to the embassy, and the result was they were a little less demanding of the embassy's than I would have thought they might be. That interested me because it left a bit more time for important work. There were also CODELs who were

disgraceful, basically. I remember escorting a busload of Congressmen to a meeting with Baroness Linda Chalker, who was the head of the British equivalent to our AID (Agency for International Development), and the leader of the delegation saw a store when we were caught in traffic and decided he wanted to go shopping. And he and half the busload got off and went into the store, and the bus went on and they appeared at the meeting when it was about two-thirds over. Linda Chalker's staff told me immediately afterwards that it was never to happen again. If she was going to set out time in her schedule to meet with our members(and she was a member of Parliament herself(they were all to appear. They had arrived carrying shopping bags, you see; it was very obvious where they had been.

The embassy at the highest level once put its foot into it when a very high-level Congressional arms-control delegation stopped over in London on the weekend after a real working visit into our Geneva delegation. The ambassador gave them a small reception but then noted to The Washington Post correspondent that their London stop was a frolic. They Chairman of the Committee was not pleased when he read the quote in the Post. And the Department of State. At another visit, Senator Dan Quail and his wife came through on the weekend. We couldn't get any Brits to meet with him. They consider weekends sacred and are usually off in the country. So we had a very small in-house reception at the ambassador's residence. Charlie Price and Quail got along very well, but I think the Senator expected more. The Brits were sorry they had not met with him when a few months earlier Bush chose him as his running mate. Of course President Reagan came to say farewell to Margaret Thatcher.

When the newly-elected President George H.W. Bush came for his first visit, his advance teams insisted initially that he could not be scheduled to do anything that President Reagan had ever done. They relented when they realized the new President would under that rubric not be able to see the prime minister or Queen.

A few additional words. When you have almost a mini-State Department in that embassy, with experts who not only are experts on a particular aspect of British society but also on

another part of the world, you find that life is pretty disjointed. A political counselor, you are trying to prioritize, but you're trying to prioritize a great many different unprioritizable issues. For instance, my next door neighbor in London, Bob Frazier, who was later killed en route to Sarajevo when his vehicle went off the road, was not only an expert on British politics. In that capacity, he tended to write for us the overview cables, which were deliciously executed and very well received in Washington. But Bob he also had been a long-time co-conspirator with Chet Crocker, the brilliant Assistant Secretary for Africa, and he and Chet were in the personal touch and in touch with the British at all hours. Bob went off with Chet to Africa any number of times, and it certainly was not something where a decision by me that we needed a cable on British domestic politics would override Chet's swooping him up and taking him to southern Africa.

So one bounced around from subject to subject quite dramatically, and one never knew what would happen. Pan Am 103 went down in Lockerbie, Scotland, on the 21st of December, not long before Christmas, in 1988. I was driving home about eight o'clock at night, walked in the door and found that on the phone was a junior officer from the section who called to alert me that he'd just heard this on the radio. I immediately called the Ambassador, who was in his car and was on the phone talking, as it turned out, with our consul general about the news and what to do. I got through to him, and he said immediately that he was going to go up there. This was Charlie Price, and his instinct was actually right on, to demonstrate our concern on the ground and to lead our team on the ground, and the ambassador asked that I start getting him a plane. Of course, we all went back to the embassy, and we stayed there most of the time, through on into the New Year. It wasn't the Christmas we had anticipated, and there were a few lessons that one learned from this horrific experience, ranging from the difficulty of getting an airline to release its passenger manifest to the real challenge of working with distraught family members, who will go the extra mile to do anything to understand better what happened. We saw the need for both the embassy and the State Department to be staffed up appropriately, whether it's a holiday or not, to deal with not only all the officials but family members, —

many of whom came over to London and then went on to Lockerbie—but who were not best pleased with the way they were dealt with by the Department during the Christmas period when the task force was dissolved and phones were being answered by the Operations Center people.

We also learned the value of test runs. We had, just about a month before in the embassy, a terrorism exercise which had involved most of the same people who found themselves around the table during this Lockerbie period, and I must say, I had thought that exercise was an intrusion into other things that were higher priority. But on the night of the 21st of December I changed my mind totally because all of us had been forced to work together under quite realistic circumstances in the exercise and we had been able to make a judgment about each other's approach to challenges which proved to be very useful. We had also mechanically found out where the phones were and how to operate everything. So I changed my mind totally about the value of training in these exercises as you went along. Certainly Charlie Price taught all of us the value of his instinctive reaction, which was to involve himself and to show how much United States officials cared about what had happened to our citizens. All the pictures in the press the next morning showed Charlie Price(and he took his wife Carol with him, —standing near a very large fragment of the plane. That was indicative, I think, of the care the embassy and the consulate in Edinburgh gave to the process. As I mentioned previously, the consulate in Edinburgh was scheduled to be closed, and it spent the next three years doing little else but working with Pan Am 103 follow-up, whether it was the belongings of the victims or the Scottish judicial system in terms of making sure that we understood fully what the judicial process might be. And of course, we were reminded once again of the whole issue of terrorism and the difficulty of preventing it. We faced the question of pre-alerting embassy officials, based on knowledge which was not available to the general public, not to fly on a certain plane, and the question of openness became very much on people's mind in a way that it wasn't before.

At any rate, these sorts of events can happen at any embassy, and they are very testing. I thought that Embassy London, in part because of the quality of people there, in part because we'd had this recent run-through of a similar event, performed very professionally. Pan Am 103 was not typical, thank God, of what you faced in London, but it was one of the awful events that happens to almost everybody at some point or other in his or her Foreign Service career.

Q: You next went to Paris. How did that come about?

PENDLETON: Well, that's a good question, and it's one that has a certain amount of pleasure attached to it and a certain amount of pain. A couple of things happened to me in London. One was that I got promoted to the FE-MC level, that of a two-star general, and I was in my latish 40s, and I suddenly realized that with this promotion, under the scheme of things at that point(which was later tinkered with(I really could have only one more assignment. An FSO had to retire after five years at that level if he didn't make career minister; and that was not in the cards.

Q: Career Minister being you were well on your way to having a couple of ambassadorial assignments?

PENDLETON: You would probably have had two ambassadorial assignments and been an Assistant Secretary, which was not in the cards. And this was a bit distressing because one of the reasons that way back in the beginning I had looked kindly on going into the Foreign Service was that I thought that I could work and help support a family till I was 65. My father had struggled as a businessman in his 50s and 60s, and it seemed to me that I'd rather do with smaller pay but enjoy the job and ration my expenditures. I always thought it would be nice to be an ambassador. Political counselors are no longer often are made ambassadors, although some are, like Hank Cohen out of Paris, who was sent to Senegal.

And then something else happened which I live with to this day, which was they had President Reagan coming over to London for his farewell visit, as I mentioned. I was the control officer for the trip, which was just a ghastly visit, because there was a lot of turmoil in the White House and the advance people kept coming for one visit and then another group would come for another visit and we would start over and over again. It was driving the British and ourselves crazy. As it came close, we were having meetings on into the night that they would call to start at 6:00 at the end of a very long day. I got really tuckered out, and I went to the doctor eventually, and to make a long story short, after a bunch of tests, it was shown that I had a life-threatening disease -chronic lymphomatic leukemia. This was going to affect my ability to live very long (I was told I could expect to live five years) and also was going to nix the possibility of going to any posts that weren't in highly industrialized societies where there was excellent medical care. I'm happy to say that I'm alive today, but this thing smolders on, and 80 per cent of the people who heard on the day that I did that they had this disease are no longer alive. So it was not something to be fooled around with, and it suddenly occurred to me that not only would I not be very long in the Foreign Service but that my extraordinary wife, really, was going to have to continue to be the major breadwinner for the family. We decided not to tell the children, and we decided definitely (because I had a bout with melanoma at NATO some years before, during which everybody suddenly treated me as if I had one and five-eighths feet in the grave(not to tell colleagues or the personnel people.

This meant that as I got calls about future assignments I had to turn down most of them without any explanation of why I didn't want to be in the running. And it wasn't that I didn't want to be in the running; it was that I couldn't be in the running because I couldn't get medical clearance and wouldn't have wanted to force the issue, as it was. And soon after you've turned down a few things, people say, "Well, hell, he's had London and he's had his show - forget about it." And so I needed to find a place to go that would be in the proper medical environment. Mark Grossman, who's now Assistant Secretary for Europe, was supposed to go to Paris as political counselor. He bowed out of that rather late on

in the process and went to Ankara as deputy chief of mission, that being a much more promotable thing. And I had rather a hard psychological struggle going laterally - because my career had not been particularly lateral up to that point - to Paris, but in terms of the possibility of my wife continuing to work as an investment banker or a lawyer and in terms of the medical and other considerations, I eventually took up the offer which Mark Lissfelt, who was deputy chief of mission there, was pushing with personnel. I signed on to go to Paris and do the same sort of job that I'd been doing in London, although I knew it wouldn't be as easy for language and cultural reasons as it might have been in the UK. You can imagine that a fair number of people serving in real leadership posts were not amused to see me go from London to Paris I certainly understand that.

Q: So you were in Paris from when to when?

PENDLETON: I was in Paris from '89 to '93.

Q: Who was our ambassador? This would be near the beginning of the Bush Administration.

PENDLETON: Yes, not long after the transition, and our ambassador was Walter Curley, who had been a school and college-roommate of George Bush's older brother Prescott. He had known the Bush family for most of his life and they were good friends. Curley was a combination of investment banker and business man, had been involved with The New Yorker and had served as ambassador to Ireland. He also was an expert on European royalty and had written a number of books on the subject. His was a long-standing fascination with the subject. And he had been, I believe, chief fund-raiser for the Bush campaign in the New York and New England area and had gotten his reward. His was an old-school charm counterposed with an ability to put his foot down.

Q: Well, now, in '89, what was the situation both domestically and in our relations with France?

PENDLETON: Well, France was still led by Fran#ois Mitterrand, who had been president for a considerable period of time and remained president for a considerable period of time. He died in 1996. Mitterrand was a Socialist, a man about whom we had many apprehensions when he became president because, in part, he undertook to put in the French cabinet a couple of communists and others whom the United States found to be anathema. At that point, Vice-President Bush went to Paris to meet with Mitterrand to express to him some of our apprehensions about these choices for ministers. Now Mitterrand was a man of considerable hauteur, and it must have been one of the more delicate jobs that any Vice-President or President or anybody could have, to walk into his office and say, "We don't like your domestic appointments." Bush, by all accounts, did so with considerable sophistication and got the message across without alienating Mitterrand. He and Mitterrand developed a relationship which really strengthened throughout the time of the Bush Presidency, once Bush became President, and to which we owe a great deal, particularly in terms of the Gulf War, when it came along. At that point Bush, to a degree, became at the highest level the Desk officer for France. He invested, even before the Gulf War, a certain amount of time and energy that other presidents would not have, probably, in communicating directly by phone with Mitterrand and taking into account what Mitterrand had to say and adjusting, at least tweaking, US approaches and policies to reflect concerns expressed by the French president. And this just strengthened Mitterrand's sense that this was a relationship which was two-way and which it would really benefit France to pursue.

Below Mitterrand, a tremendous number of both bureaucrats and elected officials continued to have the traditional distaste for many things American and had to be, on occasion, dragged along to listen to our side, particularly as France became more and more a part of Europe in a way that it hadn't been before. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, French apprehensions about the role of Germany, particularly as it unified, and the close ties between the United States and Germany were always near the surface. So I cannot say that our relationship with our oldest ally was easy. It had to be worked on the

whole time that I was there and has always had to be worked on, ever since we were allies during our Revolution. But the Bush-Mitterrand relationship allowed a kind of joint decision-making on occasion that was quite unusual in an historical sense.

Q: Well, before we move into some of the events, which were the Gulf War and the fall of the Soviet Union and all, what was your impression of the French Communist Party at that particular time? Was it still a tool of the Kremlin?

PENDLETON: The French Communist Party, by the time I arrived in 1989, was really very weak and getting weaker. The trade unions in France were weak and getting weaker. Marchais had been head of the French Communist Party for many years and remained head for much of the time that I was in France, but he had remained faithful to a form of Communism which was rapidly being discredited with the impending collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Ceausescu regime in Romania. The result was that the rest of the France was really moving on in a way that one wouldn't have expected a decade earlier. And the French Communist Party was being left in the wake, both in terms of supporters, voters and influence. So it was not a terribly important force at that point. The Green parties were coming up a bit, and France basically remained split between Socialists and more conservative members such as the "Rally for the Republic", which led to(before I arrived("cohabitation" between a Socialist president and a prime minister who was from the right. France returned later to cohabitation in 1994, which reflected basically the split of sentiment within the country. But France is so disciplined and has such a forceful bureaucracy, many of whom are "Enarchs," the graduates of the National School of Administration, who tend to go on one way or the other and have a hard time being influenced by elected officials, many of whom attended ENA as well. When you have cohabitation, for the United States, it means another address you have to go to when you're trying to convince France to do what we would prefer. You have to go to the Elys#e Palace, where the presidency is; you have to go to the Foreign Ministry, the Quai d'Orsay; and then you would have to go, under cohabitation, to the prime minister's office. All these centers of power involved themselves in issues that France deemed to be important such

as Africa, which has never been at the center of our own thinking. Nevertheless, they tend to, in France, be absolutely convinced that we wish to replace them in Africa, and they tend to be everything from jittery to frantic, depending upon whether it's morning or afternoon, about this. The whole time I was there, it was no longer Chet Crocker, there was Hank Cohen as Assistant Secretary. His wife was French. Instead of going to Africa via London, as Chet Crocker had done, he went to Africa via Paris, and he briefed the French in detail so regularly that it was destroying my limited representation budget. But his efforts only seemed, in a funny way, to heighten suspicions on the part of the long-time Africa watchers in Paris.

Q: What was the role of the(I don't know if you'd call it new, but the entrepreneur class, technicians, the people who were "The computer age is upon us," and the service industry(things like this. Were they playing, did you see, a different role than sort of the old power structure, or did you see any difference?

PENDLETON: One of the things which surprised me was that in terms of our political relationship there seemed to be less of a role than I would have expected, unless it had changed, in terms of new elements hoping to inform political decisions. This seemed to remain pretty much in the hands of traditional and bureaucratic apparatchiks who were very confident about their own abilities to make decisions and very anxious to make the best decisions possible for France. On the economic side, of course, all of Europe was going gangbusters at one level but not so fast at another level. And here France was very, very worried about it's own technological expertise and its ability to convert expertise into exports. France faced, throughout the time that I was there, growing unemployment, and that became a major preoccupation. Indeed, if there hadn't been conscription(the draft(the unemployment rate would have been for adult males up above 20 percent, with particularly high unemployment in the 18-30-year-old age cohort.

France has a remarkable capability to balance the old and the new, and France also has a level of statism that we're not quite used to. For instance, in order to keep employment

high, Air France, which was owned by the government and which at that point was in line to be privatized, kept on a great many people at all levels and all jobs who in the United States would have been downsized or let go. For instance, in 1993, for every employee working for American Airlines - which is about the size of Air France - Air France had five employees. So you're not going to make a profit on that. Instead, you are going to have to satisfy a lot of customers who like the personal attention that you can give them with five employees to every one that a major American airline might have. And you had tensions within the government between the Socialists, with a very strong commitment to social welfare and a safety net for all citizens. Of course, among the conservatives there were more business elements with a less traditional viewpoint about social welfare.

You also have in France something I might mention. You had the very interesting role in the very small group who are Protestants. And I didn't realize before I went to France that being a Protestant in France is a special role. There's a lot of respect for the Protestants, and my wife and I were very well received by Protestants, who, more than many Frenchmen, had traveled abroad, had parents and grandparents and great-grandparents who had fled and lived abroad and come back. They were more open, too, and in the process were more entrepreneurial than a lot of other Frenchmen. Their families, like Peugeot, who make the cars, Schlumberger, who do oil(

Q: My brother worked for them, yes.

PENDLETON: Et cetera(quite a very interesting role in the process. And I was surprised to find that, for instance, if you have a new person joining an office, that person might be identified as a Protestant, the way in the United States one might mention, if you had a largely white office that the new arrival was black(a very discreet sense of Protestants being separate and sometimes more than equal.

Q: What about the intelligentsia? How did you deal with it? One almost has the feeling there's a visceral anti-Americanism within this group, that it has more impact in France than it does in almost any other country. Is this true, or not?

PENDLETON: Well, it was very definitely true when I spent a little bit of time in the early '60s, but I found that there was a slow and quite remarkable evolution and that people who had considered themselves to be of the intelligentsia, by the time I was there, were much more open to American notions and ideas they recognized, at least, the need to know and understand what motivates us and the need to understand what can be uncorked in the United States in the way of political and economic energy and that frequently doesn't seem to be as possible in Europe. I found a lot more respect for American culture, particularly if it had a capital C rather than a small c, than I would have expected. Now when you have something like the establishment of something like EuroDisney 20 miles outside of Paris, that brings to the fore all the latent tensions that are not always creative between those who see the debasing of French civilization by the invasion of an American fantasy land against all of those who would like to take their children to see Mickey Mouse. And within society there is a fair bit of tension in that regard. But the French intelligentsia(and these were not the people who necessarily would welcome me immediately, in part because my French was not at the 5+ level(I did sense from many conversations, that they had come a long way in being more open to the impact we have in the world.

Q: What about the bureaucracy? Did that have a thrust as far as America was concern or did it have its own foreign policy, or not?

PENDLETON: Well, I suspect that Mitterrand or any of his prime ministers might claim that the Quai d'Orsay, the foreign ministry, had its own approach to life, and they were always trying to tame it. One of the most fascinating things about French society, really, is the influence that the graduates of the National School of Administration, mentioned above, have our patterns of thinking and French decision-making. They come out class after class and provide not just the bureaucrats but the entire political class, really, including

prime minister after prime minister (the impact that that way of thinking has on French decision-making. And the way of thinking involves a kind of philosophical approach to challenges and issues, a Cartesian division of issues into three parts. Whatever you went to make a d#marche on, you knew you were going to get a three-part answer, no matter how seemingly unnecessary that might be. And the three-part answer would always be informed by a staunch belief that France has a special role in the world and that the United States doesn't understand this and that the United States doesn't adequately take France into account and that France thinks harder about issues than the United States does. Indeed, their approach to issues frequently was more nuanced than our own. The watering-down process that goes into creating a d#marche in Washington could also be the worst enemy of those overseas trying to convince the French to do something because you would be passing along really what often seemed to me, as well as to the French, to be half-baked suggestions that were too easily dismissed. That came out of our interagency jockeying process. I found many of my interlocutors to be absolutely brilliant, in their own eyes at least.

I found that the best of them wanted to be creative, and these included people like Hubert Vedrine, with whom I met at regular intervals to discuss the future of NATO. He was Mitterrand's strategic counselor at that point. He later became Mitterrand's, basically, chief of staff, and now he's foreign minister of France. Or Ambassador Jean-David Leavitte, who was charged at the Quay d'Orsay with coming up with the world's approach to Cambodia, at the time that France was leading the efforts to have elections and have the UN appropriately involved. These people were absolutely world-class individuals who, in their professionalism, could run rings around most of us. I have to say that, as I said, my French wasn't 5+/5+, ("fluid but not fluent" I used to say) and Mitterrand said he would fire any of his underlings who ever spoke with diplomats in Paris in anything but French. It was sometimes funny that you'd work on and off with somebody for a couple of years, and then you'd have a visitor from Washington who would call on them, and you would find for the first time that the person spoke colloquial English English or American English. They are

quite a remarkable breed, and sometimes they serve France brilliantly, and sometimes the baggage they bring with them leaves them a bit in the wake as world events go on.

Q: A theme that goes throughout almost all of these oral histories, anybody who deals with the French, is(frustrations not the word, but not really anti-French because there are many things about the French that everybody likes(but the French policy to really grate; and often, at least in the eyes of the Americans whom I interview, they see French policy as being out to make a buck for France or to throw, as the British would say, a spanner into the works just to show that they have the ability to stop things in the international world. Did you get any of this?

PENDLETON: Oh, yes, I got it all the time. And the question of making money for France was very much involved in the interrelationship between large French corporations and the government. The government would choose who would head many large French corporations. And France, knowing that it is a relatively small country, has mobilized to try to increase exports, increase productivity, and it has done so against the backdrop of high unemployment that we discussed earlier. In terms of the grandeur of France(it was something that would pop up like a jack-in-the-box time and time again(it wasn't simply the misplaced notion that the U.S. is trying to compete with them in Africa or get them out of Africa or whatever because we want that role. In every negotiation, there would be a demand that (a) any new international body must have French as a language even thought that might be terribly inconvenient for all other players; (b) there inevitably would be a demand at a certain point in major international negotiations that whatever was going to be signed would be signed in Paris and that it would be yet another "Treaty of the Elys#es" ending the cold war or it would be the "Treaty of" this or that, ending the conflicts in Cambodia(this happened over and over again. President Bush was very gracious about seeing this need and subscribing to it. Repeatedly we had to bow to this intense internal French need in order to increase cooperation in terms of the substantive issues at hand. It's a small price to pay, but it's maddening, you see it coming like a steamroller; they almost can't help themselves with these demands. France is an extraordinary country

but it has a capacity to make its leaders seem petty, and leaders do seem petty when they insist oFrance's central role over and over again. I'm not at all surprised that this is a constant theme. I fortunately, and perhaps because of the Gulf War and because of President Bush, was there at a time when, yes, we paid more attention that I think many in Washington would ever have wanted us to. That came from the very top on down. A great many people in Washington were not pleased because the French can be varsity-level irritating. But I think we got some pretty good trade-offs in the process, so that my view is a little bit more positive, in terms of how the trade-offs can work for us.

Q: Did you find yourself in any relationship with Washington or anywhere else or with our embassies in Bonn or London or something trying to explain the French position on things —in a way sort of gritting your teeth while you were doing it because you didn't quite support the French position?

PENDLETON: One of the great dangers of serving in Paris is the whole question of "clientitis" and how you are perceived by those who are more skeptical of the French than perhaps I was or became (and I was more skeptical of the French than some in our embassy who had a lifetime of commitment to strengthening French-US relations, either because they had French spouses or because they'd grown up in France or had studied in France, et cetera. But what I was extremely anxious to do in both London and Paris was to try to assure that our reporting reflected US interests from top to bottom, even if we had to put it in a summary and then repeat it: why is this of interest to the United States? And if you package the French argument in an American context, then you're probably all right in terms of critics. And we did not get into the kind of slanging match with other embassies that I used to see, for instance, between Tel Aviv and Cairo when I served in Tel Aviv in the late '60s. No, everybody was trying to understand a rapidly evolving Europe, and then, in terms of Washington, as I mentioned, the tone President Bush set couldn't help but affect the approach that subordinates took, even if they had to grit their teeth in the

process. And every time you were ready to strangle the French, they would do something that was positive enough to let you breathe for another day.

Q: Well, let's take the two big events that are at least apparent hear, one the fall of the Berlin wall and all that. I would have thought we would have been looking very closely at France because it meant, you know, this thing was great, I mean, we'd all been all for this, but all of a sudden you had a greater Germany and all that. How did France feel about it? How did this affect what you were doing and your observations of the French-American relationship as these things were happening?

PENDLETON: France almost went into mourning about the unification of Germany. On the surface, they were very pleased about the course of events in Europe, but if you scratched them the slightest bit you would discover that there was a tremendous amount of apprehension about what was going to happen. Was this a new German tiger next door, now so much larger than it was, which had already wreaked havoc in Europe twice in a century(was it going to become an impossible neighbor to deal with? What would happen about the relationship that had always been so strong between the United States and Germany? Would it become even stronger? Would the United States try to influence France through Germany? What would happen about Germany's economic might, and would Germany be able to really dominate commercial ties with all of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in a way that France would like to have been able to stretch its own wings? Once you scratched the surface in Paris you found an almost funereal degree of apprehension about what all this would mean.

Nevertheless, the French had to put the best face on it because of trying to be good Europeans at that point, and French apprehensions contradicted the impulse toward a united Europe, which Mitterrand supported without reservation and which caused a great deal of concern on the part of many other Frenchmen. This led to Mitterrand calling the Maastricht referendum after the Treaty of Maastricht's propulsion toward a united defense and security foreign affairs policy for the EU. At the same time, the treaty that many

Frenchmen resisted, created a common European currency to go into effect in 1999. Many worried that somehow the mark would become the currency of Europe and that the French franc would play a third or fourth or fifth role in the process, well behind the dollar and the mark.

I think we should say a few words about the Maastricht referendum, because it was a preoccupation of ours in terms of where France came out and in terms of the impact on the future of a united Europe and the impact on the future of Mitterrand, who I thought, from the moment I heard he was going to have a referendum, had made a major mistake. I didn't see any sense in it. I didn't see what he could gain because all the polls suggested almost immediately that it was going to be very close. Indeed, it was very close. We didn't know, up to the end, whether it was going to be decided by voters in the DOM-TOMs, the overseas departments. Were the people of Martinique, Guadeloupe and the French citizens of the Pacific going to decide this issue related to Europe? One could only guess. And uncharacteristically, I had our political section gin up two different cables, one if the referendum succeeded and one if it failed and focusing on the implications for the United States. On the night of the vote count, we stayed up most of the night and then sent the correct cable (Mitterrand succeeded. As would so typically be the case when you give a lot to something the cable got lost in the central computer in the State Department and was not read by anybody at Main State, which may be an argument for "you don't need embassies." Actually, it was fortunately relayed and was read by Eagleburger up in New York, where he was at the UN, and a few others, but by the time we realized that it had never been received by anybody, it was kind of untimely. I was tired and unhappy.

Q: What were the issues on the referendum?

PENDLETON: Well, the basic issue was whether France would go along with the Maastricht Treaty, which would give away to the EU an element of French sovereignty, particularly over foreign and security matters. This was not anything which many Frenchmen had been historically able to bring themselves to do, although France had

been drifting and sometimes paddling vigorously in that direction for years. Maastricht basically was a sovereignty issue which divided, I would say, Europe, in a great many ways. It divided France in the same sorts of ways, with those who are afraid about change taking a rather conservative point of view and voting against the referendum and those who felt the change would be acceptable — if not even good — voting for it. Then you had the overlay of whether you were supporting Mitterrand or not. But it was a close call for Mitterrand.

Q: I would have thought, the French, in this period and really for a long time, were moving in two different directions. One, they were always concerned about a resurgent Germany, not necessarily a Hitlerian Germany, but just the sheer weight of a big, quite efficient country and all which could overwhelm them; and at the desire to sort of keep the United States out. I would have thought that there would have been an underlying spirit of "let's keep the United States in as a control over Germany," but the French always seemed to be going for this European solution, which would mean that they would, in a way, be overwhelmed by Germany. I mean, was that at all a thing?

PENDLETON: I think what they hoped to do was to be able to influence Germany and have us influence Germany a little less on issues where we disagreed with France but have us influence Germany about French concerns on issues where we agreed a little more. And you had a funny triangle involved, with no easy answer. France was very anxious to try to educate the Germans, and the Germans very anxious to keep French concerns and angst in mind. And there are structural relationships between France and Germany that aren't very widely known but have helped to support ties that are important. For instance, on a fairly minor level, there are Frenchmen and Germans who work in each other's foreign ministries. Now occasionally we've had somebody who has worked at the Quai, but they're asked to work on aid matters related to places in the world that France doesn't care much about. France had a German diplomat working in the European office on questions related to the integration of Europe, which is fairly extraordinary. French and German diplomats have joint meetings, not unlike our chiefs-of-mission meetings.

They have chiefs-of-mission meetings involving both French and German chiefs of missions. There are a fair number of structural approaches which allow each country to try to influence the other and to build confidence between the two. But in the back of their mind always was, the United States had 330,000 troops in Europe. The majority were in Germany. We had a remarkable impact on German thinking in the post-World War II era, and the French did fear very much that in a way we would, through the Germans, throw a spanner in the French works. And I think that we were more sophisticated than the French frequently give us credit for, but it's something that bothered them.

Q: Did you find the NATO relationship within Europe bothersome to the French? I mean, were they talking one way and performing another way?

PENDLETON: Well, sure, and this goes back over the years. France's approach to NATO has evolved over the last decade in important ways, and yet what most people in France did not realize was that even on the military side France had quite a close relationship to NATO even in the decades following France's withdrawal from the integrated military structure. France found it very much in its interest to keep us involved in as quite a way with NATO military thinking. And then of course they remained in NATO - pushed by France, NATO decamped from France to Ev#re, outside of Brussels, and yet France remained very much a player on the political side. Because of its coherent view about a variety of subjects France frequently was able to play a role way out of line with its military commitment to the Alliance, which in theory was none. Next to us and next to the Brits, they played probably the major role, the Germans being relatively cautious in NATO because of their own military history. The Brits had no army in the '70s to speak of, but they had a lot of candlepower in the people who represented them at NATO and put it to good use. The French in the latish '80s began to give a lot more thought to the question of rejoining the integrated military structure, and this led to a need on their part to understand better what they were missing and what was involved (although they had a pretty good understanding (and they were testing the political waters at home increasingly. This went on into the early '90s, with the notion of reentering, and my talks with Hubert V#drine

were very much focused on NATO and the French role and the French potential role in NATO. He was giving away nothing in terms of what they might do, but there was a certain amount of probing back and forth. And this I found encouraging over time, but you'd go in fits and starts as to whether France would rejoin the integrated military structure and do so with gusto. In parallel, of course, they were considering a stronger defense role for the EU.

What they did do, vis a vis the U.S., and we saw it during the Gulf War, was increasingly to cooperate with us on a variety of issues which would not have been possible even a few years before. If you think, for instance, how much unhappiness there was in the United States about France's role in the Libya bombing at the end of the '80s. France forced our planes flying out of the UK to go around France to get to Libya. That left a very bad taste in a lot of Americans' mouths, and rightly so. In the end of the day, with the Gulf War, they allowed our planes to land at French bases(two of them, as I recall, in the south of France(and this was a very big request which we made to them and one which in the end they agreed to approve. We also, in the early '90s, provided France on increasingly frequent occasions with what people in Washington like to call "lift." France had a military which was very deficient in terms of long-haul air capability, and it had aircraft carriers with no planes. When it sent an aircraft carrier to the Gulf, during the build-up for instance, the deck was covered with trucks. And the pictures taken from the air of the aircraft carrier put out to sea(instead of being called a porte-avions it was called a porte-camions(it was very embarrassing for France. Now why didn't it have planes? Because the French wanted to build their own advanced fighter and they were way behind in doing so. They wanted to build their own long-haul aircraft and they were way behind in doing so, so when they wanted to send troops to Chad or Somalia or whatever, we quietly had to provide them with the lift. But there was really a very large degree, in the early '90s, between the French military and the United States, even thought the French minister of defense, Chev#nement, was quite a good friend of Iraq. He was not one whom we ideally would have chosen to be the French defense minister at that point.

Q: Let's follow through on the Gulf War. This is the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. How did that sit with the public and then with the French Government when it initially happened, before there was any response from anybody?

PENDLETON: Well, I think there was a tremendous amount of unhappiness about it in France, and for a variety of different reasons, some of which wouldn(t have been necessarily our first reasons. I mentioned the French defense minister, Chev#nement. He had been very anxious to build up French military sales to the Gulf, and people of his persuasion could see immediately that the invasion was going to be highly incompatible with that aim. It was going to be highly incompatible with France's desire to build up commercial relations in the entire region, and much of French foreign policy is commercially motivated. It would mean that (if the United States took this seriously, as it was pretty clear we were going to from the outset(we were going to have a situation in which France might wish to accept, possibly, what had happened, but that would not fit into its international construct. It might wish to see some kind of diplomatic compromise, and it certainly would not like to see at the outset any kind of war in the Gulf. It took a great deal of communication back and forth from August to January, right up to the end (the invasion being in August and the Gulf War in January-February) to convince the French through each step of the way that we were on track and that we knew what we were doing and that they should be with us. And as I've said repeatedly now, Bush played a very major role in communicating with Mitterrand. Secretary of State Baker also played a very major role by coming through Paris repeatedly and keeping the French fully apprized of where we were going. So did Secretary of Defense Cheney. And in the end, they came with us to a degree that I never would have expected.

Now the French were not using conscripts so that, in a way, the French public could accept the risk because those who were involved were all volunteers and Foreign Legion types and others this would not mean death in every little village around France if things went wrong. The French were also very concerned about the potential for terrorism in

France; that was another constricting element. But they were extremely vigorous about coping with terrorism. They not only, for instance, took every waste basket out of every M#tro station, which soon turned the M#tro stations into mammoth garbage bins, but they worked through the leaders of the Muslim communities in France and basically told them that "you spread the word that if there is one terrorist incident, you people will not be welcome here." This message was terrifying for those who had come across the Mediterranean from North Africa or had come from the Middle East and who wished to stay in France, frequently for economic reasons. The upshot was that nothing happened during the whole process. As we built towards war, the French were with us, and I never personally would have guessed that they would have allowed our planes to land and refuel and stay overnight, but they did, and it was fairly remarkable.

Now at the same time as the day on which battle was to be launched by us approached, France, on the diplomatic side, felt it had to show that it would go the extra mile, and Mitterrand made some suggestions which were not welcome in Washington, about diplomacy witlraqForeign Minister Tariq Aziz. We felt that we had to go an extra mile, too, and Baker had met with Tariq Aziz in Geneva and gotten nowhere.

Then, really very much at the end of the run-up to the war, Peres-de-Cuellar, UN secretary-general at that point, decided he would go out and meet with Saddam Hussein. That led me to involvement which was interesting in a sense, because he was going to come back from Baghdad and stop in Paris. We needed desperately to know what his view of the situation was after talking with Saddam Hussein. He had said he would not say until he got back to either Paris or New York(I can't remember which(but I was asked by the folks in Washington, on I believe it was a Sunday, to find him. But at that point he was on his private plane coming from Baghdad, and I literally made more than 200 phone calls looking for him, through New York, through UN types in Paris, through everybody I could think of, from hotel bellhops to anybody and keeping the ambassador and Washington up

to speed. And in the end he turned out to be in the Crillon Hotel, which was 20 feet from my office across Boissy d'Anglais Street on the Place de la Concorde in Paris.

Ambassador Walter Curley, Mark Lissfelt (the deputy chief of mission) and I went over to call on him in the hotel, at the first meeting I could arrange in the morning. It was pretty hairy. I kept getting calls the night before and that morning from the executive secretary of the Department, who was on Baker's plane, which at that point was flying from Europe to Canada. And the Secretary of State wanted to know immediately when we saw Peres, of course, what the upshot was. I told Ambassador Curley that I'd been getting these calls and that we would have to let them know straightaway on the Secretary's plane. We went over to the hotel and were shunted into a side bedroom, rather than into Peres-de-Cuellar's suite where he was receiving people. He had the Luxembourg foreign minister with him (Luxembourg at that point had the presidency of the EU), so we had to wait. Then to my horror, just as we were about to be received, the Russian ambassador came along. He had been the Soviet ambassador at the UN and knew Peres-de-Cuellar very well. Peres-de-Cuellar came out and saw the Russian ambassador and embraced him in a big bear hug. In the meantime, it thought, Oh, my God, my ambassador is going to be upstaged by the Russian ambassador and time is going by. So I threw my body in between them and said, "the American ambassador has been waiting there, and you've got to see him next," which fortunately is what happened. And basically Peres-de-Cuellar told us there wasn't any alternative to war, that Saddam Hussein had given him nothing, and that the moment had come to go ahead(which was very important news because it kind of uncorked the bottle.

We went back to the embassy, and I called the Secretary's plane, which was on the ground in Ottawa; and then I had a memorable disconnect with Ambassador Curley because he had forgotten that the Secretary's plane people had been demanding on his behalf to know right away. He had wanted to send a personal cable, which could be received on the plane, and I was to write the cable. When I told him that the Secretary had already been informed, he was not best pleased and made clear that my future lay

perhaps better in Washington than in Paris. However, the deputy chief of mission kindly reminded him that we had discussed the need to make a phone call, and I was able to stay on in Paris. But that was one snippet of the last days before the fighting started.

Q: How did the French react to the victory over Saddam Hussein?

PENDLETON: Oh, I think it was interesting. First of all, during the war, I think they were absolutely flabbergasted by some of the films they were shown of smart bombs and that sort of thing. The American military might and ability to put together a coalition was something that even the French found themselves in awe of, and initially after the victory there was a tremendous outpouring of respect for what the United States had done. It was quite unusual to have French people telling me that "God, the U.S. have done something just unbelievable."

But like so many of us, they quickly sobered up, and before very long they became quite French. I must say, when I heard that we'd stopped the war on the hundredth hour, I thought that was a very bad thing to do, that it was artificial, and that it probably would have meant that we hadn't thought about some elements that were involved. And the French, a lot of my French compatriots, thought that there was something artificial there, that we did not know adequately what we wanted to do after the war, and we were being very heavily blamed for not caring about what was going to happen to those who were against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, including in northern Iraq. And we had this situation in which Bush was shown on TV down playing golf in Florida. The French, who have a strong humanitarian impulse, for a lot of reasons, were beginning to beat the drum in terms of humanitarian aid for those who were still in Iraq and who were hostile to Saddam Hussein. They were under his gun and his chemical weapons. So it was interesting how quickly we got back to business as usual in which the French had some very strong concerns about how we were comporting ourselves, which they were not shy about registering and which started almost as soon as the war was over.

Q: I think(and this is from my interviews with people like our ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Chas Freeman, and Gordon Brown, who was the political advisor to our general, General Schwarzkopf, there(we didn't have an end game, and the hundred hours thing sounded very much like the boys sitting and Colin Powell and George Bush and all saying, "Wouldn't it sound nice to end the war and get the hell out of there?" It was not our finest hour.

PENDLETON: Well, I would agree with you. I've lamented that, and you wonder how it happened that when we had such a long time to build up an advance. But it's always harder to think about the unthinkable. I think we probably assumed that Saddam Hussein would not survive, that he would either be killed during the conflict or that he would be put aside by his own people very quickly. And that was just wrong.

I think the French are better than we are at trying to push through the thought process and look at the consequences and the peripheral by-play that comes from any action. And whether it's there Cartesian way of thinking(most of us are good at thinking about one thing, and we pat ourselves on the back when we think about two things. The French, because of their education, have to think about three things, and it sometime takes them a step further than we find convenient. In this case, some of their concerns were mine. But that is not to say that their interests were ours.

All this said, the French basically were incredibly generous about what we did in terms of the execution of the war itself. When Dick Cheney, as Secretary of Defense, came to pay his final respects to France as he was getting ready to retire, the French treated him with the kind of honor and esteem that only the French can muster. For instance, I went to the airport to meet him, which I thought was a mistake because I thought the Ambassador(I was acting deputy chief of mission(should do so at that point. But at any rate I was dispatched. Cheney arrived at the airport at Orly, about 15 miles south of Paris on the notoriously busy autoroute that goes from the Mediterranean to Paris. You can spend hours getting from Orly into town. Some people spent many hours that day

reaching Paris, and the reason was that the French closed the autoroute and allowed only Secretary Cheney's motorcade to be on it. And partway into Paris I pointed out to him that if he looked behind him and ahead of him he would see something he would never see on that road again in his life, which was that there wasn't another car but the ones that were with him. And even Dick Cheney, who is very down-to-earth Wyoming guy with a couple of years at Yale at a patina of some sort, was quite amused by that. That's the kind of great gestures the French can make.

I fear I amused him less. I made him talk about my vision of the new post-Cold War military, dealing with hurricanes and forest fires on top of its classic duties. I also pressed peacekeeping on him. He appeared tolerant of these notions and others but did not hesitate to make clear that he disagreed. A day later when I went to take him back to the airport, I saw he had a lot of morning reading to do and said I assessed he would like peace and quiet to focus on it. "You are damn right, Pendleton," he said.

Q: I'd hear things about the French troops that were there, including air, realizing that they really weren't that integrated into NATO and that they had to be almost assisted to find out where they were. I mean, they realized how much farther ahead NATO was than they were. Did that come through?

PENDLETON: Oh, yes, after the war there was a lot of talk on the part of the French about what lessons were learned, and part of it was the whole question of how does France deal with NATO? But here were other questions which they saw as more strictly French in nature. One was that they clearly didn't have any overhead capability, and they had to rely on us to brief them on what the French forces would be facing in the places where they were assigned. France, incidentally(I mentioned that they allowed the use of air bases(also, in an absolutely extraordinary way, allowed their troops to be placed under the command of foreigners. That had not happened since World War II and was an extraordinary gesture. Particularly since they had left the Integrated Military Command of NATO many years before.

France put the Gulf War behind them with a determination to beef up their intelligence capabilities dramatically if they could, and I think without a real sense of how expensive this would be. They, I think, became more realistic about what it meant to buy foreign planes if you have an aircraft carrier rather than to wait till you can have exactly what you want, which has "France" written on every possible component. They became quite obsessed with the whole question of lift and the ability to get to foreign points of conflict without having to rely on another air force, i.e., the United States Air Force. And there were a variety of lessons there, but underlying it all, as you suggest, was the whole question of working in the best integrated fashion with NATO and what it means to be involved. This came up almost immediately again and in terms of ex-Yugoslavia and how to manage that, because France supplies a large number of troops to the UN. The role of the UN and the role of NATO(what can you decide without having a UN resolution versus a NATO resolution, have become ongoing issues.

Q: Well, we'll move to Yugoslavia in a minute, but in Iraq, I was told somewhere, that Madame Mitterrand had taken the cause of the Kurds very much under her wing and that she, in a way, was the prime force for everything that developed with the Kurds, safe haven and support and all that. Was there anything to this, or not?

PENDLETON: Yes, she played a major role. Now her relationship with her husband wasn't very good, and yet she participated with him in all necessary functions. She had her own human rights organization which she spearheaded, and she indeed was very active in terms of supporting the Kurds. The French were very much prepared to involve themselves in it. They see themselves as people of a great humanitarian impulse, and this sometimes is a cynical approach, and it sometimes is a well-meaning approach, but the humanitarian side of it, —whether it's Doctors without Borders or the French Government involving itself in the guise of humanitarianism in, say, Rwanda,— at some point can be an important impulse. I wouldn't give Madame Mitterrand too much credit, but I would very

definitely give her substantial credit against the backdrop of what the public was perceiving as a result of watching TV.

Q: You were there up to '93. What was happening in Yugoslavia? Were we working with the French to try to do something about it, or were the French sort of saying, "We'll take care of it," or how did it go?

PENDLETON: We were working with the French, but we weren't' sure what we wanted to do; and they weren't totally sure, either, and it was messy(it was really quite messy because, of course, the situation on the ground was confused, and it didn't lead to clear-cut policy options on the part of anybody involved. We had, for instance, Req Bartholomew, who for a while was our point man on the former Yugoslavia. He came to have a day-long series of meetings with the French about options. And he kept getting up and going to the telephone every 20 minutes or so, to the annoyance of the French, but Reg kept getting new instructions all day long. And it was very clear that what we had in mind was a work-in-progress, and all we could do in terms of billing it to the French was to say, "You see, we're consulting with you. You always say we face you with a fait accompli. We're consulting with you as we work out our own approach to the issues involved, of which there are many, many layers. So you keep factoring it in." And this, in a way, brought out the traditional French apprehension of that clich# that we mentioned earlier about NATO, where the only time when the allies in NATO are more apprehensive than when the United States knows what it wants to do is when the United States doesn't know what it wants to do. I'm not phrasing it very elegantly, but that sentiment was running through. It was a bit of a shock, I think, to the French to see they were dealing with us at a moment when they really could influence our policies from the outset, and yet they seemed to me to want a better sense of direction on our part.

Q: Did you have any feeling in this early period of a certain thirst on the part of some in France who were saying, "Ah, at last, here is a European problem" (i.e., the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This was even before Bosnia got into it, but it was obviously out there), and

say, "This is a European problem, and we will give a European answer and butt out"? I mean, was there that?

PENDLETON: Not really. There was a strong sentiment that it would be very nice if Europe could solve this problem by itself and for once be Europe and not the transatlantic relationship, but I think anybody who had to deal with it recognized that the capability lay with NATO and that the United States still dominated NATO. How would you create an alternative mechanism? Now this brought up the whole question of what the EU might be able to do and what the US might be able to do in conjunction with the WEU, the Western European Union, by removing some forces from NATO, deploying them under the flag of the WEU and trying to handle it that way. But this was all ground which had never been tilled before in a meaningful way. It led to a great deal of concern on both sides about whether anything could be done in timely fashion. I think most Frenchmen who were going to deal with the issue recognized, on occasion with relief, that the United States had to be a player. Presidential indecision became even more noticeable when President Clinton replaced Bush. Clinton decided to step in vigorously, only rather late on, including his useful involvement before the Dayton Accords(but it had taken months and months to sort out in his own mind what to do.

Q: What about the dissolution of the Soviet Union? Did this happen gradually enough, or did this make any difference in our relations with France or your dealing with the French?

PENDLETON: Initially, I don't think it made as much of a difference as I would have expected. I think the French were as surprised as we were and are, with the speed that it all came about, and it led to many discussions, but it led more to a sharing of views that were useful on both sides. It seemed to me, looking back, that the unification of Germany is part of a process that was much more of a blockbuster for the French for historical reasons than the breakup of the Soviet Union per se. We were all feeling our way, but Jim Baker, in particular, I think, played an important role in trying to sort out our approach to the future with his Berlin speech, to the future. The French, I think, were encouraged to

hear what our thoughts were and didn't have any necessarily great apprehensions about where we might lead them in the process. As time went on, however, there was growing French apprehensions about the only remaining superpower and US "hegemony".

Q: Did you have any feel that the French were looking at Eastern Europe, which was now becoming unstuck from the Communist Bloc and saying, "Well, we'd better get in there and start turning this into a market," because obviously the Germans would be a major factor?

PENDLETON: This was a major French preoccupation from the outset. The French feared that the Germans would dominate all of Eastern Europe from the point of view of markets; and were extremely anxious to beef up their commercial approach to Eastern Europe. They saw this as a real opportunity, but one that they would have to hustle to make a dent in. While they were determined to do so, the trade statistics, I believe, suggested within a few years that they hadn't been particularly successful. The markets proved, in a way, to be a bit smaller than they had thought. The Germans were indeed very active, and the French also have a strong cultural commitment to making sure that French language and that French culture is extended as far as it possibly can(to wit, their interest in Romania, for instance, their interests in ties with the Czech Republic. In terms of contacts among peoples, it is astonishing how Europe changed during the time I was in Paris. For instance, I had some old Czech friends from my days in Ghana who lived in Pilsen, in Czechoslovakia. We have kept in touch over the years, but it was not easy without endangering them, with me being an American diplomat. We had to be in touch on those occasions when they could leave the country. Well, after the wall came down and after the Soviet Union collapsed, we invited them to come and visit us in Paris. I had noticed that every weekend there were literally hundreds of buses from Czechoslovakia that came to France, to Paris, to see the City of Light, which was practically like the capital of Czechoslovakia in the minds of many Czechs. They weren't very warmly welcomed by the French because they brought their own food(they couldn't afford to spend a dime(and slept on the bus and went home again.

We invited our friends, and they were supposed to arrive at our house midmorning on a given day, and they appeared at 6:30 in the morning. I said, "Jeez, how did you get here so fast?" They said, well, the bus picked them up in Pilsen(this was just a regular intercity busy("picked us up in Pilsen at five in the afternoon, and we stopped at the border with Germany for about a minute and a half, and then we came on through" And for those of us who thought of Europe with these boundaries and barbed wire, just listening to them saying, "and we came on through" (it was a real reminder of how things had changed.

For their part, the French saw that you could go the other way. Out in the Place de la Concorde, for instance, this isn't commerce, but there were trucks there, and if you wanted to send a package to a city in Poland, you'd go throw your package in the Poland truck, and it would be delivered the next morning. If you wanted to do Hungary, you threw it in the Hungary truck. And off they would go, overnight, and the package would be delivered. Europe was changing vastly at the human level, of people traveling, and at the same time the French wanted to get a hold of all these changes.

I mentioned Romania. One of the things that reminded me that the United States optic and the French optic are rather different on international affairs was the revolution in Romania and the killing of Ceausescu in December of 1989. It happened about the same week that we invaded Panama. And I, of course, was under orders to get French support for the invasion of Panama. When you went to French officials, all they wanted to talk about was Romania. And all you'd see on French TV was Romania, endless shots of the Romanian revolution and then a trailer of a few seconds of what was happening in Panama. And it was a reminder that the US and France are different countries with a different view of the world, and that we're in the Western Hemisphere. Even when Colin Powell came over a bit later to help brief on what we'd done(and he was by no means the legend that he became later(the French were slightly bemused that we would send a four-star around to brief them on Panama.

And then a Romanian speaker who'd been educated in Toulouse and who spoke fluent French, Peter Romano, became the president of Romania, and that excited the French tremendously. Anne Sinclair, who was the kind of Barbara Walters of France had him on, and couldn't stop complimenting him on his French. While watching, I was reminded that nobody seemed to know all that much about him in the United States Government, and it occurred to me that if he'd been educated in Toulouse there might still be professors there who remembered him. So our able consul general, Judith Heimann, went up from Bordeaux, at our request, and found a professor who still put Romano up every summer for his holidays. We got some insight into him as a person and as a potential leader from that we otherwise wouldn't have had. And we wouldn't have had that insight if we hadn't had the consulate in Bordeaux, which has since been closed, because the consul general had already met the professor. This little episode was a reminder of the price we pay when we have to close consulates.

Q: Just how did you see the role of the Ambassador during these turbulent times, Walter Curley, because he was not a professional, and I would think it a difficult time?

PENDLETON: It was a difficult time, and I don't know quite how to say it, but Walter Curley had a great fondness for France and a great interest in things financial and commercial and cultural and less of an interest in some of the political issues which preoccupied us. I think it's fair to say that in the time I worked for him, only once did he ask to see the foreign minister, and only once did he see the foreign minister, Roland Dumas, in something other than an informal way, such as at a dinner or a cocktail party or reception or something of that nature. During the Gulf War, everything got ratcheted up and there were instructions in no uncertain terms that ambassadors should deal with particular issues. It was a little bit more difficult to gain the entr#e than you would think, even though the stakes were extremely high. Whether the ambassador would respond was an issue that obviously, for those of us working in the embassy, was of concern because, while the Ambassador's willingness to plunge into some of the most complex economic and commercial and

cultural issues was manifest, we felt a little bit limited by his lack of enthusiasm for political d#marches. And the French are so hierarchical that if you top off(I was the number three person in the embassy(at the number three, they take note of that, and the access you have is much more limited. And the deputy chief of mission had a great many challenges to face just running an embassy that included 1100 people(everything from the Battle Monuments Commission to the consulates were under the embassy(

Q: Who was the DCM?

PENDLETON: Mark Lissfelt. For him it was a challenge to get spun up on some of the issues. The embassies issues were global. The world was our oyster. I'm not talking about just the war; I learned more about, say, timber and mineral smuggling along the Thai-Cambodian border while serving in France than I ever thought I would want to know, much less need to know. You had to study extremely hard to keep on top of these substantive issues, which a political counselor could do, but a deputy chief of mission who has the FBI representative banging on his door and the DEA representative banging on his back door and at the same time the INS representative trying to waylay him in the cafeteria couldn't easily involve himself in every substantive issue that came along.

So for us it was a challenge, and certain things got done in Washington that I wish had been done in Paris. Now when Avis Bohlen came as a deputy chief of mission, involvement on the political side of the top two in the embassy changed. Avis had a very strong history of living in France, speaking impeccable French, knowing the French, being sympathetic to French concerns and understanding how to interpret them to Americans who might be more skeptical than she. She also had a kind of intellectual and personal drive that was fairly remarkable. Moreover, the arrival of Ambassador Pamela Harriman made a difference. She was determined to make her mark. She was uncertain about the issues, but she arrived with a kind of energy and commitment which was(with respect to mastering some of the tough concerns, at least when I saw her during the initial part of her tenure — really quite remarkable. And she got involved, at that point, anyway, in issues

that previously did not get attention at the ambassadorial level. She also paid attention to French officials who had never had attention paid, and of course they responded.

Q: What sort of issues would these be?

PENDLETON: Well, they ranged from some very complex arms control issues to concerns of the Treasury Attache. She not only went to make d#marches, but when we had the undersecretary for security affairs visiting, she did what she did so well, which was to throw a working dinner. There wasn't much work done at the dinner but it brought into the residence level after level of French officials involved in the issues, from the top down to the working level. They were just astonished to be invited and caught in that net and were flattered and honored. Of course, she had quite a remarkable ability to make people feel at home and important. And this helped to open more doors in the future.

With the help of numerous briefings, she took on some terribly complex issues related to finance that were fraught with potential downsides and even went public to a degree on top of her private d#marches. But she just waded in and saw people, at least initially, and called on people who were not used to having the embassy come knocking on their door. It was, to me, quite impressive.

Q: On the personal side, was your wife able to operate as a lawyer and an investment banker in France?

PENDLETON: Yes, fortunately, and that was due (a) in part to her capabilities and training and (b) in part to the fact that her father had been a British diplomat and she'd been registered as a British subject at birth. So Elisabeth had a British passport and could work in London and then later in Paris. In London, she worked for a French bank, Paribas, as a lawyer out on the trading floor, doing largely swaps and options. When I moved to Paris, she stayed in London and continued working there until she could organize a move to the French headquarters of Paribas, which she did, and she found that was really quite difficult working environment. In London it had been an international environment; her

boss was an Australian, for instance. In Paris, the headquarters was almost all French, and she was the only American in the French headquarters — and without 5+/5+ French —. Along the way she was head hunted by an American insurance company called AIG. American International Group, which is our biggest overseas insurance company. They were making so much money they set up a bank to invest and reinvest it. Not only were they doing swaps and options, but all sorts of complex derivatives. So Elisabeth moved to join them at their Paris operation, a twelve-minute walk from our grand representational apartment on Avenue Kleber, again out on the trading floor and had guite an experience. When I left France after four years, she stayed on for a year and a half. She continued to work for them as she undertook to line up a job at the World Bank here. But fundamentally my wife was the principal breadwinner in our family for the time that we were at our last two posts, which is unusual, to say the least, and I include in that even the value of the housing and schooling and things that we were provided by the US Government. I am terribly proud of her and proud to be her husband. So to me that was a relief on a variety of fronts, particularly in view of the leukemia which by that point I was being treated for at the Hotel Dieu Hospital near the cathedral.

Q: So, in '93, you went where?

PENDLETON: I came back and became a professor at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University at Fort McNair, which is the sister school to the National War College, where I'd been a student in the class of 1980.

Q: And you did this from '93 to when?

PENDLETON: I did it for two years, '93 to '95. And part of the rationale for that assignment was, again, having had to turn down a variety of things which might have been really seductive if I had been able to go to the places where they were. But I had always enjoyed the teaching process and threw myself into that with some gusto. At the senior service colleges you are dealing with students who are at the mid-level of their career,

lieutenant-colonels, colonels and State Department officers who are looking towards greater responsibilities in the not very distant future. I taught political science and some industry studies, including health care. I did things ranging from organizing a mock country-team meeting for the entire student body, where we had people argue about human rights versus commercial interests in China and most-favored-nation in a way that was really realistic. Or one day at about six o'clock at night, I was stepping outside and I saw Justice Souter of the Supreme Court jogging by. He and I had been proctors together at Harvard years before, and I said, "David, you've got to come in here and talk to the students." And he kindly agreed to speak to the students at the point in the course where we were studying the Constitution. He has done that every year since. He was in there last month, too. That sort of thing. I had some fun and met a lot of really very interesting and impressive students and faculty members. Sadly, one of my students and advisees was Julian Bartley, who along with his son was killed in the bombing in Nairobi in August. Julian taught me a lot, and I'm sure he taught a lot of others great deal. He will be missed, as they say.

Q: Well, then, after this period, had you felt that basically because of your health problems that this removed you from moving ahead. This sounds like it, because usually for a career officer, you almost have to go to a more "difficult" country to continue one's upward progress, because the more industrialized countries are usually handed over to political appointees.

PENDLETON: Well, I certainly had that as a part of the equation. I remember my wife and I were together in London in 1989 when we were told by the doctor about my illness, and my first reactions was damn, there goes the rest of my career. It's not the only factor, of course, and I think to a large measure that's right, and one has to adjust, but it's always painful if you've spent so many... I had jobs that really took me away from my family much of the time even when we were in the same city. And I thought but for that, which wasn't my fault, that I would continue and that there would be some reward that my family would appreciate. Now, of course, you can't tell somebody that you had those two hardship

posts, London and Paris, without evoking groans of "God, I never got out of Lubumbashi." I feel very blessed about the fact that I had absolutely fascinating assignments, that my incredible wife was also able to work, which relieved some of my fears about her long-term situation and that of our kids. But, yes, it would have changed if I had been able to jump in every direction.

When I was at the Industrial College it was clear I would have one more assignment before I would have to retire, and incidentally, they changed the retirement rules along the way so that instead of having to retire when I thought I was going to, practically in my 40s, they allowed a combination of years at the so-called OC (one-star level) and MC (two-star level) together so that I could stay longer than I had expected to. That was done by the director general with a stroke of the pen, and I wish he had done it earlier. What we were doing was losing all the people who had been promoted the fastest, while those who were keeping one jump ahead of the sheriff were able to work till they were 65. And that affected my thinking, too, about the question of the future. I decided that I would like after retirement to work on environmental issues, health permitting, and I took a tack at the end which was quite unexpected and went to OES to run the green environmental office, called the Office of Ecology and Terrestrial Conservation.

Q: OES is?

PENDLETON: Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science. It's not a bureau which readily attracts Foreign Service officers. It attracts civil servants more readily because it deals with issues ranging from climate change, the export of toxic wastes, a whole range of complex scientific issues, fisheries issues, et cetera, where a scientific background and long-term experience is often extremely valuable in some hideously complex negotiations. And it also doesn't attract Foreign Service officers as much as it might because it is not considered career-enhancing in terms of good onward assignments overseas. OES did not have regional offices of its own and those who have been EST officer (environment, science and technology officers) overseas have not always prospered in the promotion

wars to the degree that they should, —in terms of the importance to our country of the issues involved—.

But I was fascinated by the thought of undertaking this challenge, and it led to some of the most difficult involvement in negotiations that I've been in my entire career in the State Department, particularly on something called biosafety, which is the trans-boundary movement of living modified organisms. Today, for instance, if our biotech industries are developing a better pest-resistant tomato or a tomato which you will be able to store longer and they're doing it by injecting a peanut gene into it, how do you alert the consumer, if you do, that there may be a peanut gene in this tomato and that if he's allergic to peanuts and might succumb from the allergy, he had better not eat that tomato as against another tomato. Writ large, the issues involved in biosafety are of fundamental concern to our country. For instance, if a ship is headed toward Argentina with sovbeans, and it has 12,000 tons of soybeans aboard and two pounds happen to be genetically modified, will the ship be allowed to unload its wares (and if not, what will that do to American agriculture and the American biotech industry? There is a protocol to what is called the Convention on Biological Diversity, which is being drafted and which in danger of creating a regime that would really hamper American exports across the board because of not being able to prove that there's no commingling of biologically engineered elements. Among a great many other things, I had to take the lead in working an interagency process trying to come up with a US position on this. That was extremely demanding, before you even got into trying to sell it to countries overseas, because you had at one end of the table USTR and the Commerce Department(

Q: US trade representative.

PENDLETON: (US trade representative(and the Agriculture Department, all very interested in sales; you had at the other end of the table the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, et cetera, all interested in the question of harm and risk. And how to reach agreement on a balancing of the equities? If

you were dealing with the Middle East peace process, as we see with the Wye discussions today, if you get stuck you can go to the Secretary of State, you can go to the President. That doesn't mean you'll succeed, but you have some recourse. When you're dealing with these scientific issues, it's extremely difficult to bring in people very high on the food chain in order to sort them out. In OES I had a marvelous political appointee boss, Rafe Pomerance, who was the deputy Assistant Secretary. He was very active. Biosafety is just an example of the tough biodiversity sort of issues that we were involved in. But it was hard to get above the Assistant Secretary(it was Eileen Claussen(even though we had a very active undersecretary in Tim Wirth. There was no way that his portfolio, which went from population to women's rights, could allow him to be the master of complex scientific issues on a daily basis. So you had to work it out, and everybody in the interagency process recognized you had to work it out at a relatively low level. Everybody in the interagency process wanted the State Department in the chair, because we had a reputation of being more balanced and less engaged on a lifetime basis and perhaps more fair-minded about the equities than were some of the other cabinet departments.

We did that; we did forest negotiations; we did endangered species; we had the man and the Biosphere secretariat in the office, which threw me into a great many issues related to land use in the United States, batting your head up against the Alaska delegation in Congress, et cetera; and federal issues, incredibly complex and loaded politically.

Q: Did any of these resolve themselves? I mean, do they resolve themselves, or do they sort of hang out there?

PENDLETON: The toughest negotiations hang out there because they take years. It's a little bit like climate change. There are other issues you can have a strong impact on. Forest issues go on and on in the international arena, and we had my deputy, Stephanie Caswell, who is known as the "forest lady" in the Department. She handled the forest negotiations brilliantly, but I suspect that her grandchildren will still be dealing with them if we haven't cut all the forests down in the meantime. Endangered species issues are

frequently driven by the dates of international meetings, as so much of diplomacy is. What had to be decided by the time of those meetings often was decided. But issues related to forests or migratory birds tended to go on and on and they needed to be tended with great care. Other issues such as coral reefs we managed to greater or lesser degree depending who was in charge of international meetings. We have built a coalition called the International Coral Reef Initiative that would take a global approach to coral reefs. We realized along the way that maybe enough had been launched on a global basis so that we should look more at regional involvement of regional stakeholders in more highly targeted approaches. So the initiative evolved and we were able, with a certain amount of leaning at the political level, to pass the baton of the secretariat to Australia and move it further, we hoped, after Australia into a third world axis. But fundamentally, you don't solve environmental issues; you cope with them, and you come up with the best solutions that you can. You can also try to keep your sanity in the process.

Q: I'm told on many of these issues what we call the less fortunate countries, less economically developed making the point of "Now you people are talking about environmental concerns and everything else. You've done a real number on your area. You haven't paid attention to the environment while you got to where you are. Now you're concerned about the environment and we're down here means you stay where you are and we're trapped down below. Is this thrown at you a lot?

PENDLETON: Yes. It's a perpetual cry and an understandable one. I guess you see it most nakedly in terms of dealing with the Chinese on issues such as the Three Gorges Dam. The decision by the National Security Advisor and the President that Ex-Im Bank couldn(t be involved in supporting the sale of US goods, turbines or Caterpillar tractors for the dams, which, of course, opened up the way for foreign competition to just prance in. Our decision was made for environmental reasons. When you talked to the Chinese, until very recently, they have just said, "Look, we understand the environmental argument, but we're over a billion people. We've got to feed those people. We've got to put the economy first, and there's simply no way that we can be responsive to your concerns at

this particular juncture in our development. We will get to that, but we've got to get over some hurdles in the meantime." We ourselves here in the United States have been quite open about trying to share with others the lessons we have learned. For instance, Tim Wirth went down to South America to visit the Pantanal, which is the largest marsh area in the world. He met at that point, also further south, with the Paraguayan Government, including Wasmosy, the president of Paraguay. Wasmosy comes from a family which owns large construction companies which benefit from getting work which the president can send their way on dams, bridges, culverts, flood control items, etc. He was planning to do work in Paraguay which would have an impact on the Pantanal and the Brazilians and other adjoining countries, in terms of flood control and rivers. So Tim Wirth invited him to come up and visit the Everglades and visit the Lower Mississippi and see, basically, our remediation efforts based on the mistakes we made when we undertook a lot of lavish works during the last half century. Eventually Wasmosy came. It was a big headache because he felt that we should pay for the whole trip, and we had no money. The State Department never has money. I spent an inordinate amount of time trying to find the funding for them. We eventually did get him here and gave him a good tour, and then he lost his job. You never know. You just have to keep trying. That's fairly typical of what can happen.

We also in the biosafety debate find that because there are a great many countries with no particular independent science capability, they tend to rely on international NGOs which are very concerned about risk, and to buy the line on risk and not to buy the line on the need to have food supplies for growing populations—what is called food security. There is the very real danger that the world is going to limit American exports in a way that will be totally unhealthful to a great many countries. The decisions may well be taken for reasons that are political, sometimes affected by bribery, sometimes affected by ignorance. What are we going to do if we have a Sudan starvation situation and we try to send food aid to a country like Sudan but that country accepted the Protocol and some of the food includes genetically modified materials—as an increasing amount of our food crops in the

United States do? They're not going to accept it and let the people starve? The nations of the world are going to have to think a lot harder about the implications of some of these technological developments than we have been able to bring ourselves to do. I noticed in August that somebody got former-President Carter to write an op-ed piece in The New York Times about this particular issue. It may stem from his Africa adventures, but he's very worried about food security as against the occasional danger from harm and hazards. And harm and hazards can mean things like the introduction of species which get out of hand in the center of origin of a crop. Or you think that you're sending a modified form of corn back, but it escapes and becomes a great weed. That could be a difficulty for a receiving country. All these issues have to be much better studied and understood, but they really are the cutting edge of where we're going in many respects.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher got that religion, for whatever reason, at the end of his tenure and began to become quite involved in environmental issues, maybe for the sake of his grandchildren. I don't know what motivated him, but when he was Secretary in his last year, he spent really an inordinate amount of time on environmental issues when initially he probably had nothing to do with them.

Q: From your perspective was this good?

PENDLETON: Oh, yes. I say "inordinate" in the sense that it was inordinate in terms of what he had done before. It was just a kind of changing of the ship. But he forced every bureau and department to come up with environmental plans, to include the environment in their forward thinking. He made sure that talking points for meetings with foreign leaders included environmental points, et cetera, some of which didn't help to calm relations with some foreign officials.

But it was quite fascinating to watch, and Eileen Claussen, who could be devilishly difficult to work with, actually worked well with Christopher (she was the Assistant Secretary for Oceans, Environment and Science) in forcing this and trying to use his growing interest.

She succeeding to a degree, in getting more resources for the bureau. The inevitable battle, but the bureau really did need more resources; it needed more human resources, and it needed more money to push issues ahead, even so that you could go to all the negotiations where we needed to be represented.

One thing we were never able to do was to get high enough up on the roster of treaties to be confirmed by the Senate. A lot of these environmental treaties, some of which, like Law of the Sea have been sitting out there for decades... The Rio Treaty, the Convention on Biological Diversity, has never been ratified. There are over a hundred treaties we have up waiting to go to the Hill or sitting on the Hill. Part of it is that Senator Helms's one assistant who deals with treaties doesn(t like to cope with more than one at a time, and that generally appears to please the Senator just fine. There always seems to be something which gets ahead in the gueue. But what it does for us internationally is to mean that we are not a party to very important international treaties which almost all other nations have ratified. The Convention on Biological Diversity is one of them. The Convention on Desertification, which we were strong advocates of, is another. So when we go to the follow-on sessions, which deal with issues like biosafety with major impact on US interests, we are in the same position as a one-person NGO or the Girl Scouts or whoever wishes to go along and participate in the meetings. We don't have the status of a nation. Now we try to use our muscle to get as much status as we can, but when it comes right down to voting, it's unfortunate that as a great nation we can't untangle these things.

Q: Well, Kim, is there anything else we should discuss, do you think?

PENDLETON: I think you patience has been beyond admiration.

Q: No, it's very interesting. Well, might we close a bit. You retired in, what, '98? '97?

PENDLETON: The fall of 1997, and came over to the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the career transition seminar. I thought I would have an easier time finding a full-time job than I have. I've been close but no cigar on a variety of things, and I have been

reminded that while I've worked through the years with some of the most admirable people vou can imagine, some of the most capable people vou can imagine, some of the most under-rewarded in terms of pay, compared to some of their brothers and sisters who are lawyers and bankers or whatever, in the great wide world one had to beware that foreign service continues to seem to most Americans to be very foreign and a bit dangerous and perhaps more focused on the interests of others than on ourselves. I don't think that we're ever going to be able to change that view, either on the Hill or in the greater community. But it's interesting to be interviewed by a fair number of people who have betrayed to me their apprehensions about having to spend time with somebody who's spent so much time overseas. And that has been a sad part of my retirement phase because I just was over in London, where you retire from the Foreign Office on your 60th birthday, and if you've been at all responsible during your career you can move almost automatically into something else that's challenging and lucrative. I had lunch, for instance, with a 70-year-old former British diplomat who for the last decade has been at a major international investment bank. He looks forward to working there till he's 80. It happens but I do not see this so much in the United States, and I now encourage my colleagues to do something that used to annoy the hell out of me, —which is to bail out before you are forced out, no matter how August your position, if you are really tempted by something which may keep you going for the next decade.

At any rate, I leave the Foreign Service with tremendous respect for what so many of our colleagues do and contribute really quite selflessly, and it's not just the ones who have the bad luck to be killed but I just know, from serving in small posts in Africa and large posts in Europe, that people don't push the cookies; they usually push themselves, and I think it's in the taxpayers' interest. So enough said there.

Q:	Gr	eat
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Summary Statement of Miles S. Pendleton, Jr.CLL Patient and Research Funding Advocate

Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies

Thank you Senator Harkin, Senator Specter, and members of this Committee. My name is Miles Pendleton. For three decades I was a U.S. Foreign Service Officer. For twelve years I have had Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia, known as CLL.

In CLL, a subtype of white blood cells known as lymphocytes clog the body, crowding out the good cells in the blood and marrow. They are relentless and refuse to die. My body is also residually impregnated with a decade of harsh toxins from oral chemo and infusions through the arm that kill good and bad cells alike. These toxins cause me nausea, fatigue and mental disorientation. As we say in the Foreign Service, all this is not "career enhancing."

But as you can imagine from looking at me, this room is full of courageous blood disorder patients who are worse off than I am. Despite being heavily treated over the years, I am determined to beat back this dragon with the help of all those who are doing CLL research. In that process, no institution is more central than NCI and no army in the field is more important than the recently established CLL Research Consortium, which needs a higher level of funding now.

When I was told I have leukemia, I was running the Political Section at the U.S. Embassy in London and was called out of a meeting to be informed by a doctor - on the phone and all too briefly - that I had leukemia. But the "good" chronic kind. Let me assure you, there is no good leukemia. Soon I was told I could expect to live five years at least. I heard five years. I was 48. My wife and I suddenly had to ponder all the inevitable questions about the future of our family and careers as we faced my mortality.

We are all encouraged to take a tape recorder to the first meeting with the doctor who diagnoses us and invites us to come in for a little chat about our blood test. That is because after we hear the word "leukemia," we generally will not remember a thing.

A few words about CLL and the effort to cure it, particularly through the CLL Research Consortium funded by the National Cancer Institute. CLL is the most common form of adult leukemia. More voters in each of your states have this form of leukemia than any other. There are about 100,000 of us alive at any given time. Nobody really knows what triggers CLL and what to target. To date, CLL can't be cured. Indeed, we are not living any longer in the aggregate than when I graduated from college 40 years ago.

CLL is similar to AIDS in the way it destroys patients' health and lives. While many of us live only three to five years, many others survive for ten years - or measurably longer, struggling in most cases with bedeviling complications. CLL is truly a devastating disease.

I am glad to say that there is now an accelerating measure of hope on the research from. The CLL Research Consortium, in particular, is a remarkable initiative. Thanks to NCI, a small cadre of researchers at centers ranging from Boston to La Jolla is attempting to find a cure. The Consortium was started last year with an NCI program project grant of \$16.5 million to be shared among nine institutions over four years. It is a humble sum when divided up. The grant is exactly the same amount Mrs. Casey spent to buy land on Foxhall Road here in Washington for a new residence for our mayors.

To my astonishment, the Consortium is unique in that for the first time in NCI history it brings together the nation's top researchers on a given type of cancer from different disciplines to conduct an integrated program of basic and clinical research. It is also unique in that it brings together many of the great battleships of the cancer wars, ranging from Dana Farber to M.D. Anderson under the leadership of Dr. Thomas Kipps of UC San Diego. It is a model.

There is already evidence that cross fertilization among these leading research institutions which might not otherwise work together is generating life-saving insights, not only about CLL but about many other types of cancers as well. The interaction is already generating new opportunities - opportunities that can't be pursued vigorously at present funding levels.

More specifically, more funding is now needed by the Consortium for a stronger research infrastructure, to support further clinical trials on at least six new agents, to fund additional institutional participation, attract additional researchers - particularly in gene therapy, to support expensive data and tissue flow and to encourage the kind of breakthroughs that would attract even more support. The recently approved (and often quite harsh) antibodies like Rituxan and Campath are not enough, although desperate refractory patients welcome them. They are not a cure, but they show what can be done to prolong life.

In conclusion, there is report language going ahead in both the Senate and House strongly urging NCI to expand the scope of Consortium research activities. But as Senator Specter has said about such hortatory language, "druthers do not make dollars." It is dollars that are needed now by NCI and the Consortium - about \$20 million of them to make the kind of major CLL breakthroughs that are tantalizingly close. Thank you very much.

End of interview